Employment protection, innovation and the labor market by Bastgen, Andreas
Employment Protection, Innovation and the
Labor Market
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
2016
vorgelegt von
Andreas Bastgen
Referent: Christian Holzner
Koreferent: Timo Wollmershäuser
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Preface
This dissertation analyzes how employment protection legislation (EPL) and technological
change affect the labor market. EPL is a main institutional feature of the labor market.
Typically, it is meant to provide job security to workers by restricting firms possibility to
layoff workers. Technological change is widely recognized as key contributor to economic
growth including the growth of real wages. However, as far as technological change is
skill-biased unfavorable distributional side-effects may arise.
The main goal of EPL is to provide higher job security to workers. Risk averse work-
ers value stable employment relationships as they provide constant income streams. In
addition, EPL strengthens the bargaining power of incumbent workers. On the other
side, EPL reduces firm profits as firms may not optimally respond to negative shocks.
Either they have to pay firing costs or to operate with a suboptimal amount of workers.
The EPL effect on employment is theoretically ambiguous. The value of employing a
worker is clearly decreasing in firing costs. Thus, in a frictionless labor market EPL will
always cause a decline in employment. However, in a frictional labor market EPL may
positively affect aggregate employment via lower turnover. The canonical Mortensen-
Pissarides (MP) search and matching model is able to reflect this theoretical ambiguity
(see for example Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)).
Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) use data on the adoption of wrongful-dismissal
laws by U.S. state courts to empirically assess employment effects of EPL. They find
robust evidence that one wrongful-dismissal doctrine, the implied-contract exception, sig-
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nificantly reduces state employment rates by 0.8% to 1.7%. Chapter 2 of this dissertation
develops an theoretical model to show that the employment effect of EPL depends on
the composition (rationing versus frictional) of unemployment. Model predictions are
empirically tested using the same legal dataset as Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006).
Evidence for the effect of EPL on productivity is also mixed. Clearly EPL restrains
worker reallocation. As many papers (see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), Disney,
Haskel, and Heden (2003), Baldwin and W.Gu (2006) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and
Scarpetta (2009) among others) identify worker reallocation as a key source of produc-
tivity growth, a negative association between EPL and productivity seems to be likely.
In addition, implementation and enforcement costs associated with EPL may further de-
press productivity. However, the literature also identified several channels working in the
opposite direction. Pierre and Scarpetta (2004a), for example, show that EPL incentivize
firms to invest more in training. Zoega and Booth (2003) show that firing costs internalize
a quitting externality, which arises because firms discount the value of general human cap-
ital at a higher rate than society. Similarly, Belot, Boone, and Ours (2007) and Wasmer
(2006) argue that EPL provides an incentive for workers to invest in firm-specific capital.
Another strand of the literature investigates how EPL affects innovation. Koeniger
(2005) develops a model to analyze the effect of EPL on innovation in the context of
product market competition. As EPL makes exit more costly and more advanced firms
endogenously exit with smaller probability, EPL provides a dynamic incentive to inno-
vate. Saint-Paul (2000) analyzes EPL and innovation through the lens of international
specialization. He shows that countries with strict EPL tend to specialize in improving
existing products, rather than introducing new products. Acharya, Baghai, and Sub-
ramanian (2014) exploit the staged adoption of wrongful dismissal laws in the U.S. to
show that EPL spurs innovation and new firm creation. To explain these empirical find-
ings Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) argue that EPL limits employers’ ability
to hold up innovating employees and in turn encourages employees to innovate. Chapter
1 of this dissertation develops an alternative theoretical model to explain the empirical
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findings of Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014). In this model, EPL increases
firm’s willingness to pay for new product innovations. This shifts economic activity to-
wards firms specializing in innovation and triggers entry of start-ups. In turn, innovation,
measured by the number of new products per period, increases.
There already exists substantial literature on the labor market effects of technological
change. Most empirical evidence indicates that higher productivity is not harmful for
aggregate employment: for example, van Ark, Frankema, and Duteweerd (2004) found a
strong correlation between per capita income, productivity, and employment at least in
the medium term. Other papers (see Basu, Fernald, and KimKimball (2006) and Kim,
Lim, and Park (2010)) find that positive technology shocks cause lower employment only
in the very short run, but higher employment in the medium run. Using the label skill-
biased technological change (SBTC), many authors argue that technological change often
has very heterogeneous effects on different kinds of workers. Dustmann, Ludsteck, and
Schönberg (2009) find that technological change is an important explanation for the widen-
ing of the wage distribution in Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. El-Sahli and Upward
(2015) find that the introduction of containerization in the UK port industry has caused
the decline of some occupations (e.g. stevedores). Autor and Dorn (2013) point out that
SBTC is not monotonic across wage percentiles: many low-paid jobs done by unskilled
workers can be classified as service type jobs, which are hardly automatable. In fact, real
wages and employment in such jobs have strongly grown relative to higher paid jobs with
high degrees of routinization. The associated decline in middle-paid jobs has been labeled
labor market polarization. The latter is strongly connected to the idea, that technological
change actually is not skill-biased but task biased. Using Norwegian data Akerman,
Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015) find that well-educated workers performing abstract, non-
routine tasks seem to benefit disproportionately from broadband internet adoption by
firms. In contrast, low-skilled workers performing repetitive tasks suffer wage and em-
ployment losses. The third chapter of this dissertation empirically investigates whether
similar effects can be found using German data.
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In the following, I briefly outline the research questions analyzed in each of the three
chapters and highlight their key results and contributions. The first chapter is motivated
by the empirical finding that EPL lowers productivity and employment (see Autor, Dono-
hue, and Schwab (2006)), but boosts innovation (see Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian
(2014)). As noted above Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) explain the posi-
tive innovation effect by arguing that EPL incentivizes workers to innovate. The main
contribution of our model is to provide a novel mechanism of how employment protec-
tion stimulates innovation consistent with empirical evidence. To do so, we develop a
search and matching model in which EPL increases firms willingness to pay for innova-
tions (product ideas). The intuition goes as follows: with EPL, firms do not layoff their
workforce after an adverse idiosyncratic productivity shock. Hence, they employ more
workers when searching for a trading partner in the innovation market. With many un-
productive workers employed, the marginal benefit of obtaining a new product idea is
large and thus is the willingness to pay for a new product idea. The latter stimulates new
entry of research firms and thus triggers a higher equilibrium level of innovation. In a
nutshell, our argument is based on EPL changing industrial composition instead of EPL
changing incentives for individual workers within organizations.
The second chapter addresses the classical question whether EPL increases or decreases
unemployment. This is done by using the concept of rationing unemployment, which
was recently popularized by the seminal paper of Michaillat (2012). The chapter first
develops a small search and matching model with rigid wages, diminishing returns to
labor and firing costs. Rationing unemployment (defined as the level of unemployment,
which prevails even in the absence of search frictions) arises once the marginal product
of the least productive worker falls short of the real wage. The difference between actual
employment and the hypothetical employment level without search frictions is denoted
as search unemployment. Search frictions are absent, if either vacancy posting costs
are zero or matching efficiency is infinity. The model predicts that EPL increases the
rationing but decreases the search component of unemployment. The latter happens as
EPL lowers market tightness by lowering turnover. Lower market tightness reduces the
IV
time needed to match with a new worker which finally leads to lower effective recruiting
costs. Hence, the total effect of EPL depends crucially on unemployment composition. If
unemployment is mainly driven by job rationing, EPL strongly increases unemployment.
In contrast, if search frictions are the main driver of unemployment, EPL may even lower
unemployment. Note that the share of rationing unemployment is increasing in the total
level of unemployment. This implies that for a given matching efficiency EPL entails
adverse employment effects in particular if pre-treatment unemployment is already high.
The second part of the chapter empirically assesses the model’s prediction. I exploit a
natural experiment, which has occurred in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s
(see Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006)). By the late 1970s, several U.S. state courts
began to adopt wrongful-dismissal laws. Using this variation, I test whether the employ-
ment effect of different wrongful-dismissal laws depends on pre-treatment unemployment
(employment) rates. Results indicate that for two of the three wrongful-dismissal laws
investigated, pre-treatment unemployment rates are crucial for the induced employment
effects. Under the assumption of a constant matching efficiency across U.S. states these
results confirm the prediction of my theoretical model.
The third chapter empirically investigates whether broadband internet can be classified
as skill-biased technological change (SBTC). Using German labor market data from the
IAB, we analyze how broadband affects output elasticities and wages of different workers.
Following the task-based interpretation of SBTC, we classify workers by job routiniza-
tion. As a robustness check, we also group workers by formal education. Regarding
identification, we argue that conditional on county and time fixed effects the variation in
broadband is plausibly exogenous to our outcome variables (see Akerman, Gaarder, and
Mogstad (2015)). In addition, we carefully outline the necessary conditions for consistent
estimation of the interaction term between broadband and skill group (see Bun and Harri-
son (2014)) and explain how the interaction term should be interpreted if these conditions
are not fully satisfied. In line with SBTC, we find that broadband lowers output elastic-
ities of workers with low formal education / highly routinized jobs. When workers are
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classified by job routinization, these results pass through on individual wages. This holds
in particular when censored wages are replaced by imputed wages. Besides investigating
classical SBTC issues, we also provide evidence that broadband Internet mitigates the
wage penalty of previously unemployed workers. Interestingly, this desirable effect is not
present for workers in highly routinized occupations.
VI
Chapter 1
Employment Protection and the
Market for Innovations1
1.1 Introduction
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is thought to protect workers against temporary
productivity shocks. While most negative productivity shocks to a firm are exogenous,
like a drop in demand due to changes in taste or an increase in competition due to
new production technologies of competitors, positive productivity shocks are usually the
result of process or product innovations and are hence endogenous. Product or process
innovations can either be done within a firm through own R&D investment or they can
be bought in the market (e.g. new machinery or patent licensing). If we study the effects
of employment protection we should therefore take into account that EPL may influence
firms abilities to restore their productivity.
The academic literature has already documented multiple effects of EPL. One strand
of the literature documented a negative effect of EPL on productivity through inefficient
1This chapter is based on joint work with Christian Holzner.
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worker reallocation.2 In addition, Pierre and Scarpetta (2004a) report that EPL par-
ticularly harms the growth prospects of medium sized firms. Despite the fairly robust
negative effect on productivity, the literature has identified channels that work in the
opposite direction. Pierre and Scarpetta (2004a), for example, also show that EPL incen-
tivizes firms to invest more in training. Zoega and Booth (2003) show that firing costs
internalize a quitting externality, which arises because firms discount the value of general
human capital at a higher rate than society. Similarly, Belot, Boone, and Ours (2007)
as well as Wasmer (2006) argue that EPL provides an incentive for workers to invest in
firm-specific capital. As productivity decreases despite the positive effect on training, the
increase in training investment is likely to reflect a second-best reaction of firms to the
introduction of EPL.
Another strand of the literature investigates how EPL affects innovation. Acharya,
Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) exploit the staged adoption of wrongful dismissal laws
in the U.S. to show that EPL spurs innovation and new firm creation.3To explain these
empirical findings, Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) argue that EPL limits
employers’ ability to hold up innovating employees and in turn encourages employees to
innovate. Koeniger (2005) develops a model to analyze the effect of EPL on innovation
in the context of product market competition. As EPL makes exit more costly and
more advanced firms endogenously exit with smaller probability, EPL provides a dynamic
incentive to innovate.4 Saint-Paul (2000) analyzes EPL and innovation through the lens
2Negative productivity effects from inefficient labor reallocation are found by Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993), Griliches and Regev (1995), Olley and Pakes (1996), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan
(2001), Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003), Baldwin and W.Gu (2006) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger,
and Scarpetta (2009) among others.
3 Murphy, Siedschlag, and McQuinn (2012) find, based on OECD data, that EPL leads to lower
innovation intensity in industries with a higher job reallocation propensity.
4Other authors also emphasize different positive aspects of EPL: Bertola (1994) shows that despite
EPL lowers returns to irreversible investment and thus the speed of capital accumulation, it shifts the
income distribution towards workers with no capital income. This explains why trade unions often fa-
vor stricter EPL. Kessing (2006) argues that firms facing EPL have a stronger average market position
as they can credibly commit to fiercely defend their position against potential competitors, because
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of international specialization. He shows that countries with strict EPL tend to specialize
in improving existing products, rather than introducing new products.
Our paper employs an equilibrium matching model with imperfect labor and inno-
vation markets to provide a novel explanation for why EPL lowers productivity while
potentially boosting innovation. We do so by exploiting the interaction between employ-
ment protection and firms’ ability to restore their productivity. An innovation is defined
as a new process or product idea, which enables a producing firm to restore its produc-
tivity. Each new product replaces an old product whose life-cycle has ended, that is, each
innovation has the same productivity. However, we could also allow product and process
innovations to increase productivity and therefore induce long-run growth. The upward
shift in innovation, which EPL generates in our model, would then shift the economy’s
growth rate.
We assume labor market frictions, because without labor market frictions laid-off work-
ers could be reemployed immediately by other firms, which makes employment protection
redundant. We assume frictions in the innovation market, because without frictions firms
could immediately purchase the machinery (process innovation) or product idea (prod-
uct innovation) necessary to restore productivity. We model both markets as matching
markets, where the time to find an appropriate trading partner depends on the ratio of
buyers to sellers in the market, and where prices are negotiated bilaterally. The interac-
tion between labor and innovation markets has the following implication: Employment
protection induces firms to keep workers employed even if productivity has dropped. This
increases firms’ willingness to pay for product or process innovations in order to restore
productivity. This increases the price for innovations, triggers entry of start-ups and
shifts economic activity towards firms specializing in process and product innovation. It
hence increases the rate, at which firms that are hit by a negative productivity shock can
purchase the (process or product) innovation necessary to restore their productivity.
We calibrate our model to match aggregate U.S. labor and product market statistics as
EPL makes market exit very costly.
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well as aggregate firm exit and entry rates. We then take the calibrated model, introduce
employment protection and show that the rate at which firms are able to restore their
productivity increases. Our comparative static results are also in line with the estimated
negative impact of wrongful dismissal laws on productivity found by D.Autor, W.Kerr,
and A.Kugler (2007) and the positive effect on innovations shown by Acharya, Baghai,
and Subramanian (2014). Both exploit the fact that from 1970 to 1999 13 U.S. states
introduced wrongful dismissal laws by recognizing the so-called ”good-faith” exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine. Our calibration results are also consistent with the
findings by Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014), who show that the adoption of
wrongful dismissal laws increases the number of firms, especially start-ups. We also find
evidence for a shift in economic activity. More precisely we find that the number of firms
producing the final consumption good decreases while the number of firms specializing in
producing machinery (process innovation) or product ideas (product innovation) increases.
These results can reconcile the findings by D.Autor, W.Kerr, and A.Kugler (2007), who
observe an increase in employment in the manufacturing sector, with the findings by
Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006), who find a negative effect on state-level employment.
To be able to analyze both the firm’s entry as well as employment decision, we allow for
multiple worker firms.
The papers that are most closely related to ours are Wasmer (2006) and Bartelsman,
Gautier, and Wind (2016). Both papers investigate the effect of employment protection
in an equilibrium matching model to explain differences between the United States and
continental Europe. Wasmer (2006) investigates the effect employment protection has on
the type of human capital investment undertaken in the economy. The main difference to
our framework is that he models productivity shocks as exogenous, while we endogenize
the rate at which firms are able to restore their productivity. Bartelsman, Gautier, and
Wind (2016) consider an equilibrium matching model where, under employment protec-
tion, firms are less likely to adopt a high-risk and high-return technology and more likely
to adopt a low-risk and safe technology. The main difference to our model is that they
do not consider that employment protection can increase the returns to investment in
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innovation.
Section 1.2 is the theory part of this chapter, where we discuss key equations of
our model. The details of the model are deferred to the Appendix. The calibration in
Section 1.3 discusses the effects of the introduction of employment protection first with
fixed and then with endogenous innovation price. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Theory
1.2.1 Framework
The model has an infinite horizon, is set in continuous time and concentrates on steady
states. All agents are risk neutral and discount the future at rate r. The economy is
populated by a unit mass of homogenous workers and an endogenous mass m of firms.
Production of consumption goods requires labor Ni ∈ R+0 and the input yi ∈ {0, y},
where yi can be interpreted as the productivity of the capital, which the firm employs,
or the profitability of the firm’s product in the market.5 The production function for
consumption goods is given by yiF (Ni) = yiN
α
i . All firms, which produce consumption
goods, produce the same homogenous good with prices normalized to unity.
The input y, i.e., the product idea or the machinery, can be produced by each firm
at its firm-specific innovation cost ki. The per period cost ki is drawn randomly from
a distribution characterized by the pdf ξ (k) and the cdf Ξ (k) on the support [0, kmax].
We will also refer to the input y as an innovation. It can be thought of both, a process
innovation (machinery) or a product innovation. The research process underlying the
production of the input y is stochastic and happens at the Poisson rate η. It requires
no production workers. The innovation y is assumed to be destroyed by a productivity
5We use this binary productivity distribution in order to avoid the complications arising from a
continuum of firm sizes, wages and innovation prices
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shock at the exogenous rate δ. Thus, 1/δ can be interpreted as a product’s or machinery’s
life-cycle.
Firms choose to become one of the following types t ∈ {B,R, S} depending on firm-
specific innovation costs ki. Type B and type R firms with yi = y produce the final
consumption good. Type B firms, which have been hit by a productivity shock, i.e.,
yi = 0, search the innovation market for a new product or process innovation to restore
their yi to y. The details of the innovation market are given below. Type R firms, which
are hit by a productivity shock, do their own research to restore their yi to y. The per-
period research success rate is denoted by η and exogenously given. For simplicity, we
assume that firms cannot innovate while producing consumption goods. Type S firms
develop product ideas or produce capital goods (machinery), i.e., they produce the input
y at rate η. Once they have produced the input y, they will sell it on the innovation
market. Again, we assume for simplicity that they cannot produce y while they are busy
with selling the input y in the innovation market.
The innovation market or market for new product ideas is characterized by matching
frictions, with a constant return to scale matching function that satisfies the usual Inada
conditions. Tightness in the innovation market is defined as the ratio of firms looking for
a new machine or a product idea (B for buyers) to the firms that specialize in innovation
and sell the input y on the innovation market (S for sellers), i.e., ϕ = B/S. Type S firms
that sell the innovation y are matched at rate ϕg (ϕ) with buyers (type B firms) and
type B firms contact sellers (type S firms) at rate g (ϕ). The properties of the matching
function are such that the matching probability of a seller (buyer) increases (decreases)
with the ratio of buyers to sellers, i.e., [ϕg (ϕ)]′ > 0 and g′ (ϕ) < 0. The innovation price
is determined by Nash-bargaining where β denotes the bargaining power of sellers.
Innovation or research costs are firm-specific and set at the beginning of a firm’s life.
Formally, we assume that potential firms have to pay a cost F upon entry (sufficiently
small to guarantee existence) in order to learn the per-period, firm-specific innovation
cost ki. For simplicity, we assume that new firms are born with input yi = y upon paying
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the entry cost F .
The interaction between the destruction of firms and the layoff decision for workers is
modeled as follows. Type B and type R firms will consider laying off workers only if the
firm was hit by a productivity shock δ. A firm that decides to lay off workers will have to
pay a firing cost f per worker. Firms can be destroyed only if their current productivity is
zero, i.e., if yi = 0. Consumption good producers (t = B or t = R) with yi = 0 can be hit
by a destruction shock at rate λd. If workers must be laid off, because a firm is insolvent
and destroyed, no firing costs are due. Type S firms that specialize in innovation do not
employ production workers and therefore are not affected by firing costs. They are hit by
a destruction shock at rate λs. We assume λs < λd, in order to ensure that type S and
type B and R firms are equally likely to be destroyed. The reason is that type S firms
are not only in the ”yi = 0” state if they are hit by a productivity shock, but also when
they are doing research in order to produce the innovation y. They are hence more often
exposed to a destruction shock than type B and R firms.
The labor market for production workers is also modeled using matching frictions.
Firms hire workers by posting vacancies at the per period cost c (sufficiently small to
guarantee existence). The matching function for production workers has constant return
to scale and satisfies the Inada conditions. Labor market tightness is denoted by θ =
V/U , where V equals the number of vacancies created by all firms and U the number of
unemployed workers. The job finding rate of workers is given by θλm (θ) and the rate at
which firms contact workers by λm (θ). The properties of the matching function are such
that the matching probability of an unemployed worker (vacancy) increases (decreases)
with the ratio of vacancies to unemployed, i.e., [θλm (θ)]
′ > 0 and λ′m (θ) < 0. Wages are
negotiated and renegotiated each time the productivity of a firm changes. The bargaining
power of workers is denoted by γ. Unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits
z. Employed workers receive a wage wt (yi, Ni), which depends on yi ∈ {0, y}, on the
marginal product yiF
′(Ni), and the type t of the firm.
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1.2.2 Optimality Conditions and Equilibrium
Consumption good producers: Firms of the consumption goods sector, i.e., type
t ∈ {B,R} firms, choose their labor input by deciding on the number of vacancies V ti
they want to post and the number of workers they want to lay off Lti. The equation
governing the change in the number of workers employed at firm i that posts vacancies
V ti and lays off L
t
i workers is given by,
Ṅ ti = λm (θ)V
t
i − Lti. (1.1)
Firms, which want to start production, will immediately hire their optimal number of
workers N ti , by posting V
t
i = N
t
i /λm (θ) vacancies. The following Bellman equation
characterizes the expected profit of a type B or R firm with productivity yi = y, innovation
cost ki, and workforce N
t
i , i.e.,
rπh,t
(
N ti , y, ki
)
= y
(
N ti
)α − wh,t (y,N ti )N ti (1.2)
+ δ
(
max
[
πI,t
(
N ti , 0, ki
)
, πO,t (0, 0, ki)− fN ti
]
− πh,t
(
N ti , y, ki
))
,
for t ∈ {B,R}. Note, that this equation holds for all type B or R firms regardless of
whether they employ outsiders h = O or have insiders h = I. Firms that decide not
to layoff their workers once a productivity shock δ hits, i.e., Lti = 0, can renegotiate the
wage with their current workforce (insiders), i.e., have a continuation value πI,t (N ti , 0, ki).
Firms that decide to layoff their workers, i.e., Lti = N
t
i , have to continue without workers,
which implies a continuation value πO,t (0, 0, ki) and the payment of firing costs to the
amount of fN ti . Type B or R firms will post vacancies subject to equation (1.1) until the
marginal value of an additional worker equals the expected cost of hiring a worker, i.e.,
∂πO,t (N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
=
c
λm (θ)
. (1.3)
Thus, if the marginal value of an additional worker for a type B firm is different than
that of a type R firm, then the number of vacancies posted and the number of workers
employed will be different too.
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Wages in the labor market are determined by Nash-bargaining. We assume intra-
firm bargaining as in Smith (1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), and Cahuc, Marque, and
Wasmer (2008), among others. The worker surplus equals the value of being employed
minus the outside option of being unemployed. The firm’s surplus depends on whether
it bargains with outsiders (new workers) or with insiders. If a firm is bargaining with
outsiders the surplus is given by the marginal value of an additional worker. If an old
firm is renegotiating the wages of its current workforce (insiders), then the surplus of
continuing the employment relationship is given by the marginal value of an additional
worker plus firing cost f , since a bargaining agreement ensures that the firm does not have
to pay the firing cost. The Nash-product in the event a firm negotiates with outsiders
and insiders, respectively, is given by,
wO,t
(
yi, N
t
i
)
= arg max
w
(
WO,t (w)− U
)γ (∂πO,t(N ti , yi, ki)
∂N ti
)1−γ
, (1.4)
wI,t
(
yi, N
t
i
)
= arg max
w
(
W I,t (w)− U
)γ (∂πI,t(N ti , yi, ki)
∂N ti
+ f
)1−γ
. (1.5)
The marginal value of an additional worker for a firm with yi = y that wants to hire
new workers (h = O) is given by differentiating equation (1.2). The marginal value of an
additional worker for a firm, which has been hit by a productivity shock, i.e., yi = 0, but
retains its workers is given by,
∂πI,t (N ti , 0, ki)
∂N ti
=

η
r + λd + η
(
c
λm (θ)
− γf −
wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
η
)
if t = R,
g (ϕ)
r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β)
(
(1− β)
(
c
λm (θ)
− γf
)
−
wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
g (ϕ)
)
if t = B.
(1.6)
In the absence of a product idea workers are not productive. Correspondingly, the firms
loss during the spell without a product idea is larger if it employs more workers. Never-
theless, the marginal value of an additional worker is negative only if the wage payments
over the expected duration until the firm obtains a new innovation, i.e., 1/η or 1/g (ϕ),
are higher than the expected cost of hiring a worker c/λm (θ) minus the part of the firing
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cost that the firm would have to bear γf if it lays off a worker (the fraction (1− β) for
type B firms due to Nash-bargaining over innovation prices). If the rate at which a firm
can restore its productivity, i.e., η or g (ϕ), is sufficiently high, the marginal value of an
additional worker is positive even though workers are not productive.
The marginal value of an additional worker for a firm, which has been hit by a produc-
tivity shock, also determines a firm’s layoff decision. A firm will keep all its workers if the
surplus is positive, that is, if the marginal value of a worker plus firing costs is positive,
i.e.,
∂πI,t (N ti , 0, ki)
∂N ti
+ f ≥ 0. (1.7)
If the surplus is negative, workers will be laid off. If a firm wants to lay off workers, it will
lay off all workers, since firing costs per worker are constant and the marginal revenue
product equals zero after a productivity shock.
Innovation producers: Firms of the innovation sector, i.e., type S firms, specialize on
producing and selling innovations, i.e., producing and selling the input y for consumption
good produces. The expected discounted profit of a type S firm πS (0, yj, kj) depends
on the prices p
(
kj, N
B
i
)
it receives for its innovation. Prices are determined by Nash-
bargaining, i.e.,
p (kj, 0) = arg max
p
(
πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
− c
λm (θ)
NBi − πO,B (0, 0, ki)− p
)1−β
×
(
p+ πS (0, 0, kj)− πS (0, y, kj)
)β
,
p
(
kj, N
B
i
)
= arg max
p
(
πI,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
− πI,B
(
NBi , 0, ki
)
− p
)1−β
×
(
p+ πS (0, 0, kj)− πS (0, y, kj)
)β
,
The price p
(
kj, N
B
i
)
of the innovation will depend on the surplus that is generated by
the innovation. The surplus will depend on the type S firm’s own innovation cost kj
and on the number of workers employed at the buyer NBi . The surplus of a type B
firm that buys an innovation is given by the increase in expected profits from restoring
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productivity yi from 0 to y, which allows the firm either to bring its workforce back to
productive use, if it has kept its workforce after the productivity shock, or to hire and
productively employ new workers, if it has laid off its workforce following a productivity
shock. The buyer’s innovation cost ki does not enter the surplus, since a firm that decided
to buy the innovation y will also do so in the future, that is, it will never decide to do
own research. The surplus of a type S firm that sells the innovation is given by the price
plus the expected loss in profit πS (0, 0, kj) − πS (0, y, kj) from having to produce a new
innovation. A type S firm will not be active on the labor market for production workers,
i.e., NSj = 0, since innovation requires by assumption no production workers. Labor
market conditions only enter a type S firm’s expected discounted profit πS (0, y, kj) via
the number of workers employed by type B firms, which influences the price p
(
kj, N
B
i
)
.
Specialization: We can now characterize which firms will enter the consumption goods
sector and specialize on production of the final good without doing own research, type B
firms, which firms will enter the innovation goods sector and specialize on innovation, type
S firms, and which firms will do both produce consumption goods and do own research,
type R firms. Given the innovation cost ki each firm will choose its type t such that
expected profits are maximized, i.e.,
max
t∈{S,B,R}
πO,t
(
N ti , y, ki
)
− c
λm (θ)
N ti ,
where N ti denotes the optimal number of workers that the firm intends to hire following
the optimal vacancy creation condition in equation (1.3).
Type B firms decide to buy an innovation when they are hit by a productivity shock.
They therefore never innovate. Hence, their expected profits are independent of ki. Thus,
the minimum profit that each firm can obtain is given by the expected profit of type B
firms (before they hire workers). In contrast, type R firms conduct their own research,
when they are hit by a productivity shock. Type S firms specialize in innovation and do
more research than type R firms. Their profits are therefore more sensitive to the cost of
innovation ki. In Appendix A.5 we formally show that the expected profit of type S firms
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decreases more in the cost of innovation ki than the expected profit of type R firms, i.e.,
∂πS (0, y, ki)
∂ki
<
∂πO,R
(
NRi , y, ki
)
∂ki
<
∂πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
∂ki
= 0.
This is also shown in the following Figure.
Figure 1.1 – Specialization decision of firms
Given this single crossing property we can define the innovation cost thresholds k∗
and k∗∗. Firms with innovation cost ki ∈ [0, k∗] will specialize in innovation, firms with
innovation cost ki ∈ (k∗, k∗∗) will produce consumption goods and do their own research
if they are hit by a productivity shock, and firms with innovation cost ki ∈ [k∗∗, kmax]
will produce consumption goods and buy a new innovation when they need one. The
thresholds are formally defined by the following indifference conditions for type S and
type R firms (thresholds k∗) as well as for type R and type B firm (thresholds k∗∗)
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respectively,
πS (0, y, k∗) = πO,R
(
NRi , y, k
∗)− c
λm (θ)
NRi , (1.8)
πO,R
(
NRi , y, k
∗∗)− c
λm (θ)
NRi = π
O,B
(
NBi , y, k
∗∗)− c
λm (θ)
NBi . (1.9)
Remember that the appropriate equations for expected profits depend on whether firms
lay off workers, when a productivity shock hits.
Firm entry: The expected profit of a new firm before it draws its innovation cost ki de-
termines the number of active firms m in the economy. Since expected profits πS (0, y, ki)
and πO,R
(
NRi , y, ki
)
are linear in ki and π
O,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
independent of ki, we can write
expected profit as,
F = Ξ (k∗) πS
(
0, y, k
)
(1.10)
+ (Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗))
(
πO,R
(
NRi , y, k
)
− c
λm (θ)
NRi
)
+ (1− Ξ (k∗∗))
(
πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
− c
λm (θ)
NBi
)
,
where average innovation cost k among type S firms and k among type R firms are given
by,
k =
∫ k∗
0
ki
ξ (ki)
Ξ (k∗)
dki and k =
∫ k∗∗
k∗
ki
ξ (ki)
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
dki.
Given the entry cost F , firms will enter until the expected profit is equal to the cost
of entry. The parameter m for the number of firms is not directly visible in the entry
condition (1.10), but it enters the expected profit indirectly via labor market tightness θ.
Steady state labor market tightness is determined using the steady state flow equations
analyzed next.
Steady state flows: We denote the measure of unemployed workers by u and the
measure of type t firms with N ti employed workers and with productivity yi ∈ {0, y} by
mt (yi, N
t
i ), where the number of firms must sum up to m. The respective worker- or
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firm-level flow measures evolve according to the difference between in- and outflows as
shown in Appendix A.5.1. We focus on the steady state.
Steady state unemployment is given by,
u =

λd
θλm (θ)
(
mB
(
0, NBi
)
NBi +m
R
(
0, NRi
)
NRi
)
if Lti = 0,
δ
θλm (θ)
(
mB
(
y,NBi
)
NBi +m
R
(
y,NRi
)
NRi
)
if Lti = N
t
i .
If all R and B type firms retain their workers once they are hit by a productivity shock, the
inflow into unemployment is given by the rate λd at which consumption good producers,
which have been hit by a productivity shock, are destroyed times the number of workers
that are employed at these firms, i.e., mB
(
0, NBi
)
NBi + m
R
(
0, NRi
)
NRi . If all firms lay
off their workers once they are hit by a productivity shock, the inflow into unemployment
is given by the rate δ, at which a productivity shock hits, times the number of workers
employed at firms producing consumption goods with yi = y, i.e., m
B
(
y,NBi
)
NBi +
mR
(
y,NRi
)
NRi . The outflow is given by the matching probability of unemployed workers
times the number of unemployed workers θλm (θ)u.
Firm-level flow equations allow us to write the ratio of the steady state measures of
type B firms mB
(
0, NBi
)
to the measure of type S firms mS (y, 0), which determines
innovation market tightness ϕ and hence the meeting probability of buyers and sellers,
i.e.,
ϕ =
mB
(
0, NBi
)
mS (y, 0)
=
λs
λs + η
δ + ϕg (ϕ)
λd
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
Ξ (k∗)
. (1.11)
This equation implicitly determines innovation market tightness ϕ. Innovation market
tightness ϕ decreases with both innovation cost thresholds k∗ and k∗∗, since, in the case
of k∗, more firms decide to specialize in innovation and, in case of k∗∗, fewer firms decide
to buy a new innovation when they are hit by a productivity shock.
Equilibrium: The equilibrium in this economy is characterized by the market tightness
in the innovation market ϕ and the labor market θ, the layoff decisions of type B and R
firms LBi and L
R
i , the threshold values k
∗ and k∗∗ that determine the fraction of type S,
14
B, and R firms, as well as the number of active firms in the economy m, i.e., by the set of
variables
{
ϕ, θ, LBi , L
R
i , k
∗, k∗∗,m
}
. We concentrate on an equilibrium in which all three
types exist. Of course, there are parameter values where only S and B type firms exist (for
η sufficiently small), and parameter values where only type R firms exist (for η sufficiently
high). In Appendix A.6 we show that the equilibrium can be solved sequentially.
1.3 Calibration
In this section, we show that our model is able to reconcile the empirical findings that the
introduction of wrongful dismissal laws in the U.S. lead to a decrease in productivity as
shown by D.Autor, W.Kerr, and A.Kugler (2007) and an increase in the number of active
firms and the number of patents as shown by Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014).
1.3.1 Baseline Calibration
Parameters and targets: The model consists of 17 exogenous parameters (see Table
1.1). In the calibration we choose the time period to represent one quarter and set the
quarterly discount rate to r = 0.012 (equivalent to an annual discount factor of 0.953).
The parameters to target aggregate labor market statistics are taken from Shimer
(2005) and Kaas and Kircher (2011) among others. We use a standard Cobb-Douglas
type matching function, i.e., M(U, V ) = κlU
ψV 1−ψ. Like Shimer (2005) we target a job
finding rate θλm(θ) of 1.36. Moreover, we target an unemployment rate in line with the
long run U.S. average (4.5% to 5%). To do so, we set the labor market matching efficiency
parameter to κl = 2 and the vacancy posting costs to c = 0.0352. The matching elasticity
on the labor market ψ is set at a medium value of 0.5. As workers in our model are
all production workers unemployment benefits are set at a fairly high value z = 0.575,
implying a replacement rate of 85%, which is close to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).
Finally, workers’ bargaining power γ is set at 0.72 (see Shimer (2005)). To specify the
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parameters of the production function for large firms, we follow Kaas and Kircher (2011).
We normalize the productivity parameter to y = 1 and set the labor elasticity parameter of
the production function α equal to the labor share of 0.7. Bauer and Lingens (2014), who
also calibrate a matching model with large firms, take a value of 0.8 for the labor elasticity
parameter. They motivate their choice by targeting realistic mark-up values. Taking a
value of 0.8 instead of 0.7 for labor elasticity would change our results quantitatively but
not qualitatively.
Table 1.1 – Exogenous Parameter Values
Parameter Value Source / Target
δ 0.100
Target: Average product cycle length, see Magnier, Kalaitzandonakes,
and Miller (2010).
λd 0.250 Target: Average firm life expectancy of 50 quarters, see Burns (2010).
λs 0.010 Set to equal 25λd = λs.
η 0.356
Set to equal the ratio of average product life cycle length to time to mar-
ket of 3.56, see Griffin (2002).
y 1.000 Normalisation.
α 0.700 Set to equal the labor share, see Kaas and Kircher (2011).
ψ 0.500 Set to the medium value, see Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
κl 2.000
Target: Average job-finding rate of 1.36 (Shimer (2005)) and unemploy-
ment rate of about 5%.
ν 0.500 Set due to computational constraints.
κp 0.180 Set to get a product idea finding rate of g (ϕ) = η.
γ 0.720 See to an conventional value Shimer (2005).
β 0.500 Set to equal the elasticity of the innovation market matching function.
z 0.575 Target: Replacement rate of 85%.
c 0.035
Target: Average job-finding rate of 1.36 (Shimer (2005)) and unemploy-
ment rate of about 5%.
r 0.012 Compare Shimer (2005).
f 1.000
Set to equal 4.5 months of wages, see Bartelsman, Gautier, and Wind
(2016).
F 2.88
Set to get an average of 2.58 production workers per establishment(see
U.S. Census (2007)).
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We assume that research costs are uniformly distributed between zero and one. The
support of the research cost distribution is chosen such that the threshold values for
investment costs can be directly used to obtain the shares of the respective firm types.
Using the uniform distribution on the [0, 1] support implies a R&D expenditure to GDP
ratio of around 0.014, a value that is of the same magnitude as the 2% of GDP reported
in Eurostat (2011) for private sector R&D expenditure in the U.S. . The productivity
shock rate δ is calibrated in order to reflect average product life-cycle length. Magnier,
Kalaitzandonakes, and Miller (2010) find that on average products last for about 2.5 years,
implying δ = 0.1. In order to obtain a value for the research success rate η, we use a
result by Griffin (2002), who finds that the ratio of product life cycle length to the time to
market for the development of a new product is 3.56 in almost all industries (i.e., product
life cycle length and time to market are extremely highly correlated across industries with
ρ = 0.99). Given the ratio of product life cycle length to the time to market of 3.56 we
set the research success rate at η = 0.356.
There is less information in the literature that we can use in order to pin down the
parameters for the innovation market. We also use a Cobb-Douglas type matching func-
tions for the innovation market, i.e., P (S,B) = κp(S)
νB1−ν . We set the exponent of the
innovation market matching function to ν = 0.5 in order to derive an explicit expres-
sion for the innovation market tightness, which is done to reduce the computer capacity
necessary to solve the model numerically. The bargaining power of firms that sell their
product ideas in the innovation market is also chosen to equal β = 0.5. We choose a
matching efficiency in the innovation market of κp = 0.18 in order to obtain an innovation
acquisition rate g (ϕ) that is of roughly the same magnitude as the research success rate
η for firms that do their own research.
Firing costs f = 1 are chosen to equal 4.5 month of production in the calibration with
employment protection and zero otherwise. Given the fact that only 13 U.S. states have
adopted the ”good-faith” exception, the value f = 1 seem appropriate since it implies
roughly an average value of one month of production for the U.S. as a whole.
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The firm level destruction rates λd and λs are chosen such that the average life ex-
pectancy of firms lies somewhere around 50 quarters (see Burns (2010)). We set the
destruction shock of producing firms to be much larger than the destruction shock of
firms that specialize in innovation, i.e., λd = 0.25 and λs = 0.01, since type S firms are
more often exposed to the ”yi = 0”-state then type R and type B firms given that yi = 0
every time they sell their innovation.
Finally we set entry costs to F = 2.88, which leads to firm-level employment of 2.58
production workers at type R and type B firms. Since we do not include non-production
workers, we chose a value that is significantly smaller than the average U.S. firm size
of around 4.18 employees (production and non-production workers) documented by U.S.
Census (2007).
Baseline calibration of the U.S. economy: The first column of Table 1.2 below shows
the baseline calibration of the U.S. economy without employment protection. Given the
normalization of the number of workers in the economy and the productivity parameter
to one, final consumption output6 without employment protection is equal to 0.717. The
total measure of innovations per quarter equals 0.048 and can be decomposed into the
innovations done by existing firms 0.032 (innovations within), and innovations done by
firms, which enter the economy 0.016 (innovations upon entry).7 The private sector R&D
6Final output of consumption goods is given by all type R and type B firms with productivity yi =
y, i.e.,
Y = mR
(
y,NRi
)
y
(
NRi
)α
+mB
(
y,NBi
)
y
(
NBi
)α
.
7In our model, there are two ways in which new innovations are created. All firms that enter the
economy, i.e., me, are assumed to start with an innovation. Additionally, research is done by all type
S and type R firms with yi = 0. These firms produce a new innovation at the research success rate η.
The number of patents and patent citations in our framework is therefore measured by the number of
innovations created each period, i.e.,
I = me + η
(
mR(0, NRi ) +m
S(0, 0)
)
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expenditure to GDP ratio equals 0.014. Firms that acquire an innovation are willing to
pay an average innovation price of 1.027. The rate, at which type B firms are able to
acquire a new product idea y in the market for innovations, equals 0.307. Taking the
weighted average over type B and type R firms, the average duration in which a firm
remeins in the low productivity state yi = 0, is slightly above 9.2 months.
In steady state, the free entry condition ensures that average expected profits exactly
offset entry costs F . This pins down the number of firms in the economy at m = 0.614, out
of which 0.369 produce the final consumption goods. The remaining firms either conduct
own research 0.089 or search for a trading partner in the innovation market 0.155. The
unemployment rate among production workers equals 0.048.
1.3.2 Introducing Employment Protection
In order to shed light on the interaction of employment protection and the innovation
market we first keep the innovation price fixed at the level without employment protection.
Later, we endogenize the price to demonstrate the role of the innovation market.
Fixed innovation price: Table 1.2 compares the baseline model without employment
protection with a situation in which employment protection is in place. However, the
average innovation price is kept constant at 1.027, the level in the baseline calibration. In
order to understand the effect on profits, we first kept the number of firms in the economy
constant at 0.614. This is shown in the second column of Table 1.2.
The introduction of employment protection implies that firms continue to employ their
workers, if they are hit by a productivity shock. This increases the number of firms with
employment by 14%. Although there are more firms, which employ workers, the number
of firms producing the final consumption good decreases, because keeping and paying
unproductive workers decreases profits, especially profits of type R and type B firms, and
makes it more attractive to specialize in innovation. Higher labor costs also imply that
firm-level employment drops on average by 10.5%. Both negative effects lead to a drop
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Table 1.2 – Results: Employment Protection with Fixed Idea Price
Variable Baseline With EPL With EPL
without EPL m-fixed m-flexible
Final consumption output (Y) 0.717 0.637 0.604
Total innovations (I) 0.048 0.048 0.043
Total R&D costs / GDP 0.014 0.014 0.014
Seller-researcher threshold (k∗) 0.039 0.043 0.040
Researcher-buyer threshold (k∗∗) 0.402 0.366 0.388
Innovation acquisition rate (g(ϕ)) 0.307 0.315 0.307
Innovation price (p) 1.027 1.027 1.027
Unemployment rate (u) 0.048 0.043 0.075
Job finding rate (θg(θ)) 1.998 0.822 0.456
Job destruction rate 0.100 0.037 0.037
Firm-level employment
Type R firms (NRi ) 2.581 2.394 2.550
Type B firms (NBi ) 2.581 2.221 2.350
Total number of firms (m) 0.614 0.614 0.545
Type S with yi = y 0.115 0.125 0.105
Type S with yi = 0 0.065 0.069 0.059
Type R with yi = y 0.147 0.126 0.124
Type R with yi = 0 0.024 0.021 0.021
Type B with yi = y 0.222 0.231 0.200
Type B with yi = 0 0.040 0.041 0.036
Firms with employment 0.369 0.419 0.370
Average firm destruction rate 0.027 0.026 0.027
Average profit 2.882 2.758 2.880
in final consumption output.
Unemployment falls (slightly) as job destruction decreases even more than job creation.
The effect on job destruction emerges because under employment protection not only those
type R and type B firms, which have not been hit by a productivity shock, but all type R
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Table 1.3 – Results: Employment Protection with Endogenous Idea
Price
Variable Baseline With EPL With EPL
without EPL m-fixed m-flexible
Final consumption output (Y) 0.717 0.601 0.632
Total innovations (I) 0.048 0.048 0.053
Total R&D costs / GDP 0.014 0.013 0.013
Seller-researcher threshold (k∗) 0.039 0.064 0.064
Researcher-buyer threshold (k∗∗) 0.402 0.344 0.337
Innovation acquisition rate (g(ϕ)) 0.307 0.400 0.397
Innovation price (p) 1.027 1.365 1.323
Unemployment rate (u) 0.048 0.079 0.045
Job finding rate (θg(θ)) 1.998 0.396 0.722
Job destruction rate 0.100 0.034 0.034
Firm-level employment
Type R firms (NRi ) 2.581 2.568 2.444
Type B firms (NBi ) 2.581 2.544 2.416
Total number of firms (m) 0.614 0.614 0.670
Type S with yi = y 0.115 0.169 0.185
Type S with yi = 0 0.065 0.084 0.092
Type R with yi = y 0.147 0.088 0.095
Type R with yi = 0 0.024 0.015 0.016
Type B with yi = y 0.222 0.223 0.246
Type B with yi = 0 0.040 0.034 0.038
Firms with employment 0.369 0.361 0.394
Average firm destruction rate 0.027 0.021 0.021
Average profit 2.882 2.996 2.882
and type B firms employ workers. The drop in the unemployment rate shown in the second
column does not yet take the negative effect of employment protection on firm entry and
the respective (additional) negative effect on vacancy creation into account. The second
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column of Table 1.2 also shows that the share of type S firms slightly increases, as these
firms are not affected by firing costs.
The adoption of employment protection laws decreases average profits by roughly 4.4%
implying that the total number of firms in the economy with employment protection
decreases by about 11.3%. This can be seen by looking at the third column of Table 1.2,
which keeps the innovation prices constant, but allows for adjustment of the number of
firms. The number of innovations also decreases with the number of firms by about 10%.
Unemployment significantly increases (from 4.8% to 7.5%) once the additional effect of
lower firm entry is taken into account.
Thus, without the innovation market channel (flexible innovation price) our model is
not able to replicate the empirical findings by Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014),
who find a positive effect of employment protection on the number of patents and an
increase in the number of firms. In addition, the model is at odds with the empirical
evidence showing that employment protection has only mild effects on unemployment.
Endogenous innovation price: Until now we fixed the innovation price at its baseline
value in order to disentangle the innovation market effect from the conventional profit
depressing effects of employment protection. We now compare the baseline calibration
with the model with employment protection under flexible innovation prices. Again, the
second column of Table 1.3 keeps the number of firms in the economy at the baseline
calibration level in order to understand the effects of employment protection on profits.
The introduction of employment protection increases labor costs during the period in
which a firm keeps its workers, despite a productivity shock. This increases the willingness
of firms, which have been hit by a productivity shock, to pay for an innovation. This
leads to an increase in the innovation price from 1.027 in the baseline calibration to 1.365.
Correspondingly, profits of firms that specialize in innovation increase relative to profits
of final consumption good producers. The associated shift in the composition of firms
increases the number of innovations by type S and type R firms, by around 10%. The
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total number of innovations does not change, becasue we kept the number of firms fixed,
which implies that we exclude all innovations that are attached to the entry of new firms.8
The change in the composition of firms mainly increases the number of type S firms
that specialize in innovation. This increase is much larger compared to a situation with
fixed innovation price (see Table 1.2) implying that the change in the innovation price is
the main driver of the sectorial shift. At the same time the number of type R and type
B firms that produce consumption goods decreases from 0.369 to 0.312. Although the
reduction in the number of producing firms leads to lower hiring costs and higher profits,
firm-level employment slightly decreases as firing costs effectively increase the marginal
costs of employing a worker. Accordingly unemployment strongly increases (from 0, 048%
to 0.079%) whereas total production decreases by around 16.2%.
In stark contrast to the calibration in Table 1.2 with fixed product idea prices, average
profits increase by around 4%. This triggers firm entry and increases in the number of
firms in the new steady state from 0.614 to 0.670. The increase in the number of firms
of around 9.1% is well in line with the 8.7% to 12.4% increase estimated by Acharya,
Baghai, and Subramanian (2014).
The increase in the total number of firms has a counteracting effect on the average
innovation price, which decreases from 1.365 in the calibration with the fixed number of
firms to 1.323. However, the above mentioned shift in the composition of firms towards
a higher fraction of firms that specialize in innovation is still present and leads in com-
bination with the innovations generated by newly created firms, to an increase in total
innovations of around 8.3%. This increase is slightly below the one estimated by Acharya,
Baghai, and Subramanian (2014), which lies between 12.2% and 18.8%. The shift in eco-
nomic activity towards firms that specialize in innovation also increases the innovation
acquisition rate g (ϕ), at which type B firms can restore their productivity, from 0.307 in
the baseline calibration to 0.397. Taking the weighted average over type B and type R
8As λs ≤ λd the change in the composition of firms towards more sellers leads to less exits per
period and accordingly to less entries per period.
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firms, the average duration, in which a firm remains in the low productivity state yi = 0,
equals 7.8 months. This implies a decrease of 15.7% compared to the average duration
without employment protection of 9.2 months.
The higher number of firms m and the higher innovation acquisition rate dampen the
decrease in the number of firms producing consumption goods. Nevertheless it is still
lower than in the calibration without employment protection (0.340 instead of 0.369).
Together with the decrease in firm-level employment of around 6% on average, this still
leads to a substantial decline in the production of final consumption goods by 11.8%. In
contrast to final consumption output, unemployment fully recovers from its high value
in the calibration with fixed firm numbers once the increase in m is taken into account.
Indeed, as unemployment falls to 4.5% it is even slightly below its original value, which
was 4.8%. The model is therefore well in line with the empirical fact that employment
protection can have ambiguous effects on unemployment. Since the decrease in final
consumption output goes along with an increase in total employment, an increase in the
number of firms, and an increase in the number of innovations our calibration is also
able to explain the decrease in labor and total factor productivity due to employment
protection observed by D.Autor, W.Kerr, and A.Kugler (2007).
1.4 Conclusion
We study the effects of employment protection taking into account that firms are able
to restore their productivity. We develop an equilibrium matching model with imperfect
labor and innovation markets. We model both markets as matching markets, where the
time to find an appropriate trading partner depends on the ratio of buyers to sellers in the
market, and where prices are negotiated bilaterally. The interaction between labor and
innovation market has the following implication. Employment protection induces firms to
keep workers employed even if productivity has dropped. This increases firms’ willingness
to pay for product or process innovations in order to restore productivity. This increases
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the price for innovations, triggers entry of start-ups and shifts economic activity towards
firms specializing in process and product innovation. It hence increases the rate, at which
firms that are hit by a negative productivity shock can purchase the (process or product)
innovation necessary to restore their productivity.
We calibrate our model to match aggregate U.S. labor and product market statistics as
well as aggregate firm exit and entry rates. We then take the calibrated model, introduce
employment protection and show that the rate, at which firms are able to restore their
productivity increases. Our comparative static results are also in line with the estimated
negative impact of wrongful dismissal laws on productivity, the positive effect on innova-
tions and the number of firms, especially start-ups. We also find evidence for a shift in
economic activity towards firms specializing in producing machinery (process innovation)
or product ideas (product innovation).
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Chapter 2
Does the Effect of Employment
Protection Depend on the
Composition of Unemployment?
2.1 Introduction
Beginning in the 1970s many countries have introduced employment protection laws
(EPL). Policy makers typically consider EPL as a way to prevent unjust dismissals and
to provide income security to workers (see Clark (2005)). Scientist also emphasize the
possibility that EPL may increase productivity and innovation by giving workers incen-
tives to invest in firm-specific human capital1 or by inducing a structural shift in the
economy.2 Finally, the question whether EPL may enhance aggregate employment is of
great interest for both academics and policy makers. In this paper, I argue that taking
1See Akerlof (1984), Soskice (1997), Zoega and Booth (2003), Belot, Boone, and Ours (2007),
Pierre and Scarpetta (2004b), Wasmer (2006) and Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014).
2The first chapter of this dissertation develops an equilibrium matching model in which employ-
ment protection increases the willingness-to-pay for new ideas and thus shifts economic activity to-
wards more innovation.
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into account unemployment composition (rationing vs. frictional) is crucial for answering
this fundamental question.
In standard search models with endogenous layoffs (see Pissarides (2000)) EPL lowers
turnover while the sign of the employment effect remains ambiguous. Consequentially,
there exists a large literature trying to investigate the effect empirically. Lazear (1990) uses
European data to find that severance pay requirements reduce employment. International
organizations found a negative impact on the participation rate, but a positive effect
on the employment rate for prime age men (see OECD (1994)). Several studies have
supported the view that EPL can at least be associated with high youth unemployment
rates. 3 Despite this emerging consensus, recent studies (e.g. Noelke (2011)) challenge the
conventional view. Using OECD data Noelke (2011) founds no robust evidence whatsoever
linking EPL to inferior youth labor market performance. He notes that although there
is a strong positive correlation between regulations on temporary contracts and youth
unemployment, this correlation is completely wiped out by country fixed effects.
In order to minimize endogeneity problems, several studies4 exploited a natural exper-
iment which has occurred in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. As the U.S.
has a long tradition of employment-at-will, EPL was almost non-existent until the mid
twentieth century. However, beginning in the late 1970s, several U.S. state courts began
to adopt wrongful-dismissal laws. The most prominent ones are the implied-contract, the
public-policy and the good-faith exception.
Exploiting this variation MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) argue that the effect of
EPL differs between educational groups. They argue that the implied-contract and the
good-faith exception raise employment of high skilled workers but have detrimental effects
3See Esping-Andersen and Regin (2000), Heckman, Pags-Serra, Edwards, and Guidotti
(2000), Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002), Kahn (2007), Addison and Texeira (2003), Botero, Djankov,
Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer (2004), Breen (2005), Allard and Lindert (2006), Cahuc and Zylberberg
(2004)
4SeeAutor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006),D.Autor, W.Kerr, and A.Kugler (2007), Acharya, Baghai,
and Subramanian (2014) and MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007).
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on employment of low skilled workers. Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) find significant
negative employment effects only for the implied-contract exception, whereas the public-
policy and the good-faith exception do not significantly alter employment. Moreover,
they found that the detrimental effect is more pronounced for production workers. As
production workers have a lower level of formal education compared to non-production
workers, these findings are in line with MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007). Using the same
natural experiment D.Autor, W.Kerr, and A.Kugler (2007) conclude that EPL reduces
total factor productivity, while Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2014) note that EPL
has the potential to raise innovation.
The existing literature has not yet considered that the effect of employment effect of
EPL may depend on unemployment composition. In fact, the idea of composing unem-
ployment into different components felt somewhat out of fashion for a while. Popular
labor search models building on the pioneering work of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
focus on frictional labor markets as the only source of unemployment. In these models
workers and jobs are heterogeneous which makes it necessary to invest real resources in
search activities. Search models have vastly improved the understanding of labor mar-
ket flows and provide a natural explanation for the co-existence of unemployed workers
and job vacancies. However, these models predict that in the absence of search frictions
unemployment converges to zero, which is not convincing.
A popular alternative is the job rationing model proposed by Michaillat (2012). Ra-
tioning unemployment occurs naturally in a model with diminishing marginal returns to
labor and some sort of real wage rigidity. In such an environment, it is possible that the
marginal product of the least productive worker falls short of the real wage, implying that
firms do not further extend employment even in the absence of recruiting costs. Michail-
lat defines the unemployment level that prevails without search frictions as rationing
unemployment.5
5Note, that the term rationing unemployment as it defined by Michaillat (and also used in the
present paper) should not be confused with mutually binding rationing constraints on the product and
labor market as proposed by Keynesian disequilibrium models (see Barro and Grossman (1971).
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In the presence of (real) wage rigidities the marginal value of a worker is decreasing
in firing costs.6 Frictionless employment is determined purely by comparing the wage to
the marginal value of a worker. Hence, it decreases in firing costs, which directly implies
that rationing unemployment has to unambiguously increase in firing costs. However, an
increase in rationing unemployment also increases total unemployment and thus leads to
lower market tightness. Lower market tightness in turn causes lower recruitment costs,
which implies that the additional unemployment caused by search frictions has to be
smaller. The pro-cyclical7 behavior of the search component has been extensively dis-
cussed in Michaillat (2012). In the context of EPL, there is a second effect: EPL reduces
job destruction rates. Thus, firms need to post less vacancies in order to maintain the
same employment level over time. This second effect additionally lowers market tightness,
recruiting costs and finally frictional unemployment. The theoretical model developed in
the next section even shows that frictional unemployment is monotonically decreasing in
firing costs.
The prediction of the theoretical model is simple: if EPL is introduced in a labor mar-
ket where jobs are already heavily rationed, EPL will aggravate the situation. In contrast,
if the same laws are introduced in a labor market characterized by search frictions, aggre-
gate employment will barely decrease or even increase. In the empirical part, I use data on
the adoption of wrongful-dismissal laws by U.S. state courts in order to test this hypoth-
esis. Under the assumption that differences in matching efficiency are negligible8, search
unemployment matters most in labor markets with low unemployment, while rationing
unemployment is key in labor markets with high unemployment. Accordingly, average
pre-treatment unemployment is used as a proxy for the composition of unemployment.
Empirical results suggest that the employment effects of the public-policy and good-
faith exception significantly depend on pre-treatment unemployment. In contrast, pre-
6I use the terms “firing costs” and “EPL” interchangeably as the purpose of EPL is to make layoffs
costly.
7Pro-cyclical in the sense of being positively correlated with the business cycle.
8This assumption is discussed in detail in section B.3 in the Appendix.
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treatment unemployment does not significantly influence the way the implied-contract
exception impacts employment. A possible explanation for this result could be that firms
quickly adapt to the implied-contract exception by updating their recruitment process.9
In this way, the implied-contract exception acts more as a law that imposes additional re-
cruiting costs. Correspondingly, the labor market effect of the implied-contract exception
does not depend on the composition of unemployment.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 first outlines the theoret-
ical and then proceeds by quantitatively illustrating the main insights from the model.
Section 2.3 presents some background information on wrongful-dismissal laws, outlines
the empirical model and discusses the results. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Framework
Basic Assumptions The model is a variant of the classical search-and-matching model
in the tradition of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). It deviates from the basic textbook
model by allowing for large firms, endogenous layoffs and real wage rigidities. The assump-
tion of large firms with diminishing marginal returns combined with real wage rigidities
opens up the possibility of rationing unemployment in the sense of Michaillat (2012),
whereas endogenous layoffs are needed to study the effects of firing costs. Agents are risk
neutral and infinitely lived. The model is written down in discrete time with labor as the
only factor of production. Households consume the entire production in each period. The
model is populated by a unity mass of firms and workers, each of which supplies one unit
of labor. As the model is meant to capture the medium- to long-run impact of EPL, I
9Such an update may include a careful revision of new employment contracts and policy handbooks
to rule out the danger that an implicit contract is established.
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focus on the model’s steady state equilibrium.10
Idiosyncratic Productivity Shock Firms exhibit two different idiosyncratic states:
A low productivity state L and a high productivity state H. Firms in the H state produce
according to the production function yHi = N
α
i,t. Productivity in the L state is scaled down
by a constant factor γ (where 0 < γ < 1), that is, yi = γN
α
i,t. The transition probability
from state H to state L is given by δ, whereas the probability of returning to state H is
given by η. I denote the number of workers employed by a firm in the H, respectively L
state as NHi,t and N
L
i,t.
Labor Market Flows If firms exhibit an unfavorable transition (H ⇒ L) they adjust
their workforce from NHi,t to N
L
i,t. To do so they have to pay firing costs f per worker.
Layoffs occurring after the idiosyncratic productivity shock are the only source of job
destruction. In order to hire workers firms must post vacancies. If a firm posts a vacancy,
it incurs per-period costs c. Unemployed workers and vacancies are matched using a stan-
dard constant returns to scale matching function (see Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)).
Market tightness, defined as the ratio between vacant jobs and unemployed workers, is
denoted as xt, the job-finding rate as m(xt) and the worker-finding rate as xtm(xt).
2.2.2 Profit Functions and Optimality Conditions
Profits of a firm in the high productivity state are given by:
πHi,t(N
H
i,t) = max
V Hi,t ,L
H
i,t
(NHi,t)
α −WHt NHi,t − cV Hi,t − fLHi,t + β
(
δπLi,t+1(N
H
i,t) + (1− δ)πHi,t+1(NHi,t)
)
(2.1)
10The steady state assumption implies that the model cannot be used to assess the economies be-
havior in the transition period between one steady state (e.g. low firing costs) and another (e.g. high
firing costs). Due to the same reason the model can also not be used to investigate whether EPL am-
plifies or attenuates temporary shocks (e.g. technology shock) to the economy.
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Similarly, profits of a firm in the low productivity state read:
πLi,t(N
L
i,t) = max
V Li,t,L
L
i,t
γ(NLi,t)
α −WLt NLi,t − cV Li,t − fLLi,t + β
(
(1− η)πLi,t+1(NLi,t) + ηπHi,t+1(NLi,t)
)
(2.2)
Given firm-level employment, profits only differ due to the productivity difference implied
by γ < 1. In both states firms have to decide on the number of vacancies they post and
the number of workers they wish to layoff. As the paper has a steady state focus, time
indexes are dropped subsequently. In the steady state we have V Li = L
H
i = 0, that is, low
productivity firms never hire, whereas high productivity firms never fire workers.11 The
intuition is straight forward: each firm entering the low productivity state has been in
the high productivity state before and thus already employs NHi,t workers. As both states
are identical except of the productivity difference, it holds that NHi,t ≥ NLi,t, implying
that low productivity firms never have an incentive to post vacancies. Instead, these
firms will layoff workers until their desired employment level NLi,t is reached. Similarly,
firms just entering the high productivity state will hire NHi,t − NLi,t workers by posting
the appropriate number of vacancies and keep employment constant until they face an
adverse shock again. As firm-level employment does not exceed NHi,t , firms never have an
incentive to layoff workers as long as they stay in the high productivity state.
Accordingly, solving the right hand side problem for a firm in the high productivity
state is equivalent to finding the optimal number of vacancies, whereas for a firm in the
low productivity state it is equivalent to finding the optimal number of layoffs. Setting the
respective derivatives to zero and rearranging yields the following optimality conditions:
c
m(x)
=
∂πHi
∂NHi
(2.3)
−f = ∂π
L
i
∂NLi
(2.4)
Equation (2.3) states that firms in the high productivity state post vacancies until the
11This result relies on the assumption that there is no exogenous job separation rate. Separations
only occur if a firm explicitly decide to layoff a worker.
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marginal value of an additional worker is exactly offset by marginal hiring costs (which
depend on labor market tightness), whereas equation (2.4) reveals that firms in the low
productivity state layoff workers until the marginal value of an additional layoff is exactly
offset by marginal firing costs (which are exogenously given by f).
The marginal values of an additional worker can be computed directly from equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2) by taking the derivative with respect to N i,tH or N
L
i,t, respectively
12.
Combining the marginal values with equations (2.3) and (2.4) and rearranging yields:
c
m(x)
= α(NHi )
α−1 −WH + β
(
−δf + (1− δ) c
m(x)
)
(2.5)
−f = γα(NLi )α−1 −WL + β
(
−(1− η)f + η c
m(x)
)
(2.6)
Equations (2.5) and (2.6) determine NHi and N
L
i for given market tightness and wages.
2.2.3 Wage Setting
Most search models with endogenous layoffs assume that wages can be renegotiated13
after an idiosyncratic productivity shock occurs. Layoffs happen only voluntarily, that is,
if the joint surplus has become negative. The exclusion of involuntary layoffs is popular
in the literature since Robert Barros famous critique of sticky wage / sticky price models
(see Barro (1977)).
In the context of the present model some kind of wage rigidity is needed. This rigidity
could be established by a fairly high value of the outside option z (see Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008)) which would trigger voluntary separations after the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock has occurred. Hence, a high value of z is enough for obtaining positive
12Note that when taking the derivative V Hi,t and L
H
i,t can be treated as constant due to the envelope
conditions.
13Typically one assumes that wages satisfy the Nash bargaining solution with symmetric bargain-
ing weights. In models with large firms the corresponding assumption is intra-firm wage bargaining as
proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), which is also known as generalized Nash bargaining.
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rationing unemployment14. Instead of explicitly modeling the wage bargaining game, I
assume that wages are determined by an exogenous wage constant, which does not differ
across productivity states:
WH = WL = ω (2.7)
This simple wage setting scheme serves the purpose of the paper better than assuming
a rather complicated wage bargaining game, because wages are not always bargained
individually and layoffs are not always voluntarily. Collective wage agreements dominate
large parts of U.S. and in particular European labor markets. Minimum wage laws and
efficiency wages further contribute to downward wage rigidity. Although, a simplistic
wage setting scheme as posted above is only a rough approximation of reality, flexible
wage bargaining is just as well far from capturing all institutional and social intricacies
that determine wages in reality.15 As the presence of an outside option z greater than
the marginal product of labor (evaluated at full employment) is a realistic feature of most
labor markets, rationing unemployment would be present even with endogenous wages.
Hence, endogenizing wages would not qualitatively alter results.
Combining the wage setting schedule with (2.5) and (2.6) and rearranging implies:
NHi,t(x) =
(
α
c
m(x)
(1− β(1− δ)) + ω + βδf
) 1
1−α
(2.8)
14With Stole and Zwiebel (1996) bargaining wages are given as a linear combination between the
workers outside option z and a term that depends on recruiting costs and the marginal product of la-
bor. When recruiting costs go to zero, the corresponding term vanishes and wages simply become a lin-
ear combination between z and a term proportional to the marginal product of labor. This guarantees
full employment in the limit of no recruiting costs as long as z is below the marginal product evaluated
at full employment. Reversely, high values of z provide a mechanism which renders full employment
unprofitable even in the absence of recruiting costs.
15 Michaillat and Saez (2015) find that a fix-price equilibrium describes observed data better than
a competitive equilibrium as market tightness (ob both the product and the labor market) fluctuates a
lot.
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NLi,t(x) =
(
γα
ω − (1− β(1− η))f − ηβ c
m(x)
) 1
1−α
(2.9)
It is useful to investigate the relationship between firm-level employment and market
tightness implied by equations (2.8) and (2.9). Market tightness enters the optimality
conditions via recruiting costs. Intuitively, higher market tightness lowers the worker-
finding rate and thus causes higher recruiting costs c
m(x)
. However, optimal firm-level
employment in the two states depends very differently on recruiting costs. Firm-level
employment in the high productivity state is decreasing in recruiting costs (and thus
in market tightness) as higher recruiting costs require the marginal value of a worker
to increase (see (2.3))which can only be done by downward adjusting employment. In
contrast, firm-level employment in the low productivity state is increasing in recruiting
costs. Firms entering the low productivity state chose to layoff less workers if recruiting
costs are high in order to save future hiring costs.
2.2.4 Rationing Unemployment
Rationing unemployment occurs if total labor demand in the absence of recruiting costs
falls short of labor supply (unity). This limiting case can easily be analyzed by letting
matching efficiency go to infinity 16 or setting vacancy posting costs to zero. By doing
so market tightness drops out of equations (2.8) and (2.9). Solving both equations for
firm-level employment yields firm-level labor demand NH,Ri and N
L,R
i , which would occur
in a frictionless labor market:
NH,Ri =
(
α
ω + βδf
) 1
1−α
(2.10)
NL,Ri =
(
αγ
ω − f(1− β(1− η)
) 1
1−α
(2.11)
16In this case vacancies and workers get matched instantaneously. Correspondingly the worker find-
ing rate m(x) goes to infinity which implies that recruiting cost go to zero.
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NH,Ri and N
L,R
i depend only on the labor elasticity of output α, the wage constant ω
as well as on firing costs f . Note that NH,Ri is decreasing in firing costs, while N
L,R
i is
increasing . This is intuitive: firms entering the high productivity state hire less workers
as the marginal value of employing a worker is decreasing in firing costs. In contrast,
firms entering the low productivity state keep more workers in order to save firing costs.
To facilitate intuition, solve equations (2.10) and (2.11) for the marginal product of labor:
α(NH,Ri )
α−1 = ω + βδf (2.12)
αγ(NH,Li )
α−1 = ω − [1− β(1− η)]f (2.13)
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) demonstrate that firing costs make it optimal for firms in the
high productivity state to chose an employment level which guarantees that the marginal
product of labor exceeds the real wage, whereas firms in the low productivity state choose
an employment level at which the marginal product of labor is below the real wage. Firing
costs reduce the gap between employment levels in the high- and low productivity states.
Hence, EPL reallocates workers to low productive firms.
It is total and not firm-level labor demand what matters for determining rationing
unemployment. In the job rationing model proposed by Michaillat (2012) rationing occurs
when the marginal product of labor evaluated at full employment falls short of the real
wage. It is not possible to make an analogous statement for the present model as there is
no marginal product of labor for the whole economy, but two different marginal products
for each productivity state. Nevertheless, as in the standard model, rationing occurs if
the wage compared to marginal productivity (corrected for firing costs) is high.
To calculate rationing unemployment, it is necessary to calculate aggregate labor de-
mand, which is given by:
NR = mHN
H,R
i +mLN
L,R
i (2.14)
Rationing unemployment immediately follows as uR = 1 − NR. It depends not only on
firm-level employment in both sectors but also on the (exogenous) distribution of firms
across productivity states. Negative values of uR indicate that without recruiting costs
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labor demand would exceed labor supply, that is, there would be a shortage of labor.
Allowing for negative values of uR is useful to highlight the crucial economic mechanism
of the model. Clearly, observable unemployment is entirely caused by search frictions, if
rationing unemployment is below zero.
2.2.5 Equilibrium with Frictional Labor Market
If search frictions are present, labor market flows have to be taken into account explicitly.
As I restrict attention to stationary equilibria, labor market flows must be balanced:
qN = xm(x)U
where U = (1− (1− q)N) measures the pool of jobless individuals available for hiring. U
is also referred to as beginning-of-period unemployment(see Blanchard and Gali (2010)),
that is, unemployment before hiring has taken place. In contrast u measures within-period
unemployment. Rearranging yields an Beveridge curve like expression:
NSS =
xm(x)
q + xm(x)(1− q)
(2.15)
where NSS denotes the employment level consistent with balanced labor market flows as
a function of the job finding rate xm(x) and the job destruction rate q. In contrast, to
the standard search and matching model, q is endogenous and given by:
q = δmH
NHi (x)−NLi (x)
N
(2.16)
where mH =
η
η+δ
and mL =
δ
η+δ
denote the number of firms in the high-, respectively low
productivity state.
The second relationship between aggregate employment and market tightness can be
obtained from firm-level optimality conditions discussed in the previous section. Using
the definition of aggregate employment one obtains:
NFOC = mHN
H
i (x) +mLN
L
i (x) (2.17)
37
Equilibrium market tightness is determined by the intersection of equation(2.15) and(2.17),
that is
NSS(x)
!
= NFOC(x) (2.18)
It is easy to show that NSS is increasing in market tightness. High market tightness
implies that workers find jobs quickly, which increases the outflow out of unemployment
for a given number of unemployed workers. In the present model, there is an additional
effect working in the same direction: higher market tightness leads to lower q, that is,
the inflow rate into unemployment is lower. Correspondingly, the number of unemployed
workers has to be low in order to ensure that labor market flows balance out.
As
∂NHi (x)
∂x
< 0 and
∂NLi (x)
∂x
> 0 the sign of ∂N
FOC
∂x
is generally ambiguous. A necessary
and sufficient condition for ∂N
FOC
∂x
≤ 0 is given by
f [εβδ +ΘB(1− β(1− η))] +
c
m(x)
[ε(1− β(1− δ)) +ΘBηβ] ≤ (ΘB − ε)ω (2.19)
where ΘB =
(
ε(1−β(1−δ))
δβ
) 1−α
2−α
< 1. Thus, for a given set of exogenous variables, there
exists a x̄, such that for each x smaller (larger) than x̄ it holds that ∂N
FOC
∂x
is negative
(positive). Moreover, the denominator of equation (2.9) goes to zero if x becomes large,
implying that the slope of NFOC goes to infinity. Thus, there exist two intersections of
the NFOC and the NSS curves in (N, x)-space, reflecting two potential candidates for
equilibrium market tightness, which I denote as x∗ (low market tightness equilibrium)
and x∗∗ (high market tightness equilibrium).
Let me first consider the second equilibrium candidate. As x∗∗ > x̄, it holds that
∂NFOC
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗∗
> 0. Note, that ∂N
FOC
∂x
has always the same sign as ∂N
FOC
∂ c
m(x)
, as market
tightness only matters for labor demand via recruiting costs. Correspondingly, labor
demand in this equilibrium would be increasing in recruiting costs, implying that an
increase in search frictions (measured by c) reduces unemployment. Clearly, such an
equilibrium is not compatible with empirical evidence.
Requiring labor demand to be decreasing in recruiting costs is equivalent to imposing
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an equilibrium refinement condition17
∂NFOC
∂ c
m(x)
∣∣∣∣
x=xEquilibrium, c>0
< 0 (2.20)
which directly implies ∂N
FOC
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=xEquilibrium, c>0
≤ 0. This allows me to rule out the sec-
ond equilibrium candidate. Correspondingly, the unique market tightness, which satisfies
equation (2.18) and the refinement condition (2.20), is given by x∗.18 In addition, Sec-
tion B.1 in the Appendix shows that the high market tightness equilibrium is not stable,
while the low market tightness equilibrium is. Focusing on x∗, firm level employment is
immediately given by equations (2.8) and (2.9). As N = mHN
H
i + mLN
L
i one can also
calculate aggregate employment and, correspondingly, unemployment (u = 1−N).
The primary goal of the illustrative model is to shape intuition about how frictional and
rationing unemployment react to changes in firing costs. Computing ∂N
R
∂f
and rearranging
reveals that NR is falling in firing costs if and only if
f <
ΘA − ε
ΘA(1− β(1− η)) + βδε
ω
!
= fR,max (2.21)
where ΘA =
(
εηβ
1−β(1−η)
) 1−α
2−α
. Thus, if the ratio of firing cost to the wage is sufficiently
low, an increase in firing costs unambiguously lowers hypothetical labor demand NR and
thus leads to higher rationing unemployment. The reason why ∂N
R
∂f
changes its sign at
17The refinement condition is closely related to excluding the case of negative search unemployment.
However, it is somewhat stronger as there exist equilibria which do not satisfy the refinement condition
but still exhibit positive search unemployment (NR − N > 0). Why is that? Search unemployment is
being computed as difference in labor demand between an equilibrium with c = 0 and c > 0, where
c is not infinitesimally small. Thus the difference between the two equilibria involves a discrete jump
(!) in recruiting costs. As the derivative of labor demand with respect to recruiting costs itself depends
positively (!) on recruiting costs, a positive derivative does not imply that search unemployment is neg-
ative. However, if the derivative is negative one can conclude that search unemployment is positive.
Correspondingly, all equilibria satisfying the refinement condition (2.20) exhibit positive search unem-
ployment.
18Even if one does not require equation (2.20) to be satisfied it can be shown numerically that (for
reasonable parameter values) x∗∗ violates the plausibility constraint NHi ≥ NLi independent of the level
of firing cost or the wage regime.
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very high levels of f lies in the convex shape of NR,L. Appendix B shows that a sufficient
condition for frictional unemployment to be decreasing in firing costs is given by
∂NFOC(x, f)
∂f
< 0 (2.22)
Hence, under the assumption that equations (2.21) and (2.22) are satisfied, the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 1. An increase in firing costs causes a decrease in frictional unemployment
(as defined as NR − N), while at the same time rationing unemployment increases. In
contrast the effect on total unemployment is ambiguous.
2.2.6 Equilibrium Characterization
As the overall effect of a change in firing costs on employment is ambiguous, the next step is
to numerically explore the model’s reaction to changes in firing costs in different economic
regimes.19 Like in Michaillat (2012), the model is calibrated at a weekly frequency to fit
U.S. data. I use a standard Cobb-Douglas specification of the matching function (see
Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001)), that is, H = τUηV 1−η, where τ denotes matching
efficiency. Accordingly, the worker-finding-rate reads m(x) = τx−η and the job-finding-
rate reads xm(x) = τx1−η.
Table 2.1 – Exogenous Parameter Values
Variable Value Source/Target
Matching Efficiency: τ 0.233 Michaillat (2012)
Discount Factor: β 0.999 Michaillat (2012)
Matching Elasticity w.r.t. Unemployment: Ψ 0.700 Shimer (2005)
Vacancy Posting Costs: c 0.214 Michaillat (2012)
Output Elasticity of Labor: α 0.666 Michaillat (2012)
Firing Costs: f 0.270 Bartelsman et. al (2010)
Wage Constant: ω 0.615 Unemployment Rate 4.5
Probability High ⇒ Low: δ 0.020 Target: Job Destruction Rate of 0.01
Probability Low ⇒ High: δ 0.080 Target: Vacancy Filling Rate of 0.325
Low productivity parameter: γ 0.500 Target: Market Tightness of 1
19A side effect of numerically calibrating the model is the possibility to graphically display the key
results of the model which vastly improves intuition.
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The baseline calibration consists of the following ten values for exogenous variables:
matching efficiency is set to τ = 0.233. The discount rate is set to β = 0.99, vacancy post-
ing costs are set to c = 0.214 and the output elasticity of labor is set to α = 0.66 (all values
correspond to Michaillat (2012)). The matching elasticity with respect to unemployment
is set to Ψ = 0.7 (see Shimer (2005)). Firing costs f are set to 0.27 reflecting that firing
costs in the U.S. roughly equal one month of production (see Bartelsman, Gautier, and
Wind (2016)).
All former variables are pinned down using direct empirical evidence, while the re-
maining variables are set to ensure that outcome variables satisfy specific target values.
First, the wage constant ω is set to 0.615 to target an unemployment rate of 4.5%. The
transition probabilities between the high and low productivity state are set to δ = 0.02
and η = 0.08 targeting a job destruction rate of 0.01 as well as a vacancy filling rate
of 0.325 (see Michaillat (2012)20). Finally, I target market tightness to equal unity (as
in Shimer (2005)21, which pins down the productivity shifter to ε = 0.5.
To illustrate different labor market responses, the model is simulated not only for the
baseline value of firing costs, but instead for the whole range of potential firing cost values.
In specific, I calculate the models equilibrium for all f ∈ (0, 2.5). This range covers the
laissez-faire (f = 0) equilibrium, the baseline specification (f = 0.27) as well as European
levels of firing costs (f = 1.89).22
20Michaillat estimates the job destruction and finding rates from the seasonally adjusted monthly
series for total separations and hirings in all non-farm industries constructed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for the December 2000-
June 2009 period.
21In Shimers model targeting a market tightness of unity is a normalization as market tightness
is intrinsically meaningless in his model. Although this is not the case in my model, I follow Shimers
calibration because an equalized vacancy-unemployment ratio represents a natural benchmark while
also being an empirically plausible value in a rather tight labor market.
22Empirically firing costs range between one (U.S.) and seven months of production (see Bartels-
man, Gautier, and Wind (2016)). Taken purely mechanically, this translates into values for the firing
cost parameter f ranging from f = 3.6 to f = 25.2 (weekly output in the model is roughly 0.9). How-
ever, taken into account the setup of the model this is not sensible. In the model each separation in-
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To investigate whether firing costs impact the labor market differently depending
on the initial labor market state, the model is simulated using 4 different values ω ∈
[0.60, 0.615, 0.63, 0.645] for the wage constant. As aggregate productivity remains con-
stant, these differences translate into differences in the wage-to-productivity ratio, hence
representing four different states of the labor market. With a high real wage, the labor
market is sluggish, which is reflected in severe job rationing, whereas search frictions do
not play an important role. The opposite is true if the real wage is low: competition
for workers is high, which makes search frictions the main driver of unemployment (see
Michaillat (2012)).
Table 2.2 – Calibration Results
Unemployment f =0 f =2.5
Xω = 0.6
Total 2.19 2.00
Frictional 14.96 -0.11
Rationing -12.77 2.18
Xω = 0.615
Total 4.14 9.18
Frictional 8.888 0.09
Rationing -4.74 9.09
Xω = 0.63
Total 6.68 15.38
Frictional 4.12 0.03
Rationing 2.55 15.35
Xω = 0.645
Total 10.68 21.05
Frictional 1.50 0.02
Rationing 9.18 21.03
Notes: The Table displays total, frictional and rationing unemployment in % for four different wage
regimes with and without firing costs. Source: Own simulations.
Table 2.2 shows total, frictional and rationing unemployment in percent for each wage
volves paying firing costs. In reality two thirds of job separations happen by mutual agreement (for job
sorting, life cycle or personal reasons). In addition, half of the remaining separations are due to discon-
tinuing temporary jobs. Only about 15% of all layoffs can be attributed to retrenchments (see D’Arcy,
Gustafsson, Lewis, and Wiltshire (2012)). Retrenchments may be either a job closure or a dismissal.
If firing costs have to be paid for 50% of all retrenchments (which seems to be a sensible proxy) this
implies that only 7.5% of all dismissals are associated with paying firing costs. Taking this into account
implies an empirically plausible range for f between 0.27 and 1.89 which fits well into the range used in
the simulation.
42
regimes either with very high (f = 2.5) or without firing costs (f = 0). For a graphical
illustration of all equilibria between f = 0 and f = 2.5, see Figure B.4 in the Appendix.
If the wage is very low (ω = 0.6), unemployment equals 2.19% before firing costs
are introduced. Remarkably, rationing unemployment is highly negative -12.77%. Hence,
there would be a shortage of labor in the absence of search frictions. With search fric-
tions, such a shortage never occurs, as market tightness and thus recruiting costs approach
infinity once unemployment goes to zero. Even if the wage-to-productivity ratio is ex-
tremely low, there is always positive unemployment in an economy with search frictions.
Correspondingly, search unemployment, measured as the drop in labor demand caused
by recruiting cost, equals 14.96%. 23 With increasing firing costs, the expected pattern
materializes: rationing unemployment picks up, as the cost of employing a worker rises,
but remains negative until about f = 1.8. Conversely, frictional unemployment mono-
tonically decreases and reaches zero at f = 2.5. Most interestingly, total unemployment
is left nearly unaffected: it decreases from 2.19% (at f = 0) to 2% (at f = 2.5). The
independence of total unemployment from firing costs hides that firing cost massively
change the composition of unemployment from being entirely driven by search frictions to
being entirely driven by job rationing. This heavily affects the effectiveness of other labor
market policies. For example, if policy makers somehow manage to eliminate recruiting
cost (c = 0) unemployment would completely vanish in the equilibrium without firing
cost, while being not affected in the equilibrium with very high firing costs (f = 2.5).
Despite the slight increase in employment, firing costs lower output from 0.92 to 0.9
(see Figure B.6) as more workers are employed in low productive firms. From a welfare
point of view, it is not output, which is most relevant, but net output as defined as output
minus sunk costs. Recruiting expenditures definitely belong to sunk costs. Whether firing
costs are also sunk is not clear per se. If they consist of a severance payment, firing costs,
are simply a transfer between workers and firms (in the same way as the wage) and do not
belong to sunk costs. Instead, if firing costs mainly consist of legal costs or bureaucracy
23If, for example, NR = 1.02, we have uR = −0.02. With a total unemployment rate of 4% the drop
in labor demand (search unemployment) caused by search friction is 6%.
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costs they are lost for workers and firms and correspondingly have to be counted as
sunk. I measure net output using both interpretations of firing costs.24 If firing costs
are interpreted as severance payment, net output is almost unaffected by them. Lower
gross output is compensated by lower recruiting expenditures. Instead, if firing cost are
sunk, net output decreases in firing costs as long as f < 2. At f = 2, net output
reaches a minimum and then slightly increases again. The latter happens as turnover
heavily declines at very high levels of firing costs. Lower turnover implies less firings
and thus lower total firing cost. Overall, EPL performs remarkably well in a labor market
with low wage-to-productivity ratio: employment is marginally positively affected, output
decreases only slightly, while net output even stays constant (if firing costs are severance
payments). Apparently EPL benefits like higher job security and longer employment
spells25 can be obtained at no costs.
Turning to the high wage labor market (ω = 0.645) completely reverses this impres-
sion. In this scenario, unemployment before introducing firing costs equals 10.68%. With
increasing firing costs, unemployment heavily increases and reaches 21.03% at f = 2.5.
In this economy, search frictions do not matter much: only 1.5% can be attributed to
them before firing costs are introduced. At f = 2.5, frictional unemployment is again
zero. Hence, the decrease in frictional unemployment is quantitatively small (compared
to total unemployment) as search frictions do not matter much in the first place. As
rationing unemployment strongly increases (similarly as it does in the low wage setup),
EPL has a strong adverse effect on employment. The positive effect via lower turnover is
only small as turnover is not very costly due to low market tightness (see Figure B.5 in
the Appendix).
The negative employment effect directly passes through on output: compared with the
low wage equilibrium, gross output decreases far more steeply in firing costs, because lower
aggregate employment reinforces the negative effect of decreasing average productivity.
24Note that the models equilibrium is unaffected by the specific type of firing costs, as wages and
labor supply are fixed.
25Note that, although important in reality, these benefits are not explicitly valued in the model.
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Net output defined as output minus recruiting costs very closely resembles the course of
output as market tightness and, thus, recruiting expenditures are low for the whole range
of firing costs. Correspondingly, savings in recruiting cost caused by lower turnover can
not even closely make up for the loss in gross output. Quantitatively, net output decreases
by around 9%, when firing costs increase from f = 0 to f = 2.5. If firing costs are counted
as sunk costs, the negative effect on net output even increases to about 11%.
If ω = 0.615 and ω = 0.63 outcomes range between the previously discussed results,
ensuring that unemployment composition matters in a continuous way when assessing the
effects of firing costs. The observed decrease in search unemployment is key for under-
standing why the composition of unemployment matters. This decrease occurs, because
market tightness is monotonically decreasing in firing costs throughout all wage regimes
(see Figure B.5 in the Appendix). Appendix B.1 provides a theoretical proof for this re-
lationship. Intuitively, market tightness decreases primarily because firing costs suppress
labor turnover, implying that less vacancies are needed for a given level of employment.
In most equilibria, there is a second effect working in the same direction: a higher level of
total unemployment implying lower market tightness.26 The latter causes lower recruiting
costs per worker
(
c
m(x)
)
, which in turn decrease frictional unemployment.27
2.3 Empirical Evidence
2.3.1 Outline
The empirical analysis in this paper builds on the difference-in-difference approach used
by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006). Currently, they provide the most reliable es-
timates regarding general labor market effects of EPL. Specifically, they measure the
26This is the same channel which causes the negative dependency of frictional unemployment and
the wage-to-productivity ratio.
27Except for the case where labor demand is increasing in recruiting costs. These equilibria, how-
ever, do not satisfy the equilibrium refinement condition (see equation (2.20))
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effects on employment and wages of wrongful-dismissal laws adopted by U.S. state courts
during the 1970s till the 1990s. As heterogeneity between U.S. states is smaller than
between countries, the common-trend assumption used in their difference- in-difference28
identification strategy is more likely to be satisfied compared to a cross country study.
Basically, Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) assume that the systematic difference in
employment over time between adopting and non-adopting states can be attributed to
the introduction of wrongful-dismissal laws. Identification is discussed in greater detail
in section 2.3.4. The present paper uses the same dataset29, but augments the analy-
sis by taking into account the composition of steady state unemployment before EPL is
introduced.
As the components of unemployment are not directly observable, Proposition 1 can-
not be tested directly. The prediction of the model depends on whether differences in
unemployment are driven by differences in the wage-to-productivity ratio or by differ-
ences in matching efficiency (see section B.3 in the Appendix for details). As regional
differences in matching efficiency within a country are likely to be small (see Sunde and
Fahr (2002)), I restrict matching efficiency to be constant across counties. 30 Given this
assumption, rationing unemployment matters most if total unemployment is high, while
unemployment is driven by search frictions, if total unemployment is low. This leads to
the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. The higher the unemployment rate before EPL is introduced (before treat-
ment), the more adverse is the employment effect of EPL.
28Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) implement the difference-in-difference design by using a two-
way fixed effects regression model which includes state- as well as time fixed effects.
29Using the same data increases comparability of our results to those obtained by Autor, Donohue,
and Schwab (2006).
30To take into account differences in matching efficiency, state level vacancy data would be neces-
sary. Unfortunately, there is no regional vacancy data available for the relevant time period in the U.S.
.
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Figure 2.1 – The Figure shows the staged adoption of wrongful-
dismissal laws by U.S. state courts between the mid 1970s and the
mid 1990s. Source: Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006)
2.3.2 Wrongful-Dismissal Laws
The United States have a long tradition of employment at will, that is, both parties
(employer and employee) have the right to terminate the employment relationship at any
time. However, during the 1970s and 1980s the majority of U.S. state courts adopted
one or more common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine. These wrongful-
dismissal laws protect workers from being laid off in different ways, which are briefly
discussed below. The three distinct wrongful-dismissal laws used in the analysis are (i)
the public-policy exception, (ii) the good-faith exception and (iii) the implied-contract
exception.
The public policy exception (PP) prohibits firing a worker for an act that is consistent
with public policy31 and at the same time for refusing an act that is inconsistent with
31Take a worker who knows that his employer violates safety standards. Laying off a worker, be-
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public policy.32 The public-policy exception was widely recognized. By 1999, 43 U.S.
states had adopted the policy. However, courts restrict the application of the public-
policy exception to violations of law instead of violations of public-policy in a broader
sense. Thus, its direct economic importance is limited.
As suggested by its name, the good-faith exception (GF) requires employers to layoff
workers only with just cause. The interpretation of the good faith exception is vague.
Broadly applied, its economic impact could be very far-reaching. It could be used as
general device against any layoff that is not due to economic necessity or poor performance.
However, courts normally limit the application to timing cases, in which the employer fires
a worker just before a large payment (bonus, pension benefits, etc.) is due. In contrast, to
the public-policy exception, the good-faith exception was only adopted by 11 state courts.
The implied-contract exception (IC) rules out layoffs without “just cause” if the em-
ployer raises the expectation that it is regular policy of the company to restrict layoffs to
situations of just cause.33 According to U.S state courts raising such expectations estab-
lishes an implicit contract between the employer and its employees. This is the case, for
example, if an internal personnel policy handbook states that it is the company’s policy
to terminate employment relationships only for just cause, or if the employee has a long
history of service or promotion. By 1999, the implied-contract exception was adopted by
41 U.S. state courts. Although, employers can evade the implied-contract exception by
simply checking personnel handbooks, it can be very important as a judgement based on
the implied-contract exception potentially impacts a large fraction of an employer’s work-
force. For a more elaborated discussion of the institutional details see Autor, Donohue,
and Schwab (2006), Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger (1992) and Schwab (1993).
cause he reports the information to the inspecting authority violates the public-policy exception.
32It violates the public policy-exception if the employer fires a worker, because the latter refuses to
commit perjury or to conduct industrial spying.
33Examples for “just cause” layoffs are redundancies due to business operations or layoffs due to
serious misbehavior of the employee.
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2.3.3 Data
The dataset used by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) is available on David Autors
webpage.34 The dataset contains detailed information about when and by which state
a particular wrongful-dismissal law was adopted. Note that it is not always completely
clear when a particular wrongful-dismissal law was adopted by a certain state. Autor,
Donohue, and Schwab (2006) consider a wrongful-dismissal law as adopted once a major
appellate-court signals adoption. In particular, this excludes lower court decisions that
have been reversed on appeal. To increase the usable variation in the adoption of wrongful-
dismissal laws (and thus precision of estimation), data is coded at monthly frequency.
Most wrongful-dismissal laws were adopted already in the early 1980s, whereas in the
1990s there is only little variation. State level unemployment data is taken from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). I use the employment-to-population ratio (as done
by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006)) and the unemployment rate as outcome variable.
2.3.4 The Empirical Model
Regression Equation
I adopt the empirical model estimated by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) extended
by an interaction term between the treatment indicator posti,t and the pre-treatment
average unemployment rate.35 The latter can be thought of as a proxy for steady state
unemployment before introduction of the WDL. Formerly, the model reads:
Yi,t =γi + γs ∗ treati,t + δt +Region ∗ Y ear+ (2.23)
θ1 ∗ posti,t + θ2(Ūi ∗ posti,t) + θ3 ∗ postposti,t + εi,t (2.24)
34The full dataset and all corresponding Stata files can be found here:
http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor/data/autdonschw06.
35Note that the main effect of the average pre-treatment unemployment rate is perfectly co-linear
with state dummies, as it does not contain any variation over time.
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where Yi,t is the log of the employment-to-population ratio, δt represents a full set of
time fixed effects, whereas γs represents a full set of state fixed effects. Region and Y ear
are sets of dummy variables representing calendar years and the four major regions of the
U.S.
treati,t is one for a particular observation if the observation belongs to the treatment
group. Like Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) I use a five year pre-post interval
implying that treati,t is one if state i has adopted the specific wrongful-dismissal law
1− 24 month after or 12− 36 month before the current date. Observations from the year
directly following treatment are excluded from the treatment group in order to allow for
an adjustment interval just after treatment.
The control group contains all observations stemming from states that did not adopt
any of the three doctrines during the relevant pre36- or post37-treatment interval. If there
is not a single state that had adopted the doctrine within the relevant time-span around
the current date, all observations from that date are dropped. This happens most often,
when analyzing the good-faith exception as it was adopted by only 11 states.
In contrast to treati,t, posti,t is one only for treatment group observations after treat-
ment, but not before treatment. postposti,t is one for observations belonging to a state
that had introduced the wrongful-dismissal law more than 36 month ago.
Time dummies absorb variation over time, which is identical across all states, whereas
state dummies absorb variation across states, which is constant over time. By using such
a two-way fixed effects setup it is possible to control for both time constant heterogeneity
across states and nationwide differences across time (e.g. business cycle fluctuations).
Additionally, the setup partially absorbs differences in the variation over time: first, the
interaction between state dummies and the treatment group indicator allows for system-
atic differences between treatment and control group states, that is, the estimated state
dummy is allowed to be different for the same state during the time when the state belongs
36The pre-treatment period contains the 24 months before treatment
37The post-treatment period contains the time-span 12− 36 month after treatment
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to the treatment group. Region by year dummies control for business cycle differences
across the four major U.S. regions. postpost dummies are meant to capture systematic
differences between control observations stemming from states which were treated in the
past and those, which were not.
Identification Strategy
In order to identify the causal effect of a wrongful-dismissal law, one has to assume that
all remaining systematic differences in variation over time between treatment and control
group observations are either directly caused by the introduction of the wrongful-dismissal
law or by (temporary) shocks, which are not correlated with the adoption of wrongful-
dismissal laws. This is identical to assume that there are no state-specific temporary
shocks, which are correlated with treatment status. Without the interaction term (Ūi ∗
posti,t) this assumption is enough to identify the models parameters.
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The inclusion of the interaction term, however, creates an additional threat to iden-
tification. Estimating equation (2.23) without the interaction term (which corresponds
exactly to the specification used in Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006)) reveals that
residuals are strongly autocorrelated. 39 It is exactly this autocorrelation, which makes
the interaction term likely to be endogenous.
To see this, assume state i introduces a wrongful-dismissal law in period t = τ and let
Ūi denote the average unemployment rate in the pre-treatment period. As unemployment
is strongly correlated with the outcome variable,40 it follows that Ūi is directly correlated
with the error terms from all pre-treatment periods, that is, εi,τ−24 to εi,τ−1. That alone
would not be a problem, but as error terms are highly autocorrelated this translates
38If the assumption is violated, estimation would suffer from an omitted variable bias.
39Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) use Huber-White standard errors clustered by state in order
to be able to compute consistent standard errors despite the presence of strong serial autocorrelation.
40The outcome variable is either the employment-to-population ratio, or the unemployment rate
itself.
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immediately into a significant correlation between Ūi and εi,t for t = τ + 12 until t =
τ + 36. Correspondingly, the interaction term is potentially Ū∗i posti,t correlated with the
contemporaneous error term that causes an endogeneity bias.41
As a solution I use an instrumental variable (IV) approach. A valid instrument has
to be correlated with the endogenous variable but not with the error term. This is
the case if the instrument impacts the outcome variable via the endogenous variable,
but is not correlated with any of the variables omitted in the error term. To derive
such an instrument I estimate equation (2.23) without the interaction term and with
(log) unemployment as the dependent variable (“auxiliary regression”) and collect the
fitted values. The fitted values directly translate into estimated values for the level of
unemployment, which are then used to construct estimated values for the pre-treatment
unemployment rate.
The estimated values are by construction uncorrelated with empirical residuals. Given
the validity of the identifying assumptions used by Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006)
they are also asymptotically42 uncorrelated with the true error term . This implies that the
average pre-treatment unemployment rate constructed from fitted values can be used as
an instrument for the actual average pre-treatment unemployment rate. The instrument is
valid as it is correlated with the endogenous variable, but as outlined above, uncorrelated
with the model’s error term.
In general, using an estimated regressor renders standard errors to be wrong, because
estimated regressors only proxy the regressors of interest. However, this is not the case
41In general it is possible to consistently estimate an interaction term even if one of the involved re-
gressors is endogenous. This is the case if the correlation of that variable with the error term does not
depend on hte other variable involved in the interaction. In this case, the correlation of Ūi and the er-
ror is not allowed to depend on posti,t. However, we do not rely on this assumption but instead using
an instrumental variable approach to prevent endogeneity in the first place. For a detailed description
of the necessary conditions for consistent estimation of interaction terms see section 3.4.2 of this Dis-
sertation.
42It is safe to rely on asymptotic arguments as there are at least 7000 in any regression performed in
the paper
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here. Note that asymptotically the predicted value equals the systemic part (Xβ) of the
actual value, which is exactly the desired instrument. The predicted value is not a proxy
for the true value, but it is the actual variable of interest (i.e. the desired instrument).
This implies that the variance of the true error term of the auxiliary regression (differences
between predicted and actual value which are not due to differences between the true β
and β̂) does not matter. A problem would only arise if β̂ 6= β. In this case, the predicted
value would not be exactly equal to the systemic part, implying that the systemic part
could only be observed with an error. However, as plim β̂ = β this is relevant only in
small samples.
2.3.5 Results
Table 2.3 – Interaction Term Results
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Variable IC PP GF Region
ln(epop) -0.128 -0.602 -2.264 Yes
(0.479) (0.050) (0.002)
ln(epop) -0.426 -0.833 -2.026 No
(0.133) (0.039) (0.012)
ln(unemprate) -1.642 4.839 18.789 Yes
(0.368) (0.078) (0.001)
ln(unemprate) 0.963 7.042 22.242 No
(0.882) (0.051) (0.003)
Notes: The Table displays coefficients on the interaction term between posti, tand pre-treatment
average unemployment Ūi. Each coefficient stems from a different regression. Models are weighted
by each state’s share of national population aged 16-64 (in each month) using CPS sampling weights.
P-values in parentheses are computed using Huber-White standard errors which allow for unrestricted
error correlation within states. The column “Region” refers to whether or not region-by-year dummies
are included. Region here means one of the four major regions in the U.S.
I estimate equation (2.23) for all three wrongful-dismissal laws. I choose the employment-
to-population ratio and the unemployment rate as dependent variable. In the former case,
empirical results confirm my theoretical proposition if the coefficient on the interaction
term is significantly negative, whereas in the latter case it should be significantly positive.
Table 2.3 shows all estimated interaction term coefficients as well as the corresponding p-
values. Beside testing the paper’s main hypothesis, the section also evaluates the marginal
effect of EPL on the two outcome variables at different values of average pre-treatment
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unemployment. 43
Interaction Term
First, consider the implied-contract exception. When the employment-to-population ratio
is used as dependent variable, point estimates are in line with theory (that is, negative),
however p-values indicate that the estimated coefficients are not significantly different
from zero. The insignificance is particularly striking once regional dummies are included.
Turning to unemployment as dependent variable reveals that the point estimate even
changes its sign depending on whether regional dummies are included or not. Without
regional dummies it is positive (and thus in line with theory), while turning negative once
regional dummies are included. Overall results suggest that the pre-treatment unemploy-
ment rate does not significantly influences the way the labor market is affected by an
adoption of the implied-contract exception.
Regarding the public-policy exception results draw a fairly different picture. First, all
signs are now in line with theory regardless whether the employment-to-population ratio
or the unemployment rate is chosen as dependent variable. Using the employment-to-
population ratio leads to a point estimate for the interaction term coefficient of −0.833
without regional dummies. Regional dummies slightly decrease the absolute value of the
estimated coefficient to −0.602, however, the coefficient remains significant at the 5%
confidence level. Economically, these results imply that an increase in the average pre-
treatment unemployment rate by 1 percentage point boosts the negative effect of EPL by
0.6% to 0.8% percentage points. Replacing the dependent variable with unemployment
reveals that results are remarkably robust: Still the sign of all coefficients are well in
line with theory, that is, a higher pre-treatment unemployment rate amplifies the posi-
tive effect of EPL. Quantitatively, I find that the increase in the unemployment rate due
43Note that, as the marginal effect consists of a combination between the coefficient on posti,t and
the coefficient on the interaction term, it is necessary to employ the Delta-method to obtain correct
standard errors. When using the STATA command margins the Delta-method is used by default.
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to the adoption of the public-policy exception is between 4.8% (with regional dummies)
and 7% (without regional dummies) higher when the pre-treatment average unemploy-
ment rate increases by 1 percentage point. The corresponding p-values are between 0.05
(without regional dummies) and 0.08 (with regional dummies) indicating significance at
conventional confidence levels.
Results for the good-faith exception provide even stronger evidence in favor of the
papers main proposition: invariably all point estimates are well in line with theory and
highly significant (at the 1% confidence level). Correspondingly, the estimated coefficients
are larger than in case of the public-policy exception. In case of the employment-to-
population ratio (unemployment rate), the adverse effect of EPL is strengthened by about
2 (20) percentage points for every percentage point the pre-treatment unemployment rate
is higher.44
Marginal Effects
The second quantity of interest is the marginal employment effect of introducing a spe-
cific wrongful-dismissal law. These marginal effects are shown in Tables B.1 to B.3 in
Appendix section B.4 . In the absence of an interaction term the marginal effect is simply
given by the coefficient on posti,t which is θ1. Once the interaction term is taken into
account the the marginal effect reads θ1 + θ2Ūi. As already pointed out above, it is the
sign of θ2 that determines whether the marginal effect is increasing or decreasing in av-
erage pre-treatment unemployment. Although marginal effects can be directly obtained
using the formula stated above, computation of consistent standard errors requires us-
44Note that coefficients on both the main effect and the interaction term are naturally higher when
the unemployment rate and not the employment-to-population ratio is chosen as dependent variable.
The reason is simple: First, the model is written down in semi-log form, implying that coefficients mea-
sure the percentage change in the outcome variable due to an one unit increase of the explanatory
variable. Second, the absolute level of the unemployment is far smaller than the absolute level of the
employment-to population-ratio. Thus, the same change in absolute numbers gives rise to a far larger
percentage change if the unemployment rate is the dependent variable.
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ing the Delta method.45 Note that estimated standard errors increase in the absolute
distance between the current value of pre-treatment unemployment and its mean. Thus,
it is possible that a specific marginal effect is less significant for some extreme value of
pre-treatment unemployment. Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean as well as for
values two and four units above and below.
Implied-Contract Exception Again I start by considering the implied-contract ex-
ception (see Table B.1 ). With employment-to-population as dependent variable and
pre-treatment unemployment evaluated at its mean, marginal effects approximately co-
incide with the results from Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006)46. The small, negative
interaction term coefficient implies that the marginal effect is somewhat smaller for low
values and somewhat larger for high values of pre-treatment unemployment. As standard
errors go up when evaluating marginal effects far off the mean, marginal effects become
insignificant when evaluated at a very low value of pre-treatment unemployment (4 units
below its mean). In contrast, if it is evaluated at a high pre-treatment unemployment rate,
the marginal effects are large enough to stay significant despite larger estimated standard
errors. Turning to unemployment as dependent variable reveals that marginal effects are
less significant compared to the model with employment-to-population. If pre-treatment
unemployment is evaluated at its mean the marginal effect still remains significant. This
holds in particular, if regional dummies are included (p-value 0.023). However, as the
coefficient on the interaction term is very small (compared to the main effect), larger
standard errors lead to insignificance once marginal effects are evaluated for high or low
values of pre-treatment unemployment.
Public-Policy Exception One more time the public-policy exception reveals a rather
different picture (see Table B.2). Marginal effects are highly insignificant when evalu-
ated at the mean of average pre-treatment unemployment. This is inline with the result
45The Delta method can easily be implemented by using the STATA command margins.
46Clearly, results do not exactly coincide as the inclusion of an additional regressor (the interaction
term) lowers estimation precision leading to somewhat different point estimates.
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of Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) who does not find any significant effect of the
public policy exception. However, marginal effects become significant when being evalu-
ated at very low or very high values of the moderator. This holds true no matter whether
the employment-to-population or the unemployment rate is chosen as dependent vari-
able.47 If average pre-treatment unemployment takes on a value two units below its mean,
the employment-to-population ratio (the unemployment rate) significantly increases (de-
creases) when the public-policy exception is introduced. This corresponds to the case in
which the positive effect of a lower job destruction rate outweighs the negative effect of
a lower job finding rate. Spoken differently, the decrease in frictional unemployment is
larger than the increase in rationing unemployment. The story reverses, once the marginal
effect is evaluated at a very high value of the moderator (two units above its mean). This
case corresponds to an sluggish economy with rationing unemployment contributing the
main part to total unemployment. Now, adopting the public-policy exception has a detri-
mental effect on labor market performance. It lowers the employment-to-population ratio
and increases the unemployment rate. Significance is somewhat lower compared to the
case of a low moderator value, although p-values remain around 0.1, indicating at least
weak significance. Note that in both cases the estimated are significant despite large esti-
mated standard errors, which arise because the marginal effects are evaluated far off the
mean of average pre-treatment unemployment. Marginal effects clearly reflect the large
and significant coefficients on the interaction term, discussed above.
Good-Faith Exception Table B.3 reveals that marginal effects of the good-faith excep-
tion draw a similar pattern to those of the public-policy exception. They are insignificant
when evaluated at the mean of average pre-treatment unemployment, which again corre-
sponds to the result of Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006). When marginal effects are
evaluated at very high and very low levels of average pre-treatment unemployment, the
large coefficient on the interaction term unfolds its impact: for low values of the moder-
47Again significance levels are somewhat higher if the dependent variable is given by the
employment-to-population ratio.
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ator (one unit below the moderators mean), adopting the public-policy exception leads
to a significant improvement of labor market conditions. The employment-to-population
ratio increases by about 3.5%, whereas the unemployment rate drops by around 30%
(with regional dummies) to 40% (without regional dummies). In contrast, for high levels
of average pre-treatment unemployment (one unit above its mean), the public-policy ex-
ception has a strong detrimental effect on both the employment-to-population ratio and
the unemployment rate. The effect on the former is between 4 to 5%, while the effect
on the latter is about 45-50%. Clearly, all coefficients are highly significant (at the 1%
confidence level)48
Interpretation
Overall, results draw a somewhat mixed picture. Regarding the public-policy and the
good-faith exception, the analysis provides strong evidence in favor of the papers main
proposition. The estimated coefficients on the interaction term are significant and have
the desired sign throughout (almost) all specifications. Correspondingly, marginal effects
behave as expected: the insignificance results reported in Autor, Donohue, and Schwab
(2006) vanish when marginal effects are evaluated at low or high values of average pre-
treatment unemployment. The economic message behind these results is clear: although
the public-policy and good-faith exception do not affect the employment-to-population
ratio and the unemployment rate in a typical U.S. state, they do have strong effects when
being introduced in a notably strong or weak labor market. Adopting the public-policy or
good-faith exception has positive labor markets effects in states with low unemployment,
while adverse effects dominate in labor markets with high unemployment. This provides
strong evidence for the mechanism proposed in the theory section: EPL lowers frictional
unemployment, but increases rationing unemployment. Thus, it has adverse effects in
markets driven by job rationing, but favorable effects in markets driven by search frictions.
48Note that due to the very large interaction term coefficients marginal effects evaluated two units
below or above of the mean cannot be reliably estimated, as the model specification abstracts from
second order effects. In order to avoid confusion, the corresponding results are omitted from Table B.3.
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As rationing is likely to occur in sluggish labor markets, EPL widens the gap between
strong and weak markets. Many states adopted wrongful-dismissal laws during the 1970s
and 1980s. Interestingly, one can observe a sharp rise in U.S. income inequality during
the same time period. 49
The promising results for the public-policy and good-faith exception do not translate
to the implied-contract exception. Data does not sufficiently support the proposition
that pre-treatment unemployment (and thus unemployment composition) has a significant
impact on the way the implied-contract exception influences the labor market. Instead,
the implied contract exception seems to have detrimental labor market effects in any case
(although less significant in labor markets with low pre-treatment unemployment).
There are two possible explanations for the observed pattern: first, the implied-
contract exception could be structurally different from the other two wrongful-dismissal
laws. This perception is supported by the fact that it is the only wrongful-dismissal law
for which Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) found significant effects on labor market
performance. One explanation is that firms quickly adapt to the implied-contract excep-
tion by updating their recruitment process including a careful revision of new employment
contracts and policy handbooks. The complication of the recruitment process may not be
limited to the initial adoption as continuous effort is needed to safely prevent the forma-
tion of implicit contracts. In this way, the implied-contract exception act more as a law
which imposes additional recruiting costs instead of firing costs. An increase in recruiting
costs unambiguously leads to lower employment / higher unemployment independent of
the composition of unemployment. If this mechanism is true, obtained results are well
in line with theoretical predictions. Alternatively, insignificance results from a downward
bias caused by omitting matching efficiency (see section B.3 in the Appendix).
49The Gini-Index for the U.S. rose from about 39 at the beginning of the 1970s to about 45 at the
beginning of the 1990s.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of EPL on labor market performance taking into account
the composition of unemployment. The paper outlines a stylized equilibrium matching
model, which features diminishing marginal returns to labor and real wage rigidities.
The model suggests that EPL unambiguously increases rationing unemployment while
having a favorable effect on frictional unemployment. The first effect arises due to a
lower marginal value of employing a worker (net of hiring costs), while the second effect
is caused by lower recruiting costs, which arise due to lower labor market tightness.
Calibrating the model reveals that the overall effect of EPL crucially depends on initial
unemployment composition. If unemployment is mainly driven by search frictions, the
positive channel via lower recruiting costs is strong enough to offset the negative effect
caused by a lower marginal value of employing a worker. In contrast, if rationing unem-
ployment is the main contributor to overall unemployment, the reduction in recruiting
costs is only negligible, causing EPL to unfold strong adverse labor market effects.
The empirical part of the paper tests this theoretical prediction using data on the
adoption of wrongful-dismissal laws by U.S. state courts. Under the assumption of a
constant matching efficiency, average pre-treatment unemployment is used as an indicator
for the composition of unemployment. Results confirm the theoretical prediction for both
the public-policy and the good-faith exception. In contrast, results regarding the implied-
contract exception indicate that unemployment composition does not play a significant
role in moderating labor market effects. A possible explanation for this phenomenon could
be that firms adopt to the implied-contract exception, which complicates the recruiting
process without actually affecting firing costs.
Overall, theoretical and empirical results indicate that taking into account the compo-
sition of unemployment is crucial when assessing aggregate labor market effects of EPL.
Moreover, EPL is likely to act as an amplifier of regional differences in labor market
performance.
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Chapter 3
Labor Market Consequences of
Increased Broadband Availability -
Evidence from German Micro Data1
3.1 Introduction
Advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) have constituted the
major technological change since 1980’s. The first decades of the ”IT Revolution” were
marked by the penetration of computers, the more recent ICT changes relate to the avail-
ability of high-speed Internet enabled by the rapid expansion of broadband infrastructure.
While policy-makers emphasize ICT benefits such as higher productivity and job cre-
ation, existing empirical evidence points toward factor non-neutrality of these technolog-
ical changes. This phenomenon was labeled “skill biased technological change” (SBTC).2
People of different educational and occupational groups appear to benefit unequally from
1This chapter is based on joint work with Nadzeya Laurentsyeva.
2Effect of Internet: Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015); Atasoy (2013); Forman, Goldfarb, and
Greenstein (2012). Older generations of IT: Katz and Autor (1999); Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003);
Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006).
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the availability of ICT. Quantifying and understanding this bias has important policy
implications. Public and private spending on broadband infrastructure may not reach
the desirable welfare improvements if losses are not mitigated by designing appropriate
compensation schemes or by providing complementary investments in necessary skills.
This project investigates the labor market effects of the development in broadband
infrastructure. We link data on the gradual rollout of the broadband Internet in Germany
to labor market and firm data from the German linked employer-employee dataset (LIAB)
and the BIBB labor force survey. We analyze if the availability of broadband changes
the output elasticities and wages of different workers. To that end, we classify workers
according to their formal education or routinization of their job. Our results confirm
the presence of a skill bias. Broadband upward shifts the output elasticity of skilled
workers (workers in low-routine occupations), while lowering the output elasticity of low-
skilled workers (workers in high-routine occupations). A 10 percentage point increase in
broadband availability raises the output elasticity of non-routine workers by about 0.5-
0.7 percentage points. At the same time, the output elasticity of workers in high-routine
occupations drops by about 1 percentage point. The change in output elasticities partly
passes through to workers’ wages: we find a significant negative effect of broadband on
the relative wage of workers in highly routinized occupations. A 10 percentage point
increase in broadband decreases the relative wage of these workers by about 0.25-0.56%.
In contrast, when workers are classified by formal education, we do not find corresponding
wage effects.
We link these asymmetric labor market effects to changes in firm production processes,
which are possible due to the availability of broadband. Cloud computing helps to stan-
dardize IT systems within and between firms, hence reducing the need to manually convert
or transfer data between departments and establishments. Moreover, broadband allows
firms to centralize some functions, such as quality assurance or product distribution. For
example, complex machines become increasingly cross-linked and react autonomously to
changes in the environment and to new requirements. Branch establishments (for instance,
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branch banks) become redundant due to the availability of centralized online services. All
of these processes reduce the required amount of routinized labor (broadband substitutes
routine labor). Economically, broadband increases the effective amount of routinized la-
bor. In turn, the law of decreasing marginal returns implies a lower marginal productivity
of routinized workers, which finally leads to lower demand for this type of labor.3 In con-
trast, demand for non-routine workers, who use broadband to perform complementary
tasks, increases. In addition, demand for some non-routine workers increases directly as
broadband applications need to be implemented.
We complement the analysis by looking at the broadband effects that take place out-
side of firms. Specifically, we investigate whether broadband alters the wage penalty
associated with past unemployment spells. With the widespread availability of broad-
band Internet, new communication methods like video conferences, web videos, or Voice
over IP become feasible. This might facilitate job search, by enlarging the usual geograph-
ical or occupational labor markets and by enabling workers to approach more employers.
Skype interviews and online assessment centers can further increase matching efficiency.
Moreover, broadband Internet gives access to online labor markets and makes it easier
to improve own human capital through various online-learning platforms. Hence, broad-
band slows down human capital deterioration during an unemployment spell. Do these
improvements benefit different workers equally or is the access to these benefits also char-
acterized by the skill bias? We find that a 10 percentage point increase in broadband
availability lowers the penalty to unemployment (which is equal to 23%) by about one
percentage point. In line with SBTC, we find that the effect is not present for workers in
highly routinized occupations.
For the identification of the effects, we exploit the county-level variation in timing of
the broadband expansion. In Germany, the biggest telecommunication company Deutsche
Telekom started to roll out broadband infrastructure in 2000. By 2005, broadband cover-
age (at 384 kbit/s) has already constituted 60%. By 2010, it has reached 96%. Initially, the
3While firms may find some “useful” routinized task for their employees even when their original
task gets automated the value added by performing those additional tasks is likely to be lower.
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profit-maximizing behavior of telecommunication providers determined the geographical
spread-out of broadband. Profitability depends almost exclusively on observable county
characteristics, which do not vary much over time.4 Consequently, endogeneity issues
can be resolved by including county and time fixed effects. To increase confidence in our
identification, we allow time dummies to depend on initial county characteristics. Given
these controls, residual variation in broadband availability can be treated as exogenous
to labor market outcomes and firm performance.
To measure the differential effect of broadband, we need to estimate the coefficients
on interaction terms. Although interaction terms have played an important role in many
empirical studies, most authors (including Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015)) only
try to convince the reader why their treatment variable is exogenous. The seminal paper
by Bun and Harrison (2014), however, shows that consistent estimation of interaction
terms requires further assumptions. Our paper discusses these assumptions, reveals po-
tential biases and carefully explains how to interpret the estimated coefficients.
This paper contributes to the broad literature on technological change in general and
on the effects of information and communication technologies (ICT) in specific. Empirical
evidence indicates that higher productivity is not harmful for aggregate employment: for
example, van Ark, Frankema, and Duteweerd (2004) found a strong correlation between
per capita income, productivity, and employment at least in the medium term. Other
papers (see Basu, Fernald, and KimKimball (2006) and Kim, Lim, and Park (2010))
find that positive technology shocks lead to lower employment only in the short run, but
increase employment in the medium run. As shown by Chen, Rezai, and Semmler (2007)
a similar relationship also holds when unemployment (instead of employment) is used to
characterize the labor market state. Yet, some scholars are concerned that the previously
found positive correlation between productivity, growth and employment does not hold
anymore, a phenomenon called the great decoupling (Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011)
and Rotman (2013)).
4These characteristics include total population, population density as well as the employment-to-
population ratio. See section 3.4.1 for details.
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Besides aggregate labor market outcomes, factor non-neutrality of new technologies
(SBTC) presents another major concern in the literature. Acemoglu (2003), Bond and
Reenen (2007), and Goldin and Katz (2007) survey corresponding studies. Using German
data, Spitz-Oener (2006) finds that skill requirements have increased most rapidly in
occupations, which have experienced extensive computerization. Dustmann, Ludsteck,
and Schönberg (2009) point out that technological change is an important explanation for
the widening of the wage distribution in Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. Akerman,
Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015) exploit the progressive rollout of broadband in Norway to
compare its effects on wages, employment, and output elasticities of labor. Similarly to
our results, they report that broadband increases the output elasticity of skilled versus
unskilled workers. They also find corresponding effects on wages.
In using the degree of routinization to classify workers, our paper relates to the liter-
ature on job polarization, introduced by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). The authors
were the first to study the differential effect of computerization by looking directly at
occupational tasks, rather than educational credentials. They provide evidence that com-
puter technology substitutes routine tasks and thus decreases demand for jobs requiring
the corresponding skills. As most of these jobs (for example, manual assemblers or clerks)
are medium-paid, this leads to an asymmetric effect at the top and at the bottom of the
wage distribution.5 While ICT substitutes for routine tasks often performed at middle-
paid jobs, it cannot easily replace low-skilled, service-type jobs, which often exhibit direct
client interaction and, correspondingly, a low level of routinization. Autor and Dorn
(2013) argue along these lines to explain the growth of low-skill service occupations in
the U.S. since 1980. They hypothesize that workers performing routine task (like book-
keepers or administrative officers) reallocate into service occupations. Although formal
education and routinization are correlated (in the sense that high formal education implies
5Feng and Graetz (2015) develop a model that distinguishes between a task’s engineering complex-
ity and its training requirements. When two tasks are equally complex, firms will automate the task
that requires more training and in which labor is hence more expensive. Under quite general conditions
this leads to job polarization, a decline in middle wage jobs relative to both high and low wage jobs.
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lower routinization), the mapping is far from being one-to-one. For example, only about
39.72% of German low-skilled workers actually work in highly routinized occupations.
Against this background, we expect our routine measure to be more precise in capturing
task-biased technological change compared to rough measures of formal education.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the data as well
as key descriptive statistics. Section 3.3 outlines some details on the institutional back-
ground of broadband Internet in Germany. Section 3.4 discusses key identifying assump-
tions. Section 3.5 and 3.6 outline our regression models and discuss empirical evidence
for skill-biased technological change as well as for the relation between broadband and
past unemployment spells. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
3.2.1 Data
LIAB Data
The core dataset in our analysis is the linked employer-employee data provided by the In-
stitute for Employment Research (IAB) of the Federal Employment Agency called LIAB.
The data combines survey information on German establishments with labor market bi-
ographies of matched employees. We use the Longitudinal Model, which spans the period
1993-2010.6 The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual panel study of establishments
in all branches and of all sizes with at least one employee covered by social security.
Employee biography data stems from the administrative social security records and cov-
ers all employment spells and benefit receipts of matched workers throughout 1993-2010.
For a more detailed description of LIAB, we refer to Heining, Scholz, and Seth (2013)
and Fischer, Janik, Mueller, and Schmucker (2009). Table 3.1 summarizes the available
6The data after 2011 has become publicly available only in June 2016.
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dataset.
Table 3.1 – Dataset Summary: Number of Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Individuals 1474395 1399295 1403499 1408574 1394541 1354048
Full-time 1005607 943311 963777 974875 956089 937558
Linked to firms 789665 649208 663951 684411 581751 486906
Firms 9489 9882 10112 10578 9837 8926
Source: LIAB dataset
For our analysis, we use LIAB data from 2006-2010 as well as from 2000.7 We collapse
the dataset to a person-year level. If an employee works at more than one establishment
during a calendar year, we keep the establishment that paid the largest wage bill as the
main employer and drop other observations for this individual-year. To the extent that
most workers in the sample have only one employer during a year (the average number of
employment spells is 1.1), this transformation should not affect our results. Prior to that,
we calculate the annual wage income received from all employers, the annual number of
days in unemployment, and the annual amount of obtained social-security money.
For the worker-level regressions LIAB provides information on daily wages, education,
3-digit occupation codes, unemployment spells as well as demographics. Wage data is
right-censored at the highest level of earnings subject to social security; censoring ap-
plies to around 7.5% of all observations. We tackle the censoring problem using two
different approaches: the first approach drops all censored observations, while the second
uses an imputation procedure.8 For the establishment-level regressions, we aggregate the
individual-level dataset on the establishment level and merge it with the IAB Establish-
7Our broadband data covers years 2006-2010, and we use the fact, that in 2000 broadband coverage
was zero in all counties.
8The imputation procedure follows Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009).
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ment Panel. Before the aggregation, we limit the sample to full-time workers only and
calculate labor input by skill and routinization level for each establishment. Our dataset
contains information on establishments’ sales, capital9, material inputs and firm age. We
can also see the industry (5-digit level) and county, where the establishment operates.
Worker Classification
To classify workers in different skill groups, we adopt two approaches. First, we use
information on formal education to assign workers to a low-skill group if their highest
attainment is Volks/Haupt/Mittelschule; to a medium-skill - if they completed Abitur;
and to a high-skill - if they have a University or a Fachhochschule degree.
As outlined in the introduction, education is only a very rough proxy of the actual
tasks performed by different workers. Hence, we also classify workers using an index
that captures the degree of routinization. To develop a measure for job routinization
we follow Autor and Dorn (2013) who use job task requirements from the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles (DOT) to measure routine, abstract and manual task content by
occupation. Using this information Autor and Dorn (2013) calculate a routine intensity
for each occupation by subtracting the manual and abstract task input from the routine
task input.
We use the a labor force survey performed by the Federal Institute for Vocational
Education and Training (BIBB) to construct an index of job routinization. The survey
aggregates responses of approximately 20000 individuals regarding their job tasks and job
skill requirements. It was carried in 2000, 2006 and 2012. We use the 2006 wave as it
corresponds best to the LIAB sample. To construct the routine measure, we combine
answers from four different questions, which measure standardization, repetitiveness, new
tasks, and new procedures. The answers were codified using numbers 1 to 4, where 1 =
often and 4 = never. Standardization and repetitiveness measures enter the index with
9Establishments do not directly report the value of capital assets. However, capital can be implic-
itly approximated from the available information on investment.
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negative sign, while new tasks and new procedures enter with positive sign. Hence, the
aggregate measure maps every occupation to a value between −6 and +6, where higher
values imply that the corresponding occupation is more routinized. We assign the extent
of job routinization (at a 3-digit occupation level) to every worker in the LIAB dataset.
We then classify all workers as low-, medium-, or high-routine based on the tertiles of the
index.
Internet Data
The German ”Breitbandatlas” provides the data on broadband availability.10 The “Bre-
itbandatlas” uses the original broadband definition, that is, internet speed of at least
384 kbit/s. The annual data is available from year 2006 onwards.11 For the period
2006-2010, the ”Breitbandatlas” reports contain maps of broadband availability . These
maps are based on representative household surveys.12 Using ARCGIS software we cal-
culated broadband coverage statistics per county. Since 2010, broadband definition has
changed reflecting the ongoing technological progress. The 2010-2015 digitized broad-
band county-level data is available from the “Breitbandatlas” upon request.13 In contrast
to Falck, Gold, and Heblich (2014) who also uses German internet data, we do not ex-
ploit municipality-level broadband information, as LIAB does not contain municipality
indicators.14
10See http://www.breitbandatlas.de.
11Knowing that the rollout of broadband infrastructure in Germany started in early 2000s, we as-
sign zero broadband availability to all counties in 2000.
12Using different color intensities, the maps reflect broadband penetration rates according to the
share of households with broadband access in a given municipality.
13We plan to repeat our analysis using data from 2010 onwards as soon as the latest waves of LIAB
will be published.
14As we can identify location of firms and employees only on the county level, we cannot apply an
identification strategy in the spirit of Falck, Gold, and Heblich (2014).
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3.2.2 Descriptive Evidence
This subsection presents worker- and firm-level descriptives: we compare classifications
of workers obtained with education and routine measures, track wage dynamics and un-
employment statistics across different skill groups, and provide decompose the variation
in key variables.
Table 3.2 shows the share of worker-year observations that belong to a certain skill
(education) or routine type. Over 78% of all workers are either low-skilled or workers with
missing skill. 22.33% of low-skilled workers perform non-routine jobs, this holds true for
42.52% of medium-skilled and 77.14% of high-skilled workers. When considering highly
routinized occupations, the picture reverses: 36.28% of low-skilled workers are employed
in such occupations compared to only 10.94% of medium-skilled and 2.29% of high-skilled
workers. The overall correlation between the routine and the skill measure is -0.138.
Nevertheless, there is an important asymmetry: while being high-skilled almost surely
excludes the possibility of having a highly routinized job, being low-skilled is compatible
with working in a low-routine environment. This notion was first popularized by Au-
tor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) who pointed out that low-skilled workers often perform
manual service task, which often involve direct client interaction and therefore are hardly
automatable. Consequently, in the context of SBTC, low-skilled workers may perform
better than than medium-skilled workers.
Table 3.3 tracks the evolution of daily wages in our dataset. We treat low-skilled
workers respectively workers in high-routine occupations as reference groups. Wages of
other types are normalized.15 In that way, we can see how wage dispersion across skill or
routine levels evolves over time. Note that the wage gap between medium- and low-skilled
(medium- and high-routine) workers increases. The same holds true for relative wages of
low-routine workers. Only relative wages of high-skilled workers stay roughly constant.
Besides investigating the classical SBTC hypothesis our paper analyzes whether broad-
15We divide the average group wages by the average wage of the corresponding reference group.
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Table 3.2 – Share of Worker-Year Observations by Routine Group
for each Skill Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Skill (Formal Education)
0 1 2 Total
0 22.33% 42.52% 77.15% 30.30%
Routine 1 31.14% 43.66% 20.13% 30.07%
2 36.28% 10.93% 2.29% 30.14%
Missing 10.24% 2.87% 0.44% 8.47%
Notes: The Table displays the share of worker-year oberservations belonging to a specific
routine group separately for each skill group. Source: LIAB.
band affects the wage penalty caused by past unemployment spells. Table 3.4 shows the
percentage of worker-year observations that have experienced an unemployment spell in
the past five years by skill, respectively, by job routinization. The Table shows that work-
ers in highly routinized occupations experience unemployment spells more often than
workers in low- or medium-routine jobs. However, quantitatively the difference between
the latter two categories is negligible (5.061% vs. 5.188%) while the difference between
workers in medium and highly routinized jobs is substantial (5.188% vs. 8.777%). Classi-
fying workers by skill reveals that low-skilled workers are most often (6.670%) affected by
unemployment. Surprisingly, medium-skilled workers experience even less unemployment
spells than high-skilled workers (3.567% vs. 4.678%). Table C.2 in the Appendix in addi-
tion summarizes the number of days in unemployment per year and skill (routine) group:
Although this measure decreases over time for less-skilled workers (workers in high-routine
occupations), the difference to other groups remains large. Less-skilled workers (workers
in high-routine occupations) were also more vulnerable during the crisis in 2008-2009.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 compare the SSE16 within and between individuals (firms) with
the SSE within and between counties for several key variables. Results indicate that
county fixed effect absorb about 10% of total variance. In contrast, individual fixed
16SSE = Sum of Squared Errors.
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Table 3.3 – Dynamics of Wages by Skill and Routine Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill High-routine Medium-routine Low-rotine
2000 64.34 0.95 1.65 51.57 1.22 1.56
2006 71.24 1.01 1.70 51.96 1.37 1.79
2007 73.22 1.01 1.67 53.93 1.36 1.76
2008 75.75 1.02 1.64 55.93 1.36 1.74
2009 76.89 1.04 1.64 55.88 1.40 1.77
2010 79.66 1.10 1.63 58.01 1.40 1.78
Note: LIAB dataset. The table shows average daily wage in Euro for low-skill workers and workers in high-routine
occupations (reference groups). Wages of other groups of workers are divided by the values in the reference groups.
Table 3.4 – Frequency of Past Unemployment Spells by Skill /
Routine Group
(1) (2)
% Workers with past UE % Workers with past UE
Low Skilled 6.670 High Routine 8.777
Medium Skilled 3.567 Medium Routine 5.188
High Skilled 4.678 Low Routine 5.061
Notes: The Table displays the frequency of past unemployment spells by skill level as
well as by job routinization for each year between 2006 and 2010. Source: LIAB.
effects absorb about 90% of total variation. In addition to the theoretical considerations
outlined in section 3.4.2, these results guide us toward using county instead of individual
fixed effects.17
17Loosing variation directly translates into a loss of precision. Hence, as long as there are no strong
theoretical reasons requiring the inclusion of individual fixed effects, county fixed effects are favorable
compared to individual fixed effects.
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Table 3.5 – Variance Decomposition of Key Variables - Firm Level
XXXXFirm County
Between Within Between Within
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Value Added) 310114 13652 38832 284934
log(# Low Skilled Workers) 294419 15359 24887 284891
log(# Medium Skilled Workers) 102705 7158 7644 102219
log(# High Skilled Workers) 145299 6941 10944 141296
Broadband Availability 609 456 494 571
Notes: The table displays a decomposition of the sum of squared errors (SSE) between
and within firm and county for each variable. Source: LIAB.
Table 3.6 – Variance Decomposition of Key Variables - Worker
Level
XPerson*Firm Person County
Between Within Between Within Between Within
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Wage) 4903267 820375 5445110 1211752 780919 4942723
Skill 3163335 0 3208758 0 242104 2921231
Job Routinization 12020529 362633 11780539 602624 1325229 11057933
Notes: The table displays a decomposition of the sum of squared errors (SSE) between
and within person*firm, person and county for each variable. Source: LIAB.
3.3 Details on rollout of Broadband Infrastructure in
Germany
This section provides detailed information about the broadband rollout in Germany.18
One of the key actors in the development of broadband infrastructure was Deutsche
Telekom19, which started its broadband offensive in 2000. At the time, it was the first
18We define broadband access as permanent access to the Internet at a speed of at least 384 kbit/s.
This definition corresponds to the original definition used by the Deutsche Telekom. Due to technolog-
ical progress the definition has changed over the years, however, in order to provide comparability we
stick to the original definition.
19Deutsche Telekome had held the exclusive right to serve the German telecommunications market
until 1996 when it was privatized via an IPO and had to give up its monopoly profits.
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German telecommunication provider offering DSL access. Within five years (2005) broad-
band had been made available to more than 60% of German households. Clearly, there
were substantial differences regarding the speed of broadband rollout between different
geographical regions. Our paper exploits the resulting variation provided by this staged
rollout.
To address potential endogeneity it is important to think of the economic incentives
that guided telecommunication providers during the rollout: during the initial phase of
broadband expansion there was no public promotion of broadband. Instead, Deutsche
Telekom (and its competitors) made broadband available based on profit-maximizing be-
havior. The main driver of broadband profitability is population density. In counties with
high population density one access point is able to serve many clients. Therefore, marginal
cost of providing broadband to one potential client is higher in rural areas compared to
densely populated areas. Other supply factors include topography and existing infras-
tructure (roads, buildings, railways). Important demand factors include income level,
educational composition, as well as industry structure. In total, profit margins arising
from broadband expansion differ substantially between counties leading to the observed
pattern of a staged broadband installation. Importantly for our analysis, timing of broad-
band penetration is largely driven by observable, mostly time-constant characteristics.
The German government considers broadband as a key locational factor. To avoid
increasing regional disparities, the government decided to actively stimulate broadband
in rural areas. In practice this has happened via cooperation between municipalities
and telecommunication providers. First, the municipality analyzes its broadband require-
ments. Second, the municipality awards the request. Third, the company winning the
request commits to install the broadband infrastructure within a given time period, while
the municipality covers the (potential) gap between costs and revenues. However, such
cooperation between municipalities and telecommunication providers have not started be-
fore 2008. They do not pertain the first generation of broadband expansion. Hence, the
role of public broadband initiatives in our sample is negligible.
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The left panel of Figure C.1 shows the geographical distribution of broadband in the
initial period of our sample. Although broadband had already reached high availability
rates in some regions by 2006, the penetration is fairly low in other places, particularly
in the North-East of Germany. The other two panels show broadband in 2007 and 2009.
While broadband availability increases over time, the increase is far from being homoge-
neous across counties. There seems to be a convergence towards full broadband coverage
at the end of our sample.20
In the main empirical specifications, we use the data from year 2000 (when we set
broadband penetration in all counties to zero) and years 2006-2010. A potential concern
is that the initial growth in broadband availability (from 0% in 2000 to 60% in 2006) has
a different effect than during more mature stages of broadband expansion. We check the
robustness of results by restricting the sample only to years 2006-2010.
3.4 Identification Strategy
This section derives the key identifying assumptions underlying our econometric models.
Note that our goal is to identify the coefficient on the interaction term Broadband X skill
group. First, we address the classical endogeneity issue: we provide evidence indicating
that, conditional on fixed effects, broadband can be treated as exogenous to outcome
variables. Next, we explicitly discuss the conditions under which the interaction term can
be consistently estimated and propose an alternative interpretation.
20Note that broadband availability only refers to the original broadband definition (384 kbit/s).
hence, the absence of large differences in broadband availability in later years does not imply that there
are no substantial differences in the availability of high-speed broadband access. Unfortunately, in-
formation about the availability rates of higher bandwidths is only available for years 2010 and later,
whereas LIAB data is available only until 2010.
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3.4.1 Exogeneity of Broadband
Falck, Gold, and Heblich (2014) address potential endogeneity of broadband by exploiting
regional and technological peculiarities of the preexisting voice telephony network that
hindered the rollout of fixed-line infrastructure for high-speed Internet. Although ap-
pealing, their approach is not feasible in our setup, as LIAB data does not provide any
information in which municipality a certain worker / firm resides due to data protection.
Hence, we have to restrict our analysis to the county level, implying that we have to rely
on controlling for potential confounders in order to guarantee exogeneity of broadband.21
As outlined, broadband availability is largely determined by observable economic and
demographic variables, most of which vary little over time. Thus, conditional on county
and year fixed effects, the variation in broadband can be treated as plausibly exogenous.
To test this assumption and guide the inclusion of additional controls we perform two
types of auxiliary regressions. First, we regress broadband availability on county and
time fixed effects as well as on potential time-varying demand and supply factors (see
Table C.3 in the Appendix).
BBk,t = ηk + θt + βControlsk,t + εk,t (3.1)
where Controlsk,t is a vector of time-varying control variables
22 and β is the corresponding
coefficient vector. We report the regressions for 2000 + 2006-2010 sample; the full results
including only 2006-2010 are available upon request. In our baseline sample, regressing
on county and year effects only, yields a R2 of 0.973 ensuring that broadband rollout was
largely determined by time-invariant factors. The only significant time-varying factors
are net migration, employment to population, and age structure. However, these controls
explain less than 1% of the variation in broadband availability. We are reluctant to include
these variables in our main regressions to avoid a ”bad control” problem.23
21A similar approach has been taken by Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015).
22Demographic factors, inputs and outputs, industry structure and skill composition.
23If part of the broadband-induced changes in labor market outcomes work through the above men-
tioned time-varying factors, keeping those factors constant by including them in the regression equation
would not be appropriate.
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As a second step, we check whether the timing of broadband rollout depends on pre-
rollout county characteristics by regressing the change in broadband on county and time
fixed effects where the latter is allowed to depend on initial county characteristics (see
Figures C.4-C.5 in the Appendix):
∆BBk,t = ηk + θt + [θt ∗Controlsk,]′Ψ + εk,t (3.2)
where Ψ is a vector that contains the estimated coefficients on [θt ∗ Controlsk,]′
for each year and control variable. When only including fixed effects, the R2 reads 0.54;
allowing the time dummies to depend on pre-rollout county characteristics raises R2 to
0.58. The coefficients on the interaction term can be interpreted as follows: if, for example,
θ2007 ∗Incomek,2005 is not significant, then pre-rollout average income does not predict the
2006-2007 change in broadband. If the same coefficient is significantly positive, counties
with above average income in 2005 experience (on average) a specifically strong increase
in broadband between 2006 and 2007.
The following initial county characteristics turn out to be significant determinants of
broadband rollout: population density, total population, share of unemployed workers
as well as age structure. To control for differential time trends in our main regressions
(see equations (3.5) and (3.7)), we estimate models where time dummies are allowed to
depend on the county characteristics that have proven to alter the timing of broadband
rollout. This procedure mitigates the problem that variation in outcome variables caused
by differences in (initial) county characteristics are spuriously related to changes in broad-
band availability. In what follows we call this procedure “allowing for heterogeneous time
trends”.
3.4.2 Consistent Estimation of the Interaction Term
The primary goal of our analysis is to find out how broadband availability affects output
elasticities and wages of different workers. In our setup “different” means belonging
to different educational or occupational classes. Technically, this may happen for two
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reasons: first, broadband directly alters the returns to belonging to a certain skill group.24
The second effect arises due to unobserved worker ability. When workers’ selection into
skill groups depends on ability and the returns to ability depend on broadband, broadband
affects (for example) non-routine workers differently, not only because they perform non-
routine tasks, but also because they have high ability.
In this case, the interaction term coefficient measures not only how broadband changes
the causal effect of skill / routine group on the outcome, but also to some extent how
broadband alters the return to unobserved ability. Luckily, this does not prevent assessing
the differential effects of broadband, which is the main goal of the paper. The economic
importance and policy relevance of our results do not rely on assuming homogenous
returns to ability. Notwithstanding, we outline the exact conditions under which the
coefficient on the interaction term indeed captures how broadband changes the causal
effect of skill groups. In what follows we refer to estimates that satisfy these conditions
as “consistent”.
Exogeneity of two variables, say x and w, is neither sufficient nor necessary for the
interaction x ∗ w to be an exogenous regressor as well. Bun and Harrison (2014) show
that the interaction term can be consistently estimated if and only if
E(xi,tui,t|wi,t) = E(xi,tui,t) (3.3)
E(wi,tui,t|xi,t) = E(wi,tui,t)
where ui,t is the error term of the regression model. Equation (3.3) says that the correlation
between each regressor and the error term has to be independent of the other regressor.
Exogeneity of x and w implies E(xi,tui,t) = E(wi,tui,t) = 0, which does neither imply nor
contradict equation (3.3). This casts doubt on studies that claim to identify interaction
terms solely based on exogeneity arguments. However, it also clarifies that consistent
24When workers are classified by formal education this means, for example, that broadband alters
the return to education.
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estimation of an interaction term may be possible if one of the involved regressors is not
exogenous.
In our setup, we think of broadband availability as being exogenous once county and
time fixed effects are included.25 Whether or not the other variable can be treated as
exogenous depends on the choice of fixed effects, the inclusion of controls and ultimately
on the set of assumptions one is willing to make. For the sake of generality we denote the
variable, which is supposed to be interacted with broadband as x. x can either be skill
group or number of workers (of a certain type) employed.
In the absence of fixed effects, x is likely to be endogenous due to unobserved worker
ability / firm productivity. This idea can be formalized by writing down the error term as
ui,t = βaai+u
∗
i,t where u
∗
i,t is the white noise component of the error term, ai is unobserved
heterogeneity and βa measures its return. With this conventional specification, individual
fixed effects are able to remove the unobserved heterogeneity from the error term and
therefore lead to consistent estimates.
However, once the returns to unobserved ability depend on broadband, the error term
has to be written as:
ui,t = βa ∗ xi + βa,BB ∗BBi,t ∗ ai + u∗i,t (3.4)
Bun and Harrison (2014) show that equation (3.3) can only be satisfied if βa,BB = 0.
Correspondingly, it is not possible to consistently estimate the interaction term once the
returns to unobserved ability depend on broadband. At the same time βa,BB 6= 0 is
perfectly compatible with broadband being exogenous26 as long as unobserved ability and
broadband are uncorrelated, i.e., E(ai|BBi,t) = 0). Besides requiring βaw = 0, Bun and
Harrison (2014) show that consistent estimation of the interaction term also requires that
the correlation between x and unobserved ability does not depend on broadband, i.e.,
E(xi,t ∗ ai|BBi,t) = E(xi,t ∗ ai).
25As we argued in section 3.4.1.
26Broadband is classified as exogenous if E(uit |BBi,t) = 0 which also implies Cov(uit , BBi,t) = 0.
Hence, broadband is exogenous if it is unconditionally uncorrelated with the error term.
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One cannot directly test whether the true data generating process satisfies these crite-
ria. With x representing skill group, it seems unlikely that broadband availability directly
affects the correlation between x and unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, we take this as-
sumption as satisfied. In contrast, it cannot generally be excluded that the returns to
unobserved ability depend (positively) on broadband. Given this notion, two questions
arise: do individual fixed effects fix the problem and, if not, is it possible to characterize
the potential bias?
To answer the first question, consider the case in which βa,BB = 0. Then, equation (3.3)
is satisfied. Nevertheless, the main effect of skill group exhibits an upward bias. The main
effect of broadband is downward biased if broadband is a positive determinant of skill
group. Using worker (instead of county) fixed effects eliminates this bias. The interaction
term can be estimated consistently with both types of fixed effects as the correlation
between skill group and the error term is independent of broadband. Once βa,BB > 0 the
situation is different. Using individual fixed effects absorbs only the time constant part
of unobserved ability, i.e. βa ∗ai. Despite βa,BB > 0, this drives down the (unconditional)
correlation between skill group and the error term to zero.27 In other words: skill group
is exogenous. However, this is not sufficient for consistent estimation of the interaction
term xi,t ∗ BBi,t. Although the unconditional correlation between skill group and the
(transformed) error term is zero, the same correlation conditional on broadband is not
generally zero. Instead, with βa,BB > 0, it is increasing in broadband. To appreciate this,
note that the variance of BBi,t ∗ai conditional on BBi,t is increasing in BBi,t. Hence, the
part of the error term with which skill group is correlated, contributes a larger portion to
27To see this, note that the time-varying part of the transformed error term reads βa,BB ∗ [BBi,t −
B̂Bi] ∗ ai where B̂Bi is average broadband availability over time for individual i and BBi,t − B̂Bi ≡
.BB∗i,t the demeaned broadband availability. BB
∗
i,t and ai are uncorrelated by construction as BB
∗
i,t
varies only within workers (it has mean zero for every worker i), whereas ai varies only between work-
ers. In addition we have E(BB∗i,t) = E(ai) = 0. This implies that neither BBi,t nor ai are correlated
with BB∗i,t ∗ ai. Hence, x is also not correlated with BB∗i,t ∗ ai (although it depends on ai and po-
tentially on BBi,t) which directly implies that skill group is not correlated with the transformed error
term and thus exogenous.
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the variance of the compound error term if broadband is high. The correlation between
skill group and the error term is large (small) for high (low) values of broadband. Thus,
the estimated coefficient on the interaction term exhibits a bias even when using individual
fixed effects.
Using county fixed effects eases the problem as the time constant component of un-
observed heterogeneity is partly left in the error term. Thus, the part of the error term,
with which the interaction term xi,t ∗ BBi,t is correlated, 28 contributes a smaller share
to the overall error term variance thus attenuating the bias in the estimated interaction
term coefficient. Hence, although time constant unobserved ability is problematic when
estimating main effects, it can be even desirable when estimating interaction terms.
The next step is to characterize the potential bias. As the interaction term is positively
correlated with the error term, the coefficient on the interaction term will be upward bi-
ased. Even though (on average) x and broadband are uncorrelated with the error term
(when using individual fixed effect) both main effects will be downward biased. This hap-
pens because (on average) x and broadband (i) are unconditionally uncorrelated with the
error term and (ii) (by construction) positively correlated with the interaction term. As
the latter is positively correlated with unobserved ability, (on average) x and broadband
are, for given values of the interaction term, negatively correlated with unobserved ability
and thus with the error term.
The analysis yield the following implications: first, individual fixed effects do not
add any value for estimating the interaction term coefficient. Instead using county fixed
effects is appropriate. Second, if the interaction term coefficient shall be interpreted as
measuring the change in the causal effect of skill group, assuming βa,BB = 0 is necessary
for consistent estimation. Third, in the more realistic case βa,BB > 0, an upward bias will
be present29. Fourth, as outlined above, reinterpreting the interaction term coefficient as
28As noted above this part reads βa,BB ∗ [BBi,t − B̂Bi] ∗ ai
29A similar bias will also be present when estimating the model separately for each type of workers
without including an interaction term. In this case, the difference in the estimated effect of broadband
(on wages) between samples cannot be fully attributed to differences in skill group, but also to differ-
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measuring how broadband changes the return to skill group plus (partially) to unobserved
ability is sensible and does not harm the economic significance of our results.
3.4.3 Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)
The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) is another requirement for consis-
tency. The SUTVA states that (i) treatment status of any unit does not affect outcomes
of other units (non-interference) and (ii) treatments for all units are comparable (no vari-
ation in treatment). The second part is uncontroversial in our application: Providing
broadband availability is technologically the same in all counties. The first part requires
to assume that increasing broadband availability in one county does not directly influence
outcomes of other counties. Although one could think of specific examples in which the
assumption seems to be violated, we believe that these exceptions are rare. Hence, we
take the SUTVA as generally satisfied. This notion is supported by Akerman, Gaarder,
and Mogstad (2015) who find that broadband impacts the labor market only via firms
broadband adoption and not via changes in the demand for goods. Broadband adoption
by a firm in one county does not influence labor market outcomes in another county.
ences in average unobserved ability between samples. Consider an individual low-skilled worker with
unobserved ability equal to the average ability of his class. The broadband coefficient of the “low skill
sample” then correctly measures the expected wage change of this worker due to broadband. However,
when the worker suddenly acquires high skill the “high skill sample” coefficient does not measure the
expected broadband-associated wage change, because the workers ability is still lower than the aver-
age ability of high skilled workers. Hence, the reported difference between low-skilled and high-skilled
coefficients overestimates the true difference caused by different skill groups.
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3.5 Skill-Biased Technological Change
3.5.1 Empirical Model
To test the SBTC hypothesis, we estimate two types of models. The first model operates at
the worker level and evaluates if broadband increases wage differences between workers of
different types. The second model analyzes whether broadband changes output elasticities
of different workers.
For the wage regression the empirical model reads30:
log(Wage)i,t = β0 + β1BBc,t + β
′
xi,t + β
′
(xi,tBBc,t)+ (3.5)
β′Controlsi,t + β
′
 ∗ ξc + β′ ∗ ηI + β′ ∗ τt
β′CountyCharc,τt + εi,t
where log(Wage)i,t is the log of the daily wage earned by worker i in period t, xi,t is a
vector of mutually-exclusive dummy variables representing either educational attainment
or job-routinization, BBc,t is broadband availability in county c in period t. Controlsi,t
is a vector containing baseline worker- or firm-specific control variables such as experi-
ence, firm age and whether the wage bargaining takes place individually or on a col-
lective level. ξc, τt and ηI represent county, year, and industry fixed effects. Finally,
CountyCharc, is a vector containing year 2000-values of baseline county charac-
teristics, which have turned out to be significant determinants of broadband. We report
results with and without these heterogeneous time trends. Standard errors are clustered
at the county level and are robust to heteroscedasticity31.
Firm regressions are motivated by the notion that production takes place according to
a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function. However, in contrast to the textbook
30Bold characters represent vectors
31We choose this level of clustering as our treatment variable, that is, broadband availability, varies
on the county level.
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model, we allow output elasticities to depend on broadband availability32:
V alueAddedf,t =e
β0+β1∗BBc,tKβ2,K+β3,KBBc,t (3.6)
N
β2,N0+β3,N0BBc,t
0 N
β2,N1+β3,N1BBc,t
1
N
β2,N2+β3,N2BBc,t
2 e
εf,t
where V alueAddedf,t is the value added by firm f in period t, K is the size of the capital
stock, N0, N1 and N2 denote the number of employees of a certain skill group. We also
estimate production functions where we use total wage bills instead of employee counts.
To the extent that wages capture quality of workers, this could be a more precise measure
for labor input. Yet, it is also noisier due to wage dispersion across equally productive
workers as well as due to wage censoring.
eβ0+β1∗BBc,t is average TFP, whereas ηI and ξc represent a full set of county and industry
fixed effects. Finally, eεf,t is the firm- and time specific deviation from average TFP.33
Taking logs, adding fixed effects as well as additional controls yields the following
linear model:
log(V alueAddedf,t) = β0 + β1BBc,t + β
′
xf ,t + β
′(xi,tBBc,t)+ (3.7)
β′Controlsi,t + β
′
ξc + β
′
ηI+
β′τt + β
′
CountyCharc,τt + εf,t
where Controlsi,t is a vector containing firm age (and its square) as well as a dummy for
collective bargaining and the vector of log inputs x′i,t = [log(Ki) log(N0,i) log(N1,i) log(N2,i)].
Note that output elasticities are given by β +β ∗BB and thus can be inferred directly
from the estimated coefficients. If one of the elements in β′ = [β3,Kiβ3,N0,iβ3,N1,iβ3,N2,i ] is
significantly different from zero, broadband has a significant impact on the output elas-
ticity of the corresponding production factor. Conversely, if β is zero, output elasticities
32This specification is inspired by Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015).
33In the linearized regression model this term corresponds to the error term.
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are given by β alone.
34 β1 +β
′
xi,t captures the main effect of broadband given a certain
input factor combination.
The above specifications implicitly assume that the effects of higher broadband avail-
ability are already present in the year of its increase, whereas the firms may need some
time to adjust to the new ICT opportunities. We complement the analysis with the
event-study regressions. Within each county, we center the data around the year with
the largest increase in broadband availability and denote it y0. We keep the observations
up to three years before and after y0. To capture the change in output elasticities and
wages due to the introduction of broadband, we pull the years in two groups: the dummy
variable after equals one for years bigger or equal to y0, and zero otherwise. We then
estimate similar models to (3.5) and (3.7) but instead of interacting employee types xi,t
with the annual broadband measure, we interact them with the dummy variable after.
In addition, we estimate the production function and the wage regression, separately for
each year before and after y0, to see how the corresponding coefficients evolve over time.
We use the same set of controls, including year and county fixed effects. Such exercise
allows to check for the presence of pre-trends and for the timing of the effect.
3.5.2 Results
We estimate equations (3.5) and (3.7) using time periods 2006 to 2010 throughout which
broadband data is continuously available (baseline sample). In addition we exploit that
in 2000 broadband availability was zero across all counties. Hence, the sample consists
of year 2000 as well as 2006 - 2010 values. We have also estimated models which use
only values from 2000 and 2006 as well as models relying on 2006 - 2010 values only.
To keep tables parsimonious we only report results using the full sample. Results using
the above-mentioned alternative sample selections are available upon request, but do not
34β2,N0 , for example, measures the output elasticity of an low-skilled or low-routine worker if broad-
band availability is zero.
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qualitatively differ from the results presented in the text.35. Workers are classified using
either job routinization or formal education. 36We consider classifying by routinization
as economically more sensible. Hence we put a larger weight on results derived using
this classification. Results using formal education are reported mainly for comparability
reasons. All models are estimated with and without heterogeneous time trends.
Output Elasticity Regressions
Table C.4 in the Appendix summarizes results regarding output elasticities. Overall our
results support SBTC. When workers are classified by job routinization (columns (1) to
(4) of Table C.4) theory suggests that the output elasticity of low (high) routine workers
increases (decreases) with broadband. Results largely confirm this theory: broadband
decreases the output elasticity of highly routinized workers independent of whether het-
erogeneous time trends are included. When the number of workers employed is used as
input factor, a 10 percentage point increase in broadband is associated with a decrease in
the output elasticity of highly routinized workers by 1.2 percentage points.37
35In the output elasticity regressions we also present results from using the sum of wages paid (in-
stead of numbers of workers employed) as input factors. We only show these additional results for the
sake of comparability with other papers. Typically, “wages paid” are used in order to capture qual-
ity differences between workers. These quality differences, however, are already partially captured by
distinguishing between three types of workers. On the other hand, wage bills include much additional
noise, because very similar workers obtain potentially very different wages. This noise biases all esti-
mated coefficients toward zero. Thus, our argumentation is based only on results obtained using “num-
ber of workers employed” as input factor.
36In both cases we group workers in three categories.
37We use the convention to measure output elasticities in percent. If the production function is
given by Y = K0.5N0.5, both the output elasticity of capital and labor is 50%, implying that a 1%
increase in labor (or capital) results in a 0.5% increase in output. In our analysis we are interested in
how broadband changes these output elasticities. Stating that “broadband increases the output elas-
ticity of labor by 1 percentage point” implies, for example, that the output elasticity of labor increases
from 50% to 51%. We do so in order to provide an intuitive sense about the quantitative size of the
effects associated with movements in broadband availability.
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The expected beneficial effect for non-routine workers is also visible: a 10 percentage
point increase in broadband increases the output elasticity of non-routine workers by 0.5
to 0.75 percentage points (depending on whether heterogeneous time trends are included).
The estimated coefficient is somewhat smaller in absolute size compared to the one es-
timated for routine workers. Nevertheless, it remains significant at the 10% confidence
level. Medium routinized jobs experience the smallest change due to broadband. The
corresponding output elasticity is estimated to increase only slightly. Note that the effect
is not statistically different from zero.
Classifying workers by formal education yields similar, yet not identical results (see
columns (1) to (4) of Table C.4). The output elasticity of low-skilled workers significantly
decreases while the output elasticity of high-skilled workers significantly increases. The
latter increases by about 2.2 percentage points (for each 10 percentage point increase
in broadband), while the former drops by about 0.65 percentage points. Both effects
are statistically different from zero. Medium-skilled workers (like low-skilled workers)
experience a decrease in their output elasticity. For each 10 percentage point increase in
broadband the output elasticity of medium skilled workers decreases by 1.9 percentage
points. These results are in line with the task based interpretation of SBTC if medium
skilled workers work more often in highly routinized jobs compared to low skilled workers.
Table 3.2 shows that only 22% of low-skilled workers work in non-routine jobs whereas 42%
of medium skilled workers do. Correspondingly, the task-based interpretation cannot fully
explain the observed results. As only about 8% of all workers are classified as medium-
skilled workers we hypothesize that the striking results for medium skilled workers could
be mainly driven by chance, and should not be over-interpreted. In total, our results
support the SBTC hypothesis.
Wage Regressions
Table C.5 in the Appendix summarizes results from the wage regressions. Results are
shown with and without heterogeneous time trends. Censored observations are either
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dropped from the sample (columns (1), (2), (5) and (6)) or imputed (remaining columns)
using the wage imputing procedure by Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg (2009). The
first four columns relate to models in which workers are classified by formal education,
whereas the last four columns relate to job routinization models. SBTC suggests that
broadband leads to increasing wages of high skilled / non -routine workers compared to
wages of low skilled / routine workers. Overall, our results verify these expectations, in
particular when using imputed wages.
Relative wages of routine workers (compared to non-routine workers) are significantly
negatively affected by broadband. The effect is significant irrespective of whether censored
wages are dropped from the sample (columns (5) and (6) of Table C.5) or whether they
are replaced by imputed wages (columns (7) and (8) of Table C.5). However, the effect
is estimated to be twice as large (0.5 percentage points for each 10 percentage point
increase in broadband) when wages are imputed. In contrast, relative wages of medium
skilled workers are left virtually unchanged. As the main effect of broadband is also not
statistically different from zero, our result indicate that non-routine workers are not able
to benefit from their increased output elasticity.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table C.5 display results when workers are classified by formal
education. When censored observations are dropped, broadband internet significantly
lowers the wage of medium skilled workers relative to low skilled workers. These results
reflect that the output elasticity of these workers decreases not only in absolute terms,
but also relative to low skilled workers. However, the effect becomes insignificant once
censored wages are replaced by imputed wages.
Regarding high skilled workers results are somewhat puzzling. Although broadband
internet clearly increases the output elasticities of high skilled workers there is no cor-
responding change in the relative wage. Instead our estimates indicate that broadband
does not significantly change the wage premium high skilled workers earn compared to
low skilled workers. Put together, we interpret our results as a confirmation of the SBTC
change hypothesis. We can also partially confirm the job polarization effect in workers’
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wages.
Event-Study Results
To conduct the Event-study analysis, we center the data within each county around the
year y0, when the broadband growth was the largest. As the available broadband dataset
starts in 2006, y0 should be interpreted as the year with the largest broadband expansion
during the period 2007-2010. In our dataset, for about 70% of counties y0 = 2007; for
25% - y0 = 2008; for 4%- y0 = 2009; and for less than 1% y0 = 2010.
We then pull the observations up to three years before y0 in the pre-broadband group
and the observations in or up to three years after y0 in the post-broadband group. The
Event-study specifications are similar to our baseline regressions, the only difference being
that instead of the interaction with a broadband availability measure, we interact the skill
groups with a dummy variable After, which is equal 1 for years ≥ y0. The interaction
coefficients reflect the difference in output elasticities and in returns to skills between the
periods before and after the introduction of broadband conditional on controls, year and
county fixed effects. As before, effects are identified through different timing in broadband
expansion across German counties.
In line with our baseline results, we expect to find evidence for the SBTC. In the wage
regressions (Table C.7), we see that broadband increases the wage penalty for workers
in highly routinized occupations. In the post-broadband period, wages of these workers
decrease by about 3.06-4.21%. The results are robust, when we replace censored wages
by imputed wages rather than dropping the corresponding observations from the sample.
Similarly, Graph B in Figure C.6 illustrates that the wage penalty for highly-routinized
work in the years following y0 is growing.
38
Results from the firm-level regressions (Table C.6), though, do not concord with our
baseline specification: the interaction coefficients between the dummy After and the
38The confidence interval is large, as we estimate the regressions separately for each time-period.
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low-skill (high-routine) labor input are positive, contrary to our previous results and the
SBTC hypothesis. One should note, however, several caveats regarding the Event-study
approach due to the limitations of our dataset. First, we cannot precisely estimate the
y0 as broadband data is not available for years between 2001-2005. Median broadband
availability in 2006 (the first year in our broadband dataset) was already above 70%,
and it is likely that for most counties the year with the largest increase is within the time
period we do not observe. Figure C.6 also illustrates that output elasticities are estimated
with a lot of noise. Second, estimations suffer from a composition effect: the last year in
our dataset is 2010, and for counties with y0 > 2007, we cannot observe all three time
periods after y0. Given these limitations, we prefer to base our conclusions on the results
obtained from the baseline specification.
3.6 Broadband and Past Unemployment
3.6.1 Theoretical Background
This section analyzes whether the effect of being unemployed on the reemployment wage
depends on broadband availability. Nichols, Mitchell, and Lindner (2013) have identified
several channels that can explain why past unemployment spells lower wages: (i) unem-
ployment may lead to real deterioration of human capital; (ii) if workers are unsure about
their own productivity (or if they expect potential employers to be), they may downward
adjust their reservation wage when unemployment prolongs , even if there is no real hu-
man capital deterioration; (iii) with imperfect information, employers infer that workers
with long unemployment spells are likely to be low productivity workers, even if a specific
worker is unemployed only by chance; (iv) more productive workers find new employment
more quickly, implying that being unemployed is spuriously correlated with being a low
productivity worker. While channels (i)-(iii) constitute causal mechanisms through which
unemployment lowers wages, (iv) leads merely to a statistical correlation. In our analysis,
we do not claim to identify the causal effect of past unemployment spells on wages. In-
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stead, we are interested in how broadband changes the wage difference between workers,
which were previously unemployed and those who were not, independent of the causal
origin of these differences.
Regarding identification, the theoretical considerations outlined in section 3.4.2 still
apply. The interaction term can be estimated consistently even if xi,t is correlated with
the error term as long as the return to unobserved worker ability does not depend on
broadband. If the return to unobserved worker ability depends positively on broadband,
the interaction term exhibits an upward bias. In this case, the estimated coefficient
captures not only how broadband alters the return to past unemployment but also, to
some extent, how it alters the return to unobserved ability.
We expect broadband to lower the unemployment wage penalty for several reasons:
first, broadband potentially mitigates search frictions leading to shorter unemployment
spells, which in turn mitigates effects (i) to (iii). Second, broadband may also increase
the possibility for unemployed workers to keep in touch with their field as well as with
former and potentially future co-workers. We test this hypothesis by using the model from
section 3.5, where xi,t (see equation (3.5)) now represents a dummy variable indicating
whether or not a worker was unemployed within the past five years.
3.6.2 Results
We first discuss results obtained when including all workers in the sample. Afterwards we
assess potential implications for SBTC by estimating the model separately for workers of
different routine groups.
The upper panel of Table C.9 as well as Table C.8 in the Appendix shows the results
from the unemployment regression using the sample containing all workers. The main
effect reflects the wage difference between workers with and without unemployment spells
if broadband availability fixed at zero. The estimated wage gap is remarkably robust:
The quantitative values range between 0.2112 and 0.2322 depending on whether imputed
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wages and / or heterogeneous time trends are used, , implying that previously unemployed
workers earn between 21 and 23% less compared to other workers. These estimates should
be interpreted as the combination of self selection and effects directly caused by expe-
riencing an unemployment spell (see channels (i)-(iii) above). The main coefficient of
interest, i.e. the interaction between the past unemployment dummy and broadband
is positive throughout all specifications, indicating that broadband indeed mitigates the
wage penalty associated with past unemployment spells. A 10 percentage points increase
in broadband reduces the wage penalty by 0.84 (with heterogeneous time trends) to 0.97%
(without heterogeneous time trends) when observations with censored wages are dropped
from the sample. Both coefficients are highly statistically significant. When imputed
wages are used the coefficient is cut in half. Correspondingly, the estimated coefficients
are only weakly significantly different from zero. Despite these weaker results, the overall
conclusion remains that broadband internet significantly mitigates the wage penalty of
previously unemployed workers.
In the context of SBTC, it is interesting to ask whether the wage penalty reduction
differs between worker groups. The second panel of Table C.9 shows that when restrict-
ing the sample to workers performing non-routine tasks, the estimated coefficients on
the interaction term are very similar compared to results obtained from the full sample.
Medium routinized workers (third panel of Table C.9) experience the strongest reduction
in the wage penalty. Coefficients are somewhat larger compared to the full sample and
significant even when imputed wages are used. In stark contrast, the reduction of the
wage penalty is completely absent for high routine workers39 (fourth panel of Table C.9).
Our results suggest that workers in highly routinized occupations have difficulties to use
broadband as a tool to find new employers quicker and prevent human capital deteriora-
tion. In that way, our analysis uncovers another variety of SBTC.
Table C.8 presents results from repeating the same exercise with formal education as
classification device. The beneficial effect is strongest for high skilled workers followed by
39This is particularly important as high routine workers experience past unemployment spells more
often than other workers (see Table 3.4).
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low skilled workers (which represent 75% of all workers in the sample). Similarly as for
high routine workers, there is no significant change in the unemployment wage penalty
for medium skilled workers.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically study the differential effects of increasing broadband avail-
ability on labor market outcomes. We do so by combining German data on broadband
rollout with the linked employer-employee dataset provided by the Institute for Employ-
ment Research. To test the SBTC hypothesis, we classify workers using formal education
and the degree of job routinization. In addition, we test whether broadband influences
the wage penalty of previously unemployed workers.
Regarding the change in output elasticities our results largely confirm the SBTC hy-
pothesis: output elasticities of low and medium skilled workers decline, while high skilled
workers are able to realize higher output elasticities. Similarly, the output elasticity of
workers performing non-routine (abstract) tasks increases, while high routine workers ex-
perience a lower output elasticity. The broadband effect on the output elasticity of workers
in medium routinized jobs depends on sample selection. Using the full sample the effect
is not significant. Overall, results regarding output elasticities definitely strengthen the
task-biased interpretation of the SBTC hypothesis.
The documented changes in output elasticities partially pass-through on relative wages.
In line with those results, relative wages of high routine workers drop significantly. Com-
pared to the change in output elasticities, the effect on relative wages is smaller reflecting
some form of wage rigidity. In contrast, we do not find an increasing wage premium for
high skilled workers due to broadband. As we believe that classifying workers according
to job routinization is more appealing than using formal education, we interpret our wage
results as a confirmation of SBTC.
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In addition to investigating classical SBTC issues, we found convincing evidence that
broadband narrows the wage gap between workers who were previously unemployed and
those who were not. Depending on the particular specification, a 10 percentage point
increase in broadband lowers the wage penalty due to past unemployment spells by 0.8 to
1.4%. When using imputed wages, estimates drop by around a half. These results suggest
that broadband either mitigates search frictions or slows down the loss of human capital
by enabling unemployed workers to keep in touch with their profession. We also report
that the documented beneficial effect is not present when restricting the sample to high
routine workers.
Finally, we call attention to the problem that the returns to unobserved ability may
depend on broadband. In this context, we explicitly outline the conditions necessary
for consistent estimation of the interaction terms estimated in this paper. As similar
problems were largely ignored by the existing literature and may well arise in a broad
range of applications, we think of these remarks as of general interest. In addition, we
provide guidance for appropriate interpretation of the estimated interaction terms.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Value Functions
Workers: Workers can become employed only at firms that produce consumption goods,
since innovation firms will not be active on the labor market for production workers. Firms
will post vacancies and hire unemployed workers. Denote the fraction of vacancies posted
by type t ∈ {B,R} firms with productivity yi and Ni employed workers by vt (yi, Ni). We
therefore can write the value of being unemployed as,
rU = z + θλm (θ)
∑
t∈{B,R},yi∈{0,y},Ni
max
[
vt (yi, Ni)W
O,t
(
wO,t (yi, Ni)
)
− U, 0
]
, (A.1)
where the value of being employed at a type t firm as an outsider, that is, as a newly
hired worker (indexed by O), at the wage wO,t (y,Ni) is given by,
rWO,t
(
wO,t (y,Ni)
)
= wO,t (y,Ni)+δ
(
max
[
W I,t
(
wI,t (0, Ni)
)
, U
]
−WO,t
(
wO,t (y,Ni)
))
.
(A.2)
Once a worker is employed, he becomes an insider, indexed by I, and has employment
protection. This protection (manifested through firing costs) implies that insiders will
receive a higher wage when wages are renegotiated. The value of being employed as an
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insider at a firm with yi = y is given by,
rW I,t
(
wI,t (y,Ni)
)
= wI,t (y,Ni) + δ
(
max
[
W I,t
(
wI,t (0, Ni)
)
, U
]
−W I,t
(
wI,t (y,Ni)
))
.
(A.3)
The value of being employed depends on whether the surplus of the match is negative
if the firm is hit by a productivity shock. If it is negative, wage negotiations will fail
and the worker will be laid off. However, if the surplus of a match is positive even if a
productivity shock hits, then wages will be renegotiated and the value of being employed
changes to,
rW I,R
(
wI,R (0, Ni)
)
=
 wI,R (0, Ni) + η
(
W I,R
(
wI,R (y,Ni)
)
−W I,R
(
wI,R (0, Ni)
))
+λd
(
U −W I,R
(
wI,R (0, Ni)
))
, if t = R,
(A.4)
rW I,B
(
wI,B (0, Ni)
)
=
 wI,B (0, Ni) + g (ϕ)
(
W I,B
(
wI,B (y,Ni)
)
−W I,B
(
wI,B (0, Ni)
))
+λd
(
U −W I,B
(
wI,B (0, Ni)
))
, if t = B.
(A.5)
The value of being employed at a firm with yi = 0 depends on the wage, the type
t ∈ {B,R} of a firm, the respective rate at which the firm is able to restore yi to y, that
is, η for firms that do their own research and g (ϕ) for firms that buy the innovation, and
on the destruction rate λd.
Firms: Firms that specialize in innovation will not be active on the labor market for
production workers, i.e., NSi = 0. Thus, labor market conditions only enter the expected
profit of a selling firm via the prices it receives for its innovation. The expected profit of
a type S firm that is doing research to obtain a new innovation is given by,
(r + λs) π
S (0, 0, ki) = −ki + η
(
πS (0, y, ki)− πS (0, 0, ki)
)
. (A.6)
The expected profit of a type S firm, which sells its innovation, is given by,
rπS (0, y, ki) = ϕg (ϕ) max
[
ENj
[
p
(
ki, N
B
j
)]
+ πS (0, 0, ki)− πS (0, y, ki) , 0
]
(A.7)
+ δ
(
πS (0, 0, ki)− πS (0, y, ki)
)
,
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where the price p
(
ki, N
B
j
)
that is negotiated on the innovation market will depend on the
surplus that is generated. The surplus will depend on the innovation cost ki of the seller
and the number of workers employed at the buyer NBj . The buyer’s innovation cost does
not enter the surplus, since a firm that decided to buy the input y will also do so in the
future, that is, it will never decide to do own research. Sellers only sell their innovation
when the surplus is positive.
The Bellman equation (1.2) characterizes the expected profit of a type B or R firm
with productivity yi = y, innovation cost ki, and N
t
i workers. The Bellman equations for
a type R firm that decides to do own research when it was hit by a productivity shock
are given by,
(r + λd) π
O,R (0, 0, ki) = −ki + η
(
πO,R
(
NRi , y, ki
)
− c
λm (θ)
NRi − πO,R (0, 0, ki)
)
,
(A.8)
(r + λd) π
I,R
(
NRi , 0, ki
)
= −wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
NRi − ki + η
(
πI,R
(
NRi , y, ki
)
− πI,R
(
NRi , 0, ki
))
,
(A.9)
with and without laying off workers, respectively. A type B firm that decides to acquire
an innovation when it is without one has the following expected profit,
(r + λd) π
O,B (0, 0, ki) = g (ϕ)
∫ kmax
0
max
[
SB, 0
]
h (kj) dkj, (A.10)
(r + λd)π
I,B
(
NBi , 0, ki
)
= −wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
NBi + g (ϕ)
∫ kmax
0
max
[
SB, 0
]
h (kj) dkj,
(A.11)
with and without laying off workers, respectively, where the surplus for the buyer is given
by,
SB =

πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
− c
λm (θ)
NBi − πO,B (0, 0, ki)− p (kj, 0) if LBi = NBi ,
πI,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
− πI,B
(
NBi , 0, ki
)
− p
(
kj, N
B
i
)
if LBi = 0.
The decision whether to do own research or, instead, acquire an innovation depends
on the rate η or g (ϕ) at which the firm can restore its productivity level, on the level
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of firm-specific innovation cost ki, and on the expected price of the innovation. Since
a firm can buy an innovation only from firms that decide to sell their innovations, we
denote by h (kj) the pdf of those firms that are willing to sell their innovations and that
have innovation cost kj (in equilibrium h (kj) = γ (kj) /Ξ (k
∗), since all firms with kj
below some threshold k∗ prefer to specialize in innovation and are willing to sell their
innovations). The maximum operator in the integral guarantees that firms will buy an
innovation only when the surplus is positive.
The marginal value of an additional worker for a firm with yi = y that wants to hire
new workers (h = O) is given by differentiating equation (1.2). The value depends on
whether a firm lays off workers when it is hit by a productivity shock, i.e.,
∂πO,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
=

αy (N ti )
α−1 − wO,t (y,N ti )−
∂wO,t (y,N ti )
∂N ti
N ti + δ
∂πI,t(N ti , 0, ki)
∂N ti
r + δ
if Lti = 0,
αy (N ti )
α−1 − wO,t (y,N ti )−
∂wO,t (y,N ti )
∂N ti
N ti − δf
r + δ
if Lti = N
t
i ,
(A.12)
The third term in the marginal value of an additional worker
(
∂wO,t (y,N ti ) /∂N
t
i
)
N ti
captures the fact that each time a new worker is hired, the wages of all workers are
renegotiated and adjusted to the new marginal revenue product.
The marginal value of an additional worker for a firm, which has been hit by a pro-
ductivity shock but retains its workers can be obtained by differentiating equations (A.9)
and (A.11) and using equation (A.14) to substitute out the price for an innovation (see
Appendix A.4 below). Substituting the vacancy creation condition (1.3) implies equation
(1.6).
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A.2 Wage Equations
Let us first consider the wages paid in type R firms. Wage bargaining according to
equations (1.4) and (1.5) implies the following surplus splitting rule for outsiders in firms
with yi = y, for insiders in firms with yi = y and for insiders in firms with yi = 0,
(1− γ)
(
WO,R
(
wO,R
(
y,NRi
))
− U
)
= γ
(
∂πO,R(NRi , y, ki)
∂NRi
)
,
(1− γ)
(
W I,R
(
wI,R
(
y,NRi
))
− U
)
= γ
(
∂πI,R(NRi , y, ki)
∂NRi
+ f
)
,
(1− γ)
(
W I,R
(
wI,R
(
0, NRi
))
− U
)
= γ
(
∂πI,R(NRi , 0, ki)
∂NRi
+ f
)
,
where firms only have to pay firing costs f , if they do not continue to employ an insider.
Substituting the marginal value of a worker in the respective situation from equations
(A.12) and (1.6), i.e.,
∂πO,R(NRi , y, ki)
∂NRi
=
αy
(
NRi
)α−1 − wO,R (y,NRi )− ∂wO,R (y,NRi )∂NRi NRi + δ∂π
I,R(NRi , 0, ki)
∂NRi
(r + δ)
,
∂πI,R(NRi , y, ki)
∂NRi
=
αy
(
NRi
)α−1 − wI,R (y,NRi )− ∂wI,R (y,NRi )∂NRi NRi + δ∂π
I,R(NRi , 0, ki)
∂NRi
(r + δ)
,
∂πI,R(NRi , 0, ki)
∂NRi
=
−wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
−
∂wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
∂NRi
NRi + η
∂πI,R(NRi , y, ki)
∂NRi
(r + λd + η)
,
and the workers’ surplus from employment using equations (A.2) and (A.4), i.e.,
[
WO,R
(
wO,R
(
y,NRi
))
− U
]
=
wO,R
(
y,NRi
)
− rU + δ
[
W I,R
(
wR (0, Ni)
)
− U
]
(r + δ)
,
[
W I,R
(
wI,R
(
y,NRi
))
− U
]
=
wI,R
(
y,NRi
)
− rU + δ
[
W I,R
(
wR (0, Ni)
)
− U
]
(r + δ)
,
[
W I,R
(
wI,R
(
0, NRi
))
− U
]
=
wI,R (0, Ni)− rU + η
[
W I,R
(
wi,R (y,Ni)
)
− U
]
(r + η + λd)
,
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and rearranging using again the surplus splitting rules in the equations above, leads to
the following set of differential wage equations,
wO,R
(
y,NRi
)
= (1− γ) rU + γ
(
αy
(
NRi
)α−1 − ∂wO,R (y,NRi )
∂NRi
NRi
)
− γδf,
wI,R
(
y,NRi
)
= (1− γ) rU + γ
(
αy
(
NRi
)α−1 − ∂wI,R (y,NRi )
∂NRi
NRi
)
+ γrf,
wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
= (1− γ) rU − γ
∂wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
∂NRi
NRi + γ (r + λd) f,
Solving the differential equations for wO,R
(
y,NRi
)
and wI,R
(
y,NRi
)
following Cahuc and
Wasmer (2001) and Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer (2008) gives the above wage equations.
If we substitute the value of being unemployed by (1− γ) rU = (1− γ) z + γθc, we
obtain wages as a function of labor market tightness. The differential wage equation for
wI,R (0, Ni) is independent of N
R
i and is therefore given by setting ∂w
I,R
(
0, NRi
)
/∂NRi =
0.
Now consider wages paid by type B firms. The surplus splitting rules are given by,
(1− γ)
(
WO,B
(
wO,B
(
y,NBi
))
− U
)
= γ
(
∂πO,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
)
,
(1− γ)
(
W I,B
(
wI,B
(
y,NBi
))
− U
)
= γ
(
∂πI,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
+ f
)
,
(1− γ)
(
W I,B
(
wI,B
(
0, NBi
))
− U
)
= γ
r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β)
r + λd + g (ϕ)
(
∂πI,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
+ f
)
,
where the surplus splitting rule for the case with yi = 0 takes into account that innovation
price bargaining implies that part of the marginal value of continuing the employment
relationship (the fraction β) is going to the seller. This causes the additional term in the
100
last equation. The marginal values of employing a worker are given by,
∂πO,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
=
αy
(
NBi
)α−1 − wO,B (y,NBi )− ∂wO,B (y,NBi )∂NBi NBi + δ∂π
I,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
(r + δ)
,
∂πI,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
=
αy
(
NBi
)α−1 − wI,B (y,NBi )− ∂wI,B (y,NBi )∂NBi NBi + δ∂π
I,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
(r + δ)
,
∂πI,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
=
−wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
−
∂wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
∂NBi
NBi + g (ϕ) (1− β)
∂πI,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
(r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
,
and the workers’ surplus from employment by,[
WO,B
(
wO,B
(
y,NBi
))
− U
]
=
wO,B
(
y,NBi
)
− rU + δ
[
W I,B
(
wI,B
(
0, NBi
))
− U
]
(r + δ)
,
[
W I,B
(
wI,B
(
y,NBi
))
− U
]
=
wI,B
(
y,NBi
)
− rU + δ
[
W I,B
(
wI,B
(
0, NBi
))
− U
]
(r + δ)
,
[
W I,B
(
wI,B
(
0, NBi
))
− U
]
=
wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
− rU + g (ϕ)
[
W I,B
(
wI,B (y,Ni)
)
− U
]
(r + λd + g (ϕ))
.
Substituting implies the following differential wage equations,
wO,B
(
y,NBi
)
= (1− γ) rU + γαy
(
NBi
)α−1 − γ ∂wO,B (y,NBi )
∂NBi
NBi − δγf
+ δ
βg (ϕ)
r + λd + g (ϕ)
γ
(
∂πI,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
+ f
)
,
wI,B
(
y,NBi
)
= (1− γ) rU + γαy
(
NBi
)α−1 − γ ∂wI,B (y,NBi )
∂NBi
NBi + γrf
+ δ
g (ϕ) β
r + λd + g (ϕ)
γ
(
∂πI,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
+ f
)
,
wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
= (1− γ) rU − γ
∂wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
∂NBi
NBi + γ (r + λd) f
− βg (ϕ) γ
(
∂πI,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
+ f
)
,
where the last term in each line, i.e., a fraction of firms’ surplus, appears due to innovation
price bargaining. Since wages of outsiders and insiders at a firm with yi = y only differ by
a constant, we know that the ∂wO,B
(
y,NBi
)
/∂NBi = ∂w
I,B
(
y,NBi
)
/∂NBi . This allows
us to write the differences in wages between outsiders and insiders as,
wI,B
(
y,NBi
)
− wO,B
(
y,NBi
)
= γ (r + δ) f.
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Substituting allows us to write the difference in the marginal values of employing an
outsider and an insider as,
∂πO,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
− ∂π
I,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
=
wI,B
(
y,NBi
)
− wO,B
(
y,NBi
)
(r + δ)
= γf.
Given the vacancy creation condition, we can write the marginal value of employing an
insider as
∂πI,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
=
∂πO,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
− γf = c
λm (θ)
− γf.
This allows us to determine the wage for an insider at a firm with yi = 0,
wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
= (1− γ) rU + γ (r + λd) f − βg (ϕ) γ
(
c
λm (θ)
+ (1− γ) f
)
where we used the fact that the differential equation is independent of NBi .
Substituting implies that the marginal value of employing an insider with yi = 0 is
independent of the number of employed workers, i.e.,
∂πI,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
=
g (ϕ) (1− β)
(
c
λm (θ)
− γf
)
− wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
(r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
.
This allows us to write the wage equation for an outsider and an insider at a firm with
yi = y as,
wO,B
(
y,NBi
)
= (1− γ) rU + γ α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NBi
)α−1 − δγf
+ δβg (ϕ) γ
g (ϕ) (1− β)
(
c
λm (θ)
− γf
)
− wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
(r + λd + g (ϕ)) (r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
,
wI,B
(
y,NBi
)
= (1− γ) rU + γ α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NBi
)α−1
+ γrf
+ δβg (ϕ) γ
g (ϕ) (1− β)
(
c
λm (θ)
− γf
)
− wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
(r + λd + g (ϕ)) (r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
,
If we substituted the value of being unemployed by (1− γ) rU = (1− γ) z+ γθc, then we
get wages as a function of labor market tightness.
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A.3 Innovation Price
The vacancy creation and firing conditions (1.3) and (1.7) imply that in a given steady
state, all type B firms have either 0 or NBj employees. This simplifies the analysis and
implies that the expected price of an innovation charged by a firm with innovation cost ki
is given by p (ki, 0) or p
(
ki, N
B
j
)
. Since we concentrate on parameter sets that guarantee
the existence of an innovation market, we know that all type S firms are willing to sell
to any type B firm, that is, all matches in the innovation market will generate a positive
surplus.
The innovation price is given by the surplus splitting rule,
p (kj, 0) = β
(
πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
− c
λm (θ)
NBi − πO,B (0, 0, ki)
)
(A.13)
+ (1− β)
(
πS (0, y, kj)− πS (0, 0, kj)
)
,
p
(
kj, N
B
i
)
= β
(
πI,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
− πI,B
(
NBi , 0, ki
))
(A.14)
+ (1− β)
(
πS (0, y, kj)− πS (0, 0, kj)
)
.
The closed form expressions for the expected profit of type S firms that sell their innova-
tions and of type B firms that buy innovations are as follows. Given the fact that the price
that a type S firm with innovation cost ki is given by p (ki, 0) or p
(
ki, N
B
j
)
, respectively,
and using equations (A.7) and (A.6) the expected profit with yi ∈ {0, y} can be written
as,
πS (0, y, ki) =
(r + λs + η)ϕg (ϕ) p (ki, N)− (δ + ϕg (ϕ)) ki
r (r + λs + η) + (δ + ϕg (ϕ)) (r + λs)
, (A.15)
πS (0, 0, ki) =
ηϕg (ϕ) p (ki, N)− (r + δ + ϕg (ϕ)) ki
r (r + λs + η) + (δ + ϕg (ϕ)) (r + λs)
. (A.16)
where N = NBj if L
B
j = 0 and N = 0 if L
B
j = N
B
j . Using equations (1.2) and (A.11) the
expected profit for firms that do not lay off their workers if they are hit by a productivity
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shock can be written as,
πI,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
=
(r + λd + g (ϕ))
(
y
(
NBi
)α − wI,B (y,NBi )NBi )
(r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r
(A.17)
− δ
wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
NBi + g (ϕ)Ekj
[
p
(
kj, N
B
i
)]
(r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r
,
πI,B
(
NBi , 0, ki
)
=
g (ϕ)
(
y
(
NBi
)α − wI,B (y,NBi )NBi )
(r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r
(A.18)
− (r + δ)
wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
NBi + g (ϕ)Ekj
[
p
(
kj, N
B
i
)]
(r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r
.
If workers are laid off in case of a productivity shock, the expected profits are given by,
πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
=
(r + λd + g (ϕ))
(
y
(
NBi
)α − wO,B (y,NBi )NBi − δfNBi )
(r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r
(A.19)
− δg (ϕ)
(r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r
(
c
λm (θ)
NBi + Ekj [p (kj, 0)]
)
,
πO,B (0, 0, ki) =
g (ϕ)
(
y
(
NBi
)α − wO,B (y,NBi )NBi − δfNBi )
(r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r
(A.20)
− (r + δ) g (ϕ)
(r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r
(
c
λm (θ)
NBi + Ekj [p (kj, 0)]
)
.
To determine the price that type B firms expect to pay for an innovation, we first focus
on the average seller that has innovation cost k such that its price equals the expected
price, i.e.,
p
(
k,NBi
)
= Ekj
[
p
(
k,NBi
)]
or p
(
k, 0
)
= Ekj [p (k, 0)] .
Computing the differences in expected profits using equations (A.15) to (A.20) and plug-
ging the results into the innovation price equations (A.13) and (A.14) leads to
Ekj
[
p
(
k,NBi
)]
=
K2β (r + λd)
(
y
(
NBi
)α − wB (y,NBi )NBi )+K2βrwI,B (0, NBi )NBi
K1K2 −K1 (1− β) (r + λs)ϕg (ϕ)−K2βrg (ϕ)
(A.21)
+
K1 (1− β) rk
K1K2 −K1 (1− β) (r + λs)ϕg (ϕ)−K2βrg (ϕ)
,
Ekj
[
p
(
k, 0
)]
=
K2β (r + λd)
(
y
(
NBi
)α − wO,B (y,NBi )NBi − δfNBi − (r + δ) cλm (θ)NBi
)
K1K2 −K1 (1− β) (r + λs)ϕg (ϕ)−K2βrg (ϕ)
(A.22)
+
K1 (1− β) rk
K1K2 −K1 (1− β) (r + λs)ϕg (ϕ)−K2βrg (ϕ)
,
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where
K1 = (r + δ) (r + λd) + rg (ϕ) ,
K2 = (r + δ + ϕg (ϕ)) (r + λs) + rη.
Given the expected price in equation (A.21) or (A.22) the innovation price p
(
kj, N
B
i
)
or
p (kj, 0) for a seller with innovation cost kj is given by substituting the expected price
in the respective expected profit functions (A.15) to (A.20) and inserting them into the
innovation price equations (A.13) and (A.14). Rearranging implies,
p
(
kj, N
B
i
)
=
K2β (r + λd)
(
y
(
NBi
)α − wI,B (y,NBi )NBi )+K2βrwB (0, NBi )NBi
K1K2 −K1 (1− β) (r + λs)ϕg (ϕ)
+
K1 (1− β) rkj +K2βrg (ϕ) p
(
k,NBi
)
K1K2 −K1 (1− β) (r + λs)ϕg (ϕ)
,
p (kj, 0) =
K2β (r + λd)
(
y
(
NBi
)α − wO,B (y,NBi )NBi − δfNBi − (r + δ) cλm (θ)NBi
)
K1K2 −K1 (1− β) (r + λs)ϕg (ϕ)
+
K1 (1− β) rkj +K2βrg (ϕ) p
(
k, 0
)
K1K2 −K1 (1− β) (r + λs)ϕg (ϕ)
.
A.4 Vacancy Creation Conditions
Using the respective marginal values of a worker from section A.2 and the fact that,
∂πO,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
− ∂π
I,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
=
wI,t (y,N ti )− wO,t (y,N ti )
(r + δ)
= γf,
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where
∂πI,R(NRi , y, ki)
∂NRi
=
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NRi
)α−1 − (1− γ) rU − γrf + δ∂πI,R(NRi , 0, ki)
∂NRi
(r + δ)
=
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NRi
)α−1 − (1− γ) rU − γrf
(r + δ)
+
δ
(r + δ)
η
(
c
λm (θ)
+ (1− γ) f
)
− wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
− ηf
(r + λd + η)
=
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NRi
)α−1 − (1− γ) rU − γrf
(r + δ)
+
δ
(r + δ)
η
c
λm (θ)
− (1− γ) rU − γ (r + λd + η) f
(r + λd + η)
and using the fact that
∂πO,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
=
∂πI,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
+ γf =
c
λm (θ)
implies
c
λm (θ)
=
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NRi
)α−1 − (1− γ) rU
(r + δ)
+
δ
(r + δ)
η
c
λm (θ)
− (1− γ) rU
(r + λd + η)
c
λm (θ)
=
(r + λd + η)
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NRi
)α−1 − (r + δ + λd + η) (1− γ) rU
(r + δ) (r + λd) + rη
Similarly for type B firms, i.e.,
∂πI,B(NBi , y, ki)
∂NBi
=
αy
(
NBi
)α−1 − wI,B (y,NBi )− ∂wI,B (y,NBi )∂NBi NBi + δ∂π
I,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
(r + δ)
=
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NBi
)α−1 − (1− γ) rU − γ (r + δ) f − δ (1− γ) f
(r + δ)
+
δ
(r + δ)
r + λd + g (ϕ)− g (ϕ) γβ
r + λd + g (ϕ)
(
∂πI,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
+ f
)
.
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Using the fact that
∂πO,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
=
∂πI,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
+ γf =
c
λm (θ)
,
implies
c
λm (θ)
=
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NBi
)α−1 − (1− γ) rU − δ (1− γ) f
(r + δ)
+
δ
(r + δ)
r + λd + g (ϕ)− g (ϕ) γβ
r + λd + g (ϕ)
(
∂πI,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
+ f
)
,
c
λm (θ)
=
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NBi
)α−1 − (1− γ) rU − δ (1− γ) f
(r + δ)
+
δ
(r + δ)
r + λd + g (ϕ)− g (ϕ) γβ
(r + λd + g (ϕ))
g (ϕ) (1− (1− γ) β) c
λm (θ)
− (1− γ) rU
(r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
+
δ
(r + δ)
r + λd + g (ϕ)− g (ϕ) γβ
r + λd + g (ϕ)
r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β) + g (ϕ) γβ
r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β)
(1− γ) f,
=
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NBi
)α−1
(r + δ)
−
(
1 + δ
(r + λd + g (ϕ)− g (ϕ) γβ)
(r + λd + g (ϕ)) (r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
)
(1− γ) rU
(r + δ)
+
δ
(r + δ)
(r + λd + g (ϕ)− g (ϕ) γβ) g (ϕ) (1− (1− γ) β)
(r + λd + g (ϕ)) (r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
c
λm (θ)
+
g (ϕ) β (1− γ) g (ϕ) γβ
(r + λd + g (ϕ)) (r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
δ
(r + δ)
(1− γ) f,
Rearranging implies,
c
λm (θ)
=
C2
C1
(
(1− γ)α
1− γ (1− α)
y
(
NBi
)α−1 − (1− γ) rU)
− r + λd + g (ϕ)− g (ϕ) γβ
C1
δ (1− γ) rU
+
g (ϕ) β (1− γ) g (ϕ) γβ
C1
δ (1− γ) f
with
C1 = C2 (r + δ)− (r + λd + g (ϕ)− γβg (ϕ)) δ (1− (1− γ) β) g (ϕ)
C2 = (r + λd + g (ϕ)) (r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
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The first-order condition for the optimal number of posted vacancies in equation (1.3)
shows that vacancy posting costs always exceeds the marginal value of an additional
worker for a firm that has been hit by a productivity shock, i.e.,
∂πt(N ti , 0, ki)
∂V ti
=
∂πt(N ti , 0, ki)
∂N ti
λm (θ)− c < 0,
as one can easily verify by substituting the marginal value of an additional worker us-
ing equation (1.6). Thus, firms that have been hit by a productivity shock never post
vacancies.
A.5 Type Choice
We show
∂πS (0, y, ki)
∂ki
<
∂πO,R
(
NRi , y, ki
)
∂ki
<
∂πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
∂ki
= 0.
Note first that πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
is independent of ki as shown in equation (A.19), which
implies ∂πO,B
(
NBi , y, ki
)
/∂ki = 0.
The closed form expression for the expected profit of type R firms is obtained by
rearranging equations (A.8), (A.9) and (1.2), i.e.,
πO,R
(
NRi , y, ki
)
=

(r + λd + η)
(
y
(
NRi
)α − wO,R (y,NRi )NRi )− δki
((r + λd) (r + δ) + rη)
−δ
wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
NRi + ηγfN
R
i
((r + λd) (r + δ) + rη)
if LRi = 0,
(r + λd + η)
(
y
(
NRi
)α − wO,R (y,NRi )NRi − δfNRi )− δki
(r + λd) (r + δ) + rη
− δη
(r + λd) (r + δ) + rη
c
λm (θ)
NRi if L
R
i = N
R
i ,
The expected profit is strictly decreasing in ki, which makes it less attractive for high
innovation cost firms to do own research if they are hit by a productivity shock.
Type S firms that only innovate in order to sell their innovations obtain the expected
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profit πS (0, y, ki), where substituting the price p (ki, N) implies,
πS (0, y, ki) =
(r + λs + η)ϕg (ϕ) β (r + λd)
(
y
(
NBj
)α − wB (y,NBj )NBj )
((r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r) ((r + λs) (r + δ + βϕg (ϕ)) + rη)
+
(r + λs + η)ϕg (ϕ) β
(
rwB
(
0, NBj
)
NBj + rg (ϕ) p
(
ki, N
B
j
))
((r + λd) (r + δ) + g (ϕ) r) ((r + λs) (r + δ + βϕg (ϕ)) + rη)
− (δ + βϕg (ϕ))
(r + λs) (r + δ + βϕg (ϕ)) + rη
ki if L
B
j = 0 ,
πS (0, y, ki) =
(r + λs + η)ϕg (ϕ) β (r + λd)
(
y
(
NBj
)α − wB (y,NBj )NBj − δfNBj )
((r + δ) (r + λd) + rg (ϕ)) ((r + δ) (r + λs) + βϕg (ϕ) (r + λd) + rη)
+
(r + λs + η)ϕg (ϕ) β
(
− (r + λd)
(
(r + δ)
c
λm (θ)
NBj
)
+ rg (ϕ) p
(
kj, 0
))
((r + δ) (r + λd) + rg (ϕ)) ((r + δ) (r + λs) + βϕg (ϕ) (r + λd) + rη)
− (δ + βϕg (ϕ))
(r + λs) (r + δ + βϕg (ϕ)) + rη
ki if L
B
j = N
B
j ,
The expected profit πS (0, y, ki) is strictly decreasing in ki. Comparing how the expected
profit of type S and R firms change with the innovation cost ki reveals,
∂πS (0, y, ki)
∂ki
−
∂πO,R
(
NRi , y, ki
)
∂ki
=
δ
(r + δ) (r + λd + η)
(
1 +
ηδ
((r + λd) (r + δ) + rη)
)
− (δ + βϕg (ϕ))
(r + λs) (r + δ + βϕg (ϕ)) + rη
=
δ
(r + λd) (r + δ) + rη
− (δ + βϕg (ϕ))
(r + λs) (r + δ + βϕg (ϕ)) + rη
=
(λs − λd) (rδ + δ)− (r + λd + η) rβϕg (ϕ)
((r + λd) (r + δ) + rη) ((r + λs) (r + δ + βϕg (ϕ)) + rη)
< 0,
since λs < λd by assumption.
A.5.1 Steady State Measures
Firm Flows and Innovation Market Tightness: Denote the measure of firms that
exit the economy each period by me, where the assumptions regarding the destruction of
firms imply,
me = λsm
S (0, 0) + λd
(
mR
(
0, NRi
)
+mB
(
0, NBi
))
.
In a steady state the measure of firms that exit the economy is equal to the measure of
new firms that enter, i.e., me = mn. The respective measure of firms evolve according to
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the difference between in- and outflows, i.e.,
ṁS (0, 0) = (δ + ϕg (ϕ))mS (y, 0)− (λs + η)mS (0, 0) (A.23)
ṁS (y, 0) = Ξ (k∗)mn + ηmS (0, 0)− (δ + ϕg (ϕ))mS (y, 0) (A.24)
ṁR
(
0, NRi
)
= δmR
(
y,NRi
)
− (λd + η)mR
(
0, NRi
)
(A.25)
ṁR
(
y,NRi
)
= (Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗))mn + ηmR
(
0, NRi
)
− δmR
(
y,NRi
)
(A.26)
ṁB
(
0, NBi
)
= δmB
(
y,NBi
)
− (λd + g (ϕ))mB
(
0, NBi
)
(A.27)
ṁB
(
y,NBi
)
= (1− Ξ (k∗∗))mn + g (ϕ)mB
(
0, NBi
)
− δmB
(
y,NBi
)
(A.28)
We focus on the steady state, where the measures of the different firm types do not
change, i.e., ṁt (yi, N
t
i ) = 0. The above flow equations allow us to write the ratio of the
steady state measures of type B firms mB
(
0, NBi
)
to the measure of type S firms mS (y, 0)
as written in equation (1.11). Note, that the Inada conditions guarantee that the RHS
of equation (1.11) increases in the innovation market tightness ϕ at a decreasing rate.
Since in addition the RHS at ϕ = 0 exceeds the LHS, i.e., RHS(0) > 0, equation (1.11)
determines the unique innovation market tightness ϕ for given innovation cost thresholds
k∗ and k∗∗.
Worker Flows and Labor Market Tightness: We denote the measure of unemployed
workers by u. Unemployment evolves according to the difference between inflows and
outflows, i.e.,
u̇ =

θλm (θ)u− λd
(
mB
(
0, NBi
)
NBi +m
R
(
0, NRi
)
NRi
)
if Lti = 0,
θλm (θ)u− δ
(
mB
(
y,NBi
)
NBi +m
R
(
y,NRi
)
NRi
)
if Lti = N
t
i .
(A.29)
We denote the measure of employed workers by l. Let us first consider the case when
all firms keep their workers if they are hit by a productivity shock. We can determine
the steady state measure of employed workers by equating the in- and outflow from
unemployment, i.e.,
θλm (θ)u = λd
(
mB
(
0, NBi
)
NBi +m
R
(
0, NRi
)
NRi
)
,
= λd
(
NBi +
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
NRi
)
mB
(
0, NBi
)
.
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The level of employment l can be obtained by summing over all type B and R firms, i.e.,
l =
(
mB
(
0, NBi
)
+mB
(
y,NBi
))
NBi +
(
mR
(
0, NRi
)
+mR
(
y,NRi
))
NRi ,
=
(
δ + λd + g (ϕ)
δ
NBi +
δ + λd + η
δ
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
NRi
)
mB
(
0, NBi
)
,
where the flow equations for firms in equations (A.23) to (A.28) imply,
1
mB (0, NBi )
=
(
1
ϕ
+
δ + ϕg (ϕ)
(λs + η)ϕ
+
δ + λd + g (ϕ)
δ
)
1
m
(A.30)
+
δ + λd + η
δ
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
1
m
.
Using the fact that the number of unemployed and employed workers have to add up to
one, i.e., l = 1−u, allows us to write labor market tightness θ as a function of the number
of workers employed at type B and R firms NBi and N
R
i , as well as of {ϕ, k∗, k∗∗,m}, i.e.,(
λd
δ
δ + θλm (θ)
θλm (θ)
+
δ + g (ϕ)
δ
)
NBi +
(
λd
δ
δ + θλm (θ)
θλm (θ)
+
δ + η
δ
)
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
NRi
(A.31)
=
(
1
ϕ
+
δ + ϕg (ϕ)
(λs + η)ϕ
+
δ + λd + g (ϕ)
δ
+
δ + λd + η
δ
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
)
1
m
,
The vacancy creation conditions at type B and R firms can then be used to substitute out
NBi and N
R
i to get an equation that solely determines θ as a function of {ϕ, k∗, k∗∗,m}.
Let us now consider the case when all firms lay off workers if they are hit by a produc-
tivity shock. Equating in- and outflow into employment defines steady state employment
as,
θλm (θ)
δ + θλm (θ)
= l =
(
mB
(
y,NBi
)
+mR
(
y,NRi
))
N ti ,
=
(
λd + g (ϕ)
δ
+
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
λd + η
δ
)
mB
(
0, NBi
)
N ti ,
where 1/mB
(
0, NBi
)
is given by equation (A.30). Substituting mB
(
0, NBi
)
again implies,(
1
ϕ
+
δ + ϕg (ϕ)
(λs + η)ϕ
+
δ + λd + g (ϕ)
δ
+
δ + λd + η
δ
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
)
1
m
(A.32)
=
(
λd + g (ϕ)
δ
+
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
λd + η
δ
)
δ + θλm (θ)
θλm (θ)
N ti .
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This again allows us to write labor market tightness θ as a function of the number of
workers N ti employed at type B and R firms with yi = y, as well as {ϕ, k∗, k∗∗,m}.
Again we can use the vacancy creation conditions for productive firms under Lti = N
t
i to
substitute out N ti .
If only type B or only type R firms lay off workers, if they are hit by a productivity
shock, steady state unemployment and the respective employment level are given by,
θλm (θ)u =
 λdmB
(
0, NBi
)
NBi + δm
R
(
y,NRi
)
NRi if L
B
i = 0 and L
R
i = N
R
i ,
λdm
R
(
0, NRi
)
NRi + δm
B
(
y,NBi
)
NBi if L
B
i = N
B
i and L
R
i = 0,
l =

(
mB
(
0, NBi
)
+mB
(
y,NBi
))
NBi +m
R
(
y,NRi
)
NRi if L
B
i = 0 and L
R
i = N
R
i ,
mB
(
y,NBi
)
NBi +
(
mR
(
0, NRi
)
+mR
(
y,NRi
))
NRi if L
B
i = N
B
i and L
R
i = 0.
The flow equations (A.23) to (A.28) then determine the respective measures for the num-
ber of firms of type B and R. Using the fact that all workers have to add up to one, i.e.,
l = 1−u, allows us again to write the labor market tightness θ as a function of the number
of workers employed at type B and R firms NBi and N
R
i , as well as of {ϕ, k∗, k∗∗,m}, i.e.,
for LBi = N
B
i and L
R
i = 0,(
1
ϕ
+
δ + ϕg (ϕ)
ϕ (λs + η)
+
δ + λd + g (ϕ)
δ
+
δ + λd + η
δ
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
)
1
m
(A.33)
=
(
λd + g (ϕ)
θλm (θ)
+
λd + g (ϕ)
δ
)
NBi +
(
λd
θλm (θ)
+
δ + λd + η
δ
)
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
NRi ,
and for LBi = 0 and L
R
i = N
R
i ,(
1
ϕ
+
δ + ϕg (ϕ)
ϕ (λs + η)
+
δ + λd + g (ϕ)
δ
+
δ + λd + η
δ
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
)
1
m
(A.34)
=
(
λd
θλm (θ)
+
δ + λd + g (ϕ)
δ
)
NBi +
(
λd + η
θλm (θ)
+
λd + η
δ
)
Ξ (k∗∗)− Ξ (k∗)
1− Ξ (k∗∗)
NRi .
Keeping the variables {ϕ, k∗, k∗∗,m} constant, equations (A.31) to (A.34) determine the
respective increasing functions of the number of workers employed at the respective firms,
i.e., θ
(
NRi , N
B
i
)
with ∂θ
(
NRi , N
B
i
)
/∂N ti > 0.
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A.6 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is characterized by the market tightness in the innovation and the labor
markets, the layoff decision of type B and R firms LBi and L
R
i , the threshold values
k∗ and k∗∗ of the innovation cost ki that determine the fraction of type S, B, and R
firms and the number of active firms in the economy m, i.e., by the set of variables{
ϕ, θ, LBi , L
R
i , k
∗, k∗∗,m
}
.
The innovation market tightness ϕ is determined by equation (1.11). Comparative
statics using the implicit function theorem imply that innovation market tightness ϕ
decreases with both innovation cost thresholds k∗ and k∗∗, since, in the case of k∗, more
firms decide to specialize in innovation and, in case of k∗∗, fewer firms decide to buy a
new innovation when they are hit by a productivity shock.
The layoff decision for firm types B and R are given by substituting the respective
values of an additional worker into the firing condition (1.7). Workers are laid off, i.e.,
Lti = N
t
i , if the marginal value of continuing an employment relationship plus the firing
cost is negative, i.e., if and only if,
g (ϕ) (1− β)
(
c
λm (θ)
− γf
)
− wI,B
(
0, NBi
)
(r + λd + g (ϕ) (1− β))
+ f < 0,
η
(
c
λm (θ)
− γf
)
− wI,R
(
0, NRi
)
(r + λd + η)
+ f < 0,
These firing conditions for type R and type B firms are derived as follows. We know that
workers are laid off if,
∂πI,R(NRi , 0, ki)
∂NRi
+ f < 0, and
∂πI,B(NBi , 0, ki)
∂NBi
+ f < 0.
Using the respective marginal values of a worker from section A.2 and the fact that,
∂πO,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
− ∂π
I,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
=
wI,t (y,N ti )− wO,t (y,N ti )
(r + δ)
= γf,
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and that the vacancy creation condition,
∂πO,t(N ti , y, ki)
∂N ti
=
c
λm (θ)
,
gives the above equations.
Bargained wages are given in Appendix A.2. The vacancy creation conditions are given
in Appendix A.4. All vacancy creation curves define the number of employed workers
as a decreasing function of labor market tightness, i.e., N ti (θ) with ∂N
t
i (θ) /∂θ < 0.
Substituting the respective functions N ti (θ) into the respective steady-state equations
(A.31) to (A.34) determines labor market tightness as a function of
{
ϕ,LBi , L
R
i , k
∗, k∗∗,m
}
.
The property ∂N ti (θ) /∂θ < 0 together with ∂θ
(
NRi , N
B
i
)
/∂N ti > 0, guarantees that the
equilibrium market tightness is unique for a given set of variables
{
ϕ,LBi , L
R
i , k
∗, k∗∗,m
}
.
The comparative static result that a higher number of firms m leads to higher labor
market tightness θ ensures that the free entry condition (1.10) is well defined.
The innovation cost thresholds k∗ and k∗∗ are determined by comparing the expected
profits of the different types of firms as defined in equations (1.8) and (1.9). The single
crossing property of the expected profits guarantees a unique pair of innovation cost
thresholds k∗ and k∗∗ for a given set of variables {ϕ, θ,m}. Thus, firms with low innovation
costs specialize in innovation, firms with high innovation costs buy innovations when they
are hit by a productivity shock and firms with medium innovation costs do own research
if they are hit by a productivity shock.
The final equation that determines the number of firms m in equilibrium is the free
entry condition (1.10), where the number of firms enters indirectly via labor market
tightness θ. A higher number of firms m increases, ceteris paribus, labor market tightness
θ. A higher labor market tightness increases the recruitment cost of workers and thus
decreases the expected profit of type B and R firms. Thus, the free entry condition is
decreasing in the number of firms.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Equilibrium Stability
The models steady equilibrium is determined by equating NSS(x) and NFOC(x) (see
equation (2.18)). In the main text I outlined that equation (2.18) is satisfied by two
distinct values of x, denoted as x∗ and x∗∗. The equilibrium characterized by x∗∗ was
ruled out, as it requires unemployment to be locally decreasing in firing costs. In this
section I augment this argument by showing that the equilibrium associated with x∗∗ is
not stable, while the equilibrium associated with x∗ is. As a full-blown out of steady-state
analysis under rational expectations is not feasible, I rely on a simplified, yet intuitive,
graphical analysis, which relies on the assumption that firms behave according to (2.8)
and (2.9) even if market tightness is off its steady state value. Put differently, I assume
that firms expect market tightness to remain constant at any given point in time.
Figure B.1 shows the adjustment process resulting from a (small) deviation from the
low market tightness equilibrium denoted by x∗ in the main text. First note that the
NFOC curve is downward sloping (in an environment around x∗) as ∂NFOC∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=x∗
< 0.
If x = x′ < x∗ and N is below the NFOC line firms find it optimal to hire workers until
N = NFOC(x′). However, the new employment level can only be held constant, if firms
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continuously hire many workers from a small pool of unemployed which. Correspondingly
the NSS line indicates a high level of market tightness x = x′′ > x∗. Firms react to the
increase in market tightness by reducing employment to N = NFOC(x′′), which again
leads to a decrease in steady state market tightness. However, as long as the negative
slope of the NFOC line is smaller in absolute value than the positive slope of the NSS line
this decrease does not fully offset the initial increase in market tightness. Hence, after
one adjustment step market tightness is in between x′ and x∗. The same process repeats
itself until x∗ is reached, that is, the low market tightness equilibrium x∗ is stable. If
the slope of NFOC evaluated at x = x∗ is larger in absolute value than the slope of NSS
evaluated at x = x∗, the adjustment process would not fully converge. In this case the
economy oscillates around x = x∗. However, as NFOC becomes flatter (and eventually
upward sloping) when x increases the magnitude of the oscillation process is bounded.
Hence, a divergent behavior can be excluded. Consequentially, describing the equilibrium
associated with x∗ is economically meaningful in any case.
In contrast, Figure B.1 shows that the high market tightness equilibrium x∗∗ is not
stable (knife-edge equilibrium). If market tightness is slightly below x∗∗ (at x′, point
A) firms will downward adjust employment to NFOC(x′). To maintain the lower level of
employment firms continuously hire less workers from a larger pool of unemployed, leading
to lower market tightness as indicated by the NSS line. As NFOC(x) is upward sloping
(around x = x′′) firms react to the lower market tightness with an further decrease in
employment, followed once again by a decrease in market tightness. The economy diverges
away from x∗∗. Analogous arguments hold true, if market tightness is slightly above x∗∗.
In fact, the high market tightness equilibrium turns out to be a modeling artifact and is
not of economic importance. Neglecting it does not harm the generality of my analysis.
116
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Computing ∂N
R
∂f
and rearranging reveals that NR is falling in firing costs if and only if
f <
ΘA − ε
ΘA(1− β(1− η)) + βδε
ω
!
= fR,max (B.1)
where ΘA =
(
εηβ
1−β(1−η)
) 1−α
2−α
. If the ratio between firing costs and wages is sufficiently low,
an increase in firing costs unambiguously lowers hypothetical labor demand NR and thus
leads to higher rationing unemployment. The reason why ∂N
R
∂f
changes its sign at very
high levels of f is rooted in the convex shape of NR,L.
The next step is to infer the impact of introducing firing costs on frictional unem-
ployment. The frictional component is defined as the drop in labor demand caused by
recruiting cost, that is, NR−N . Equation (2.20) implies that the frictional component is
always greater zero and positively linked to market tightness (via recruiting costs). Hence,
showing that higher firing costs lead to lower frictional unemployment boils down to show-
ing that firing costs lead to lower market tightness. To do so rewrite equation (2.18) as:
G(x, f) = xm(x)−NFOC(x, f) ∗ (q(x, f) + xm(x)(1− q(x, f))) (B.2)
The implicit function theorem implies that dx
∗
df
= −
∂G(x,f)
∂f
∂G(x,f)
∂x
, that is, market tightness is
decreasing in firing costs if Gx and Gf have the same sign. Correspondingly, the next step
is to compute the partial derivatives. It holds that:
Gx = (xm(x))
′(1−NFOC(x, f))− ∂N
FOC(x, f)
∂x
[q(x, f) + xm(x)(1− q(x, f))]
−NFOC(x, f)[(1− xm(x))∂q(x, f)
∂x
− (xm(x))′q(x, f)]
= (xm(x))′(1−NFOC(x, f))− (1− xm(x))δmH
(
∂NHi (x, f)
∂x
− ∂N
L
i (x, f)
∂x
)
+NFOC(x, f)(xm(x))′q(x, f)− ∂N
FOC
∂x
xm(x) (B.3)
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Gf = −
∂NFOC(x, f)
∂f
[q(x, f) + xm(x)(1− q(x, f))]− (1− xm(x))NFOC(x, f)∂q(x, f)
∂f
= −∂N
FOC(x, f)
∂f
xm(x)− (1− xm(x))δmH
(
∂NHi (x, f)
∂f
− ∂N
L
i (x, f)
∂f
)
(B.4)
Under the restriction of the refinement condition (see equation (2.20)), equation (B.3)
reveals that Gx is always positive. A sufficient condition for Gf > 0 (and thus for
dx
df
< 0)
is given by ∂N
FOC(x,f)
∂f
< 0. The latter is is equivalent to:
f [εβδ +ΘA(1− β(1− η))] +
c
m(x)
[ε(1− β(1− δ)) +ΘAηβ] < (ΘA − ε)ω (B.5)
where ΘA is already known from equation (2.21). Unfortunately, equation (B.5) is harder
to satisfy than equation (2.19) as ΘA < ΘB. Thus the refinement condition does not
automatically imply Gf > 0
1.
Let x and x denote the maximum market tightness for which equation (B.5), respec-
tively (2.19) are just satisfied (for a given set of exogenous parameters). As the left hand
side of equation (B.5) is increasing in x, equation (B.5) is (by definition) strictly satisfied
for all x∗ < x. Hence, focusing on equilibria with x∗ < x is sufficient to ensure that equi-
librium market tightness is declining in firing costs. Note that this is equivalent to assume
∂NFOC(x,f)
∂f
< 0, therefore labor demand is required to be decreasing in firing costs for given
market tightness. This is not a strong assumption as the primary channel through which
firing costs can positively influence employment is via lowering market tightness (as less
vacancies are needed for a given level of employment) and thus recruiting costs.
Moreover, note that the difference between ∂N
FOC(x,f)
∂f
< 0 and the refinement condi-
tion (2.20) is quantitatively negligible. The difference between equations (B.5) and (2.19)
is entirely due to the difference between ΘA and ΘB. Note that, independent of any other
parameter values, ΘA = ΘB if the discount factor β is set to unity. For reasonable values
1Equations(2.19) and (B.5) share the feature that market tightness cannot be directly substituted
out, because no closed form solution for x can be derived. The latter results from the non-linearity of
the matching function.
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of β (for example β = 0.999) ΘA is only marginally smaller than ΘB
2. Correspondingly,
assuming ∂N
FOC(x,f)
∂f
< 0 is only a very small additional assumptions once the refinement
condition (see equation (2.20)) is accepted (see Figure B.3).
Although equilibria satisfying the above mentioned conditioned are necessarily char-
acterized by an inverse relationship between firing costs and frictional unemployment this
does not imply that other equilibria do not exhibit this relationship. In the calibration
frictional unemployment is be decreasing in f even if f > fmax 3.
To facilitate intuition the models limiting behavior can be investigated. Assume that
firing costs are raised to the highest level (denoted as f ∗) consistent with the plausibility
constraint NHi −NLi ≥ 0. By definition it holds that lim
f→f∗
NHi −NLi = 0. Correspondingly
the job destruction rate q converges against zero as well. As labor market flows have to
be balanced in steady state, this requires that either market tightness or unemployment
converges against zero. However, as long as lim
f→f∗
N < 1 one can conclude that market
tightness converges to zero. Hence lim
f→f∗
x∗ = 0, which also implies lim
f→f∗
(N − NR) = 0,
that is, frictional unemployment vanishes when firing costs are raised to the maximum
value.
B.3 The Role of Matching Efficiency
In the main text average pre-treatment unemployment proxies the steady state composi-
tion of unemployment before treatment. However, relatively high unemployment can only
be attributed to a large (small) share of rationing (search) unemployment, if matching
efficiency is constant across observations. As no data on matching efficiency is available,
it is necessary to assume that matching efficiency does not vary across states. This section
2In the calibration it holds that ΘA = 0.8381 and ΘB = 0.8510.
3For each set of exogenous parameters (excluding f) there exist an f for which x∗ = x, that is,
equilibrium market tightness equals the maximum market tightness for which the refinement condition
is just satisfied. I denote this value as fmax, as it is the maximum level of firing cost which yields an
equilibrium compatible with the refinement condition.
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analyzes how a violation of this assumption might change results.
If matching efficiency is not constant, estimation potentially suffers from an omitted
variable bias. Luckily, it is possible to determine the sign of the resulting bias. Once
matching efficiency is available, one can compute average pre-treatment matching effi-
ciency τ̄i for every state and append equation (2.23) by an additional interaction term
τ̄i ∗ posti,t. If matching efficiency is high, the share of frictional unemployment is low (for
a given unemployment rate). Correspondingly, the theoretical model implies that in this
case the employment effect of EPL should be more adverse. Put differently, the expected
sign of the coefficient on τ̄i ∗posti,t is negative 4. Remember also, that theory implies that
the coefficient on Ūi ∗ posti,t should be negative as well. At the same time, observations
with high pre-treatment average matching efficiency should, on average, have low levels of
pre-treatment unemployment. Hence, τ̄i ∗posti,t and Ūi ∗posti,t are likely to be negatively
correlated.
Consider an observation with high pre-treatment unemployment rate . This obser-
vation is likely to have low pre-treatment matching efficiency. The latter causes the
employment effect of EPL to be rather favorable. Correspondingly, omitting τ̄i ∗ posti,t
causes the coefficient on Ūi ∗ posti,t to be less negative compared to a model which in-
cludes τ̄i ∗ posti,t. Hence, differences in matching efficiency bias the estimated coefficient
on Ūi ∗ posti,t towards zero.
Hence, it is not possible that untruly significant results occur. Accordingly, including
matching efficiency is very unlikely to change conclusions in case of the public-policy and
good-faith exception. In contrast, taking into account differences in matching efficiency is
likely to strengthen the presented empirical evidence. In addition, the bias may provide an
alternative explanation for the lack of significance when evaluating the implied-contract
exception5.
4The argumentation reverses if the unemployment rate is used as dependent variable.
5In the main text the lack of significance is explained by structural differences between the implied-
contract exception and the other two wrongful-dismissal laws.
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B.4 Tables
Table B.1 – Implied Contract Exception
Marg. Eff. at icUbari = icUbari plus
Dep. Variable Variable Coefficient -4 -2 0 2 4 Region
ln(epop) icposti,t -1.573 -1.063 -1.318 -1.573 -1.828 -2.083 Yes
(0.000) (0.236) (0.031) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009)
icposti,t ∗ icUbari -0.128
(0.479)
ln(epop) icposti,t -1.639 -0.066 -0.787 -1.639 -2.492 -3.344 No
(0.004) (0.956) (0.292) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012)
icposti,t ∗ icUbari -0.426
(0.133)
ln(unemprate) icposti,t 8.714 15.281 11.997 8.714 5.430 2.147 Yes
(0.023) (0.108) (0.055) (0.023) (0.186) (0.751)
icposti,t ∗ icUbari -1.642
(0.368)
ln(unemprate) icposti,t 10.303 6.452 8.377 10.303 12.229 14.155 No
(0.090) (0.687) (0.408) (0.090) (0.112) (0.277)
icposti,t ∗ icUbari 0.963
(0.771)
Notes: Models are weighted by state’s share of national population aged 16-64 in each month using
CPS sampling weights. P-values in parentheses are computed using Huber-White standard errors
which allow for unrestricted error correlation within states. icUbari equals state i
′s average unem-
ployment rate in the 24 months before the introduction of the Implied Contract Exception.
Table B.2 – Public Policy Exception
Marg. Eff. at icUbari = icUbari plus
Dep. Variable Variable Coefficient -4 -2 0 2 4 Region
ln(epop) ppposti,t -0.039 2.371 1.166 -0.039 -1.243 -2.448 Yes
(0.947) (0.033) (0.070) (0.947) (0.221) (0.120)
ppposti,t ∗ ppUbari -0.602
(0.050)
ln(epop) ppposti,t -0.160 3.172 1.506 -0.160 -1.825 -3.491 No
(0.836) (0.023) (0.056) (0.836) (0.181) (0.097)
ppposti,t ∗ ppUbari -0.833
(0.039)
ln(unemprate) ppposti,t 1.770 -17.587 -7.909 1.770 11.448 21.127 Yes
(0.712) (0.081) (0.164) (0.712) (0.183) (0.120)
ppposti,t ∗ ppUbari 4.839
(0.078)
ln(unemprate) ppposti,t 2.878 -25.289 -11.205 2.878 16.961 31.045 No
(0.668) (0.038) (0.093) (0.668) (0.165) (0.100)
ppposti,t ∗ ppUbari 7.042
(0.051)
Notes: Models are weighted by state’s share of national population aged 16-64 in each month using
CPS sampling weights. P-values in parentheses are computed using Huber-White standard errors
which allow for unrestricted error correlation within states. ppUbari equals state i
′s average unem-
ployment rate in the 24 months before the introduction of the Public Policy Exception.
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Table B.3 – Good Faith Exception
Marg. Eff. at icUbari = icUbari plus
Dep. Variable Variable Coefficient -4 -2 0 2 4 Region
ln(epop) gfposti,t -0.949 3.579 -0.949 -5.478 Yes
(0.288) (0.008) (0.288) (0.008)
gfposti,t ∗ gfUbari -2.264
(0.002)
ln(epop) gfposti,t -0.551 3.501 -0.551 -4.603 No
(0.381) (0.024) (0.381) (0.015)
gfposti,t ∗ gfUbari -2.026
(0.012)
ln(unemprate) gfposti,t 7.961 -29.615 7.961 45.538 Yes
(0.274) (0.001) (0.274) (0.006)
gfposti,t ∗ gfUbari 18.789
(0.001)
ln(unemprate) gfposti,t 4.196 -40.288 4.196 48.680 No
(0.505) (0.003) (0.505) (0.010)
gfposti,t ∗ gfUbari 22.242
(0.003)
Notes: Models are weighted by state’s share of national population aged 16-64 in each month using
CPS sampling weights. P-values in parentheses are computed using Huber-White standard errors
which allow for unrestricted error correlation within states. gfUbari equals state i
′s average unem-
ployment rate in the 24 months before the introduction of the Good Faith Exception.
B.5 Figures
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𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐶  
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𝑥′ 𝑥′′ 
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x 
Figure B.1 – The Figure shows the adjustment process resulting
from a small deviation from the low market tightness equilibrium.
Source: Own Simulations.
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𝑁𝐹𝑂𝐶  
𝑁𝑆𝑆 
𝑥∗∗ 
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𝑥′ 𝑥′′ 
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Figure B.2 – The Figure shows the adjustment process resulting
from a small deviation from the high market tightness equilibrium.
Source: Own Simulations.
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Figure B.3 – The Figure shows the value of ∂N
FOC
∂x (blue line) and
∂NFOC
∂f (red line) as functions of firing costs f . Source: Own Simula-
tions.
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Figure B.4 – The figure shows total, frictional and rationing un-
employment as a function of firing costs. Each graph results from a
simulation using the exact same set of parameter values except of
the wage parameter. Source: Own simulations.
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Figure B.5 – The figure shows equilibrium market tightness as a
function of firing costs. Each graph results from a simulation using
the exact same set of parameter values except of the wage parame-
ter. Source: Own simulations.
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Figure B.6 – The figure shows total output and two definitions of
net output as functions of firing costs. Net Output is calculated as
total output net of recruiting expenditures, while Net Output B is
calculated as Net Output minus total firing costs. Each graph re-
sults from a simulation using the exact same set of parameter values
except of the wage parameter. Source: Own simulations.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Figures
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Figure C.1 – Geographical distribution of broadband availability
across German counties in years 2005, 2007 and 2009. Source: Breit-
bandatlas
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Figure C.2 – Timing of Broadband and Demographic Controls,
2006-2010
Note: Red solid line connects estimated coefficients; blue dashed lines connect upper and lower bounds (95% confidence level). The coefficients are estimated for the inter-
actions of variables (value from 2005) with year dummies. Missing values for some years correspond to omitted interactions.
Source:LIAB
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Figure C.3 – Timing of Broadband and Input/Output Controls,
2006-2010
Note: Red solid line connects estimated coefficients; blue dashed lines connect upper and lower bounds (95% confidence level). The coefficients are estimated for the inter-
actions of variables (value from 2005) with year dummies. Missing values for some years correspond to omitted interactions
Source:LIAB
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Figure C.4 – Timing of Broadband and Demographic Controls,
2000+2006-2010
Note:Red solid line connects estimated coefficients; blue dashed lines connect upper and lower bounds (95% confidence level). The coefficients are estimated for the inter-
actions of variables (value from 2000) with year dummies. Missing values for some years correspond to omitted interactions
Source:LIAB
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Figure C.5 – Timing of Broadband and Input/Output Controls,
2000+2006-2010
Note: Red solid line connects estimated coefficients; blue dashed lines connect upper and lower bounds (95% confidence level). The coefficients are estimated for the inter-
actions of variables (value from 2000) with year dummies. Missing values for some years correspond to omitted interactions
Source:LIAB
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Figure C.6 – Event-Study Illustration
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Graph A. Change in skill premium
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Graph B. Change in routine penalty
routine = 1 (Medium-routinized) routine = 2 (Highly routinized)
ub lb
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Graph C. Change in output elasticity by skill
skill = 1 (Vocational) skill = 2 (University)
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Graph D. Change in output elasticity by routine level
routine = 1 (Medium-routinized) routine = 2 (Highly routinized)
ub lb
ub lb
Note: Red solid lines connect estimated coefficients; blue dashed and dotted lines connect upper and lower bounds (95% confidence level). Year 0 is the year of the largest
increase in broadband availability within a county. Wage and production function regressions are estimated separately for each period (including controls, year, industry,
and county fixed effects). The plotted coefficients correspond to skill premium (Graph A), routine penalty (Graph B), output elasticity of skilled workers (Graph C), and
output elasticity of workers in routine occupations (Graph D). Note: Red solid lines connect estimated coefficients; blue dashed and dotted lines connect upper and lower
bounds (95% confidence level). Year 0 is the year of the largest increase in broadband availability within a county. Wage and production function regressions are estimated
separately for each period (including controls, year, industry, and county fixed effects). The plotted coefficients correspond to skill premium (Graph A), routine penalty
(Graph B), output elasticity of skilled workers (Graph C), and output elasticity of workers in routine occupations (Graph D).
Source:LIAB
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C.2 Tables
Table C.1 – Frequency of Past Unemployment Spells by Skill /
Routine Group
(1) (2)
% Workers with past UE % Workers with past UE
Year = 2006
Low Skilled 7.347 Low Routine 5.702
Medium Skilled 4.021 Medium Routine 5.664
High Skilled 5.121 High Routine 9.949
Year = 2007
Low Skilled 7.459 Low Routine 5.444
Medium Skilled 3.822 Medium Routine 5.626
High Skilled 5.056 High Routine 9.905
Year = 2008
Low Skilled 7.159 Low Routine 5.188
Medium Skilled 3.447 Medium Routine 5.325
High Skilled 4.726 High Routine 9.376
Year = 2009
Low Skilled 6.3372 Low Routine 4.848
Medium Skilled 3.287 Medium Routine 4.965
High Skilled 4.398 High Routine 8.086
Year = 2010
Low Skilled 4.578 Low Routine 3.777
Medium Skilled 3.104 Medium Routine 4.033
High Skilled 3.943 High Routine 5.669
Total
Low Skilled 6.670 Low Routine 5.061
Medium Skilled 3.567 Medium Routine 5.188
High Skilled 4.678 High Routine 8.777
Notes: The table displays the frequency of past unemployment spells by skill level as
well as by job routinization for each year between 2006 and 2010. Source: LIAB.
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Table C.2 – Dynamics of Days in Unemployment by Skill and Rou-
tine Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low-skill Medium-skill High-skill High-routine Medium-routine Low-rotine
2000 25.78 0.27 0.34 34.01 0.66 0.54
2006 12.06 0.41 0.48 15.25 0.75 0.60
2007 9.83 0.40 0.47 12.39 0.75 0.59
2008 9.83 0.37 0.45 13.51 0.65 0.51
2009 13.07 0.36 0.41 18.21 0.58 0.51
2010 8.85 0.45 0.52 11.94 0.69 0.59
Note: LIAB dataset. The table shows average annual number of days in unemployment for low-skill workers and workers
in high-routine occupations (reference groups). Unemployment days for other groups of workers are divided by the values
in the reference group.
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Table C.3 – Variance Decomposition - Broadband Availability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full sample full sample 2006-2010 2006-2010
Total Population 0.0649 -1.409***
(0.130) (0.524)
Population Density 0.0102 0.263
(0.0948) (0.313)
Share of Foreigners -0.0722 4.002***
(0.441) (1.519)
Net Migration 0.00284*** -0.00114
(0.000733) (0.00101)
Employment-to-Population 0.0721*** 0.0177
(0.0205) (0.0241)
Number of Unemployed 0.0630*** -0.0285
(0.0204) (0.0319)
Income per Capita -0.0105 0.614***
(0.0765) (0.184)
Age Structure -0.532** -1.731***
(0.267) (0.553)
Average Revenue per County -0.00182 0.00142
(0.00200) (0.00262)
High Skilled Share per County 0.0127 -0.0318
(0.0574) (0.0709)
Observations 2,408 2,180 1,971 1,835
R2 0.973 0.976 0.795 0.825
FE y kkz y kkz y kkz y kkz
Controls no yes no yes
KKZ 465 396 412 396
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: LIAB dataset. Full sample includes year 2000, when broadband availability was equal 0 in all counties.
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Table C.4 – Results - SBTC: Output Elasticity (2000 + 2006-2010)
Formal Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Number Number Wage bill Wage bill
Low-skill 0.229*** 0.226*** 0.0625*** 0.0621***
(0.0276) (0.0261) (0.0079) (0.00815)
Medium-skill 0.178*** 0.130** 0.0453*** 0.0409***
(0.0552) (0.0586) (0.00705) (0.00781)
High-sill 0.215*** 0.224*** 0.0609*** 0.0619***
(0.0423) (0.0433) (0.00640) (0.00678)
Broadband -0.0267 -0.236* 0.130 -0.0903
(0.116) (0.126) (0.129) (0.134)
L-skill*Broadband -0.0638* -0.0672** -0.0133 -0.0137
(0.0364) (0.0316) (0.00913) (0.00891)
M-skill*Broadband -0.199*** -0.163** -0.00862 -0.00443
(0.0591) (0.0637) (0.00777) (0.00843)
H-skill*Broadband 0.220*** 0.226*** 0.0174** 0.0169**
(0.0483) (0.0489) (0.00712) (0.00734)
Collective 0.672*** 0.682*** 0.674*** 0.686***
(0.0352) (0.0371) (0.0345) (0.0362)
Observations 26,510 24,232 26,510 24,232
R2 0.664 0.667 0.667 0.671
FE y i kkz y i kkz y i kkz y i kkz
HTT no yes no yes
Clusters 446 402 446 402
Routine-Index
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Number Number Wage bill Wage bill
High-routine 0.227*** 0.237*** 0.0609*** 0.0620***
(0.0289) (0.0280) (0.00582) (0.00566)
Medium-routine 0.0630* 0.0655** 0.0270*** 0.0272***
(0.0324) (0.0322) (0.00616) (0.00636)
Low-routine 0.234*** 0.214*** 0.0570*** 0.0556***
(0.0295) (0.0312) (0.00619) (0.00653)
Broadband -0.113 -0.323*** -0.136 -0.311
(0.114) (0.124) (0.130) (0.137)
H-routine*Broadband -0.118*** -0.128*** -0.0109* -0.0120*
(0.0279) (0.0267) (0.00637) (0.00611)
M-routine*Broadband 0.0146 0.00411 0.00415 0.00233
(0.0314) (0.0323) (0.00415) (0.00233)
L-routine*Broadband 0.0530* 0.0758* 0.00939 0.0105
(0.0292) (0.0313) (0.00667) (0.00709)
Collective 0.716*** 0.727*** 0.729*** 0.739***
(0.0365) (0.0384) (0.0359) (0.0380)
Observations 25,510 24,232 25,510 24,232
R2 0.657 0.660 0.659 0.662
FE y i kkz y i kkz y i kkz y i kkz
HTT no yes no yes
Clusters 446 402 446 402
Note: The table presents results of the standard production function estimation. Workers are classified by either formal education or job routinization. All regressions
include year, industry, and county fixed effects. Unreported controls are firm capital stock, its interaction with Broadband, firm age (linear and squared). Specifications 2,
4, 6, 8 control for heterogeneous time trends. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the county level. In the skill regressions, Low ∗Broadband represents
the number (wage bill) of low-skilled workers employed by a firm. In the routine regressions, Low ∗Broadband represents the number (wage bill) of workers employed in
low-routine jobs. The same denotation holds for Medium ∗Broadband and High ∗Broadband.
139
Table C.5 – Results - SBTC: Wage Regressions (2000 + 2006-2010)
Formal Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Uncensored Uncensored Imputed Imputed
Medium-skill 0.0664*** 0.0645*** 0.147*** 0.149***
(0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0121) (0.0123)
High-sill 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.533*** 0.541***
(0.0149) (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0126)
Broadband -0.00215 -0.0155 0.000997 -0.0189
(0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0190)
M-skill*Broadband -0.0435*** -0.0423*** -0.00509 -0.00786
(0.0116) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.0148)
H-skill*Broadband -0.0153 -0.0144 0.0171 0.0101
(0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0156) (0.0138)
Experience 0.204*** 0.202*** 0.162*** 0.161***
(0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0216)
Collective 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.138*** 0.135***
(0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0122)
Female -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.159*** -0.160***
(0.00827) (0.00877) (0.00962) (0.0101)
Observations 1,875,948 1,795,661 2,244,190 2,155,442
R2 0.528 0.522 0.544 0.541
FE y i kkz y i kkz y i kkz y i kkz
HTT no yes no yes
Clusters 459 406 459 406
Routine-Index
(5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Uncensored Uncensored Imputed Imputed
Medium-routine -0.0678*** -0.0711*** -0.190*** -0.199***
(0.00854) (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0129)
High-routine -0.190*** -0.187*** -0.368*** -0.370***
(0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0173)
Broadband -0.00156 -0.00536 0.0190 0.0142
(0.0172) (0.0222) (0.0201) (0.0257)
M-routine*Broadband 0.00240 0.00497 -0.0134 -0.00597
(0.00761) (0.00987) (0.0121) (0.0130)
H-routine*Broadband -0.0244** -0.0287** -0.0567*** -0.0578***
(0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0102) (0.0109)
Experience 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.240*** 0.241***
(0.0212) (0.0220) (0.0211) (0.0217)
Collective 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.152*** 0.148***
(0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0132) (0.0136)
Female -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.157*** -0.158***
(0.00750) (0.00794) (0.0104) (0.0109)
Observations 1,875,948 1,795,661 2,244,190 2,155,442
R2 0.529 0.523 0.505 0.500
FE y i kkz y i kkz y i kkz y i kkz
HTT no yes no yes
Clusters 459 406 459 406
Note: The table presents results of the standard wage regressions. Workers are classified by either formal education or job routinization. All specifications include year,
industry, and county fixed effects. Specifications 2, 4, 6, 8 control for heterogeneous time trends. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the county level.
“Skill”(”Routine”) are indicator variables. We choose Low − skill (Low − routine) as the base category. The reported interaction coefficients reveal how wages of medium-
and high-skill (routine) workers change due to broadband compared to low-skill(routine) workers.
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Table C.6 – Effect of Broadband on Output Elasticities, Event-
Study
Formal Education
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Number Wage bill
Low-skill 0.143*** 0.0452***
(0.0191) (0.00387)
Medium-skill 0.055*** 0.0428***
(0.0305) (0.00386)
High-skill 0.453*** 0.0896***
(0.0317) (0.00369)
After -0.0850* 0.0100
(0.0497) (0.00881)
Low-skill*After 0.0667*** 0.0127*
(0.0158) (0.00405)
Medium-skill*After -0.0977*** 0
(0.0298) (0.00365)
High-skill*After 0.0295 0.00164
(0.0246) (0.00352)
Collective 0.808*** 0.817***
(0.0363) (0.0351)
Constant 10.85*** 10.61***
(0.225) (0.239)
Observations 37,412 37,412
R2 0.591 0.598
FE y i kkz y i kkz
HTT no no
Clusters 408 408
Routine Index
(3) (4)
VARIABLES Number Wage bill
High-routine 0.123*** 0.0501***
(0.0155) (0.00316)
Medium-routine 0.0739*** 0.0323***
(0.0200) (0.00356)
Low-routine 0.316*** 0.0739***
(0.0201) (0.00374)
After -0.0435 -0.0787
(0.0456) (0.0507)
H-routine*After 0.0297** 0.00979***
(0.0147) (0.00313)
M-routine*After 0.0237 0.00575*
(0.0165) (0.00298)
L-routine*After -0.00106 0.00322
(0.0155) (0.00296)
Collective 0.845*** 0.855***
(0.0364) (0.0366)
Constant 10.68*** 10.17***
(0.252) (0.240)
Observations 37,412 37,412
R2 0.582 0.586
FE y i kkz y i kkz
HTT no no
Clusters 408 408
Note: The table presents the results of the standard production function estimation. The dummy variable After is equal
1 for years ≥ the year of the largest growth in broadband availability. All regressions include year, industry, and county
fixed effects. Unreported controls are firm capital stock, its interaction with After, firm age (linear and squared). Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the county level. In the skill regressions Low represents the number (wage
bill) of low-skilled workers employed by a firm. In the routine regressions Low represents the number (wage bill) of
workers employed in low-routine jobs. The same denotation holds for Medium and High. The reported interaction
coefficients reveal how output elasticities of high and medium-skilled (routine) workers change compared to low-skilled
(routine) workers before and after the expansion of broadband.
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Table C.7 – Effect of Broadband on Wages, Event-Study
Formal Education
(1) (2)
VARIABLES uncensored imputed
Medium-skill 0.0467*** 0.153***
(0.0158) (0.0153)
High-skill 0.284*** 0.569***
(0.0101) (0.0146)
After 0.00363 0.0100
(0.00745) (0.00881)
Medium-skill*After 0.0107 0.0174**
(0.00908) (0.00768)
High-skill*After -0.00495 -0.000527
(0.00905) (0.0103)
Experience 0.225*** 0.185***
(0.0190) (0.0188)
Experience2 -0.0190*** 0.00248
(0.00350) (0.00369)
Collective 0.149*** 0.149***
(0.0121) (0.0134)
Female -0.0935*** -0.146***
(0.00848) (0.00962)
Constant 2.926*** 2.903***
(0.0998) (0.109)
Observations 3,988,323 4,777,405
R2 0.492 0.523
FE y i kkz y i kkz
HTT no no
Clusters 465 465
Routine Index
(3) (4)
VARIABLES uncensored imputed
Medium-routine -0.0591*** -0.193***
(0.00702) (0.0156)
High-routine -0.205*** -0.403***
(0.0111) (0.0143)
After 0.0143 0.0278**
(0.00881) (0.0126)
M-routine*After 0.000475 -0.00773
(0.00659) (0.0132)
H-routine*After -0.0306*** -0.0421***
(0.00880) (0.0123)
Experience 0.249*** 0.262***
(0.0190) (0.0178)
Experience2 -0.0263*** -0.0208***
(0.00336) (0.00344)
Collective 0.164*** 0.173***
(0.0128) (0.0151)
Female -0.0978*** -0.150***
(0.00725) (0.00946)
Constant 3.042*** 3.118***
(0.0993) (0.118)
Observations 3,988,323 4,777,405
R2 0.491 0.474
FE y i kkz y i kkz
HTT no no
Clusters 465 465
Note: The table presents the results of the standard wage regressions. The dummy variable After is equal 1 for years ≥
the year of the largest growth in broadband availability. All regressions include year, industry, and county fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the county level. “Skill” (“routine”) are indicator variables. We
choose Low − skill (Low − routine) as the base category. The reported interaction coefficients reveal how wages of high-
and medium-skilled (routine) workers change compared to low-skilled (routine) workers before and after the broadband
expansion.
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Table C.8 – Past Unemployment Penalty, Formal Education
(2000+2006-2010)
XX(1) XX(2) XX(3) XX(4)
Sample: All Workers
Uncensored Imputed
Variable With HTT Without HTT With HTT Without HTT
Past UE -0.2112*** -0.2293*** -0.2184*** -0.2322***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past UE x Broadband 0.0839** 0.0969*** 0.0435 0.0509
(0.020) (0.002) (0.200) (0.103)
R-squared 0.4713 0.4963 0.4010 0.4218
Worker - year Observations 1703865 1875948 2053684 2244190
Sample: High-skilled Workers
Uncensored Imputed
Variable With HTT Without HTT With HTT Without HTT
Past UE -0.1767*** -0.2200*** -0.2409*** -0.2909***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past UE x Broadband 0.1005** 0.1425*** 0.0485 0.0951*
(0.035) (0.002) (0.348) (0.076)
R-squared 0.3545 0.3813 0.3759 0.3835
Worker - year Observations 135423 152902 305872 335092
Sample: Medium-skilled Workers
Uncensored Imputed
Variable With HTT Without HTT With HTT Without HTT
Past UE -0.0874 -0.1058 -0.0715 -0.0968
(0.258) (0.124) (0.363) (0.168)
Past UE x Broadband 0.0119 0.0256 -0.0692 -0.0492
(0.882) (0.718) (0.405) (0.508)
R-squared 0.4115 0.4113 0.4277 0.4278
Worker - year Observations 108575 115991 141179 149733
Sample: Low-skilled Workers
Uncensored Imputed
Variable With HTT Without HTT With HTT Without HTT
Past UE -0.1961*** -0.2129*** -0.1937*** -0.2086***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past UE x Broadband 0.061* 0.0727** 0.0401 0.0501*
(0.068) (0.011) (0.206) (0.070)
R-squared 0.5227 0.5457 0.4852 0.5089
Worker - year Observations 1459867 1607055 1606633 1759365
Notes: The table presents results of the unemployment wage penalty regressions using different sam-
ples. All specifications include year, industry and county fixed effects. Specifications 1 and 3 control
for heterogeneous time trends. P-values in parentheses are computed using standard errors which
are clustered on the county level. “Past UE” is an dummy variable, indicating whether a worker
experienced an unemployment spell during the past five years.
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Table C.9 – Past Unemployment Penalty, Routine Index
(2000+2006-2010)
XX(1) XX(2) XX(3) XX(4)
Sample: All Workers
Uncensored Imputed
Variable With HTT Without HTT With HTT Without HTT
Past UE -0.2112*** -0.2293*** -0.2184*** -0.2322***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past UE x Broadband 0.0839** 0.0969*** 0.0435 0.0509
(0.020) (0.002) (0.200) (0.103)
R-squared 0.4713 0.4963 0.4010 0.4218
Worker - year Observations 1703865 1875948 2053684 2244190
Sample: Low-routine Workers
Uncensored Imputed
Variable With HTT Without HTT With HTT Without HTT
Past UE -0.1905*** -0.2276*** -0.2573*** -0.2920***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past UE x Broadband 0.0906** 0.1239** 0.0800* 0.1097*
(0.030) (0.015) (0.085) (0.064)
R-squared 0.4706 0.5092 0.3756 0.4062
Worker - year Observations 160172 175489 254603 274187
Sample: Medium-routine Workers
Uncensored Imputed
Variable With HTT Without HTT With HTT Without HTT
Past UE -0.2668*** -0.2795*** -0.2620*** -0.2771***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Past UE x Broadband 0.1434*** 0.1513*** 0.1163** 0.1257***
(0.008) (0.001) (0.027) (0.004)
R-squared 0.4608 0.4827 0.4393 0.4556
Worker - year Observations 604533 671548 684540 756025
Sample: High-routine Workers
Uncensored Imputed
Variable With HTT Without HTT With HTT Without HTT
Past UE -0.0894*** -0.1244*** -0.0867*** -0.1207***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Past UE x Broadband -0.0144 0.0189 -0.0223 0.010
(0.634) (0.462) (0.466) (0.697)
R-squared 0.5925 0.6134 0.5766 0.5988
Worker - year Observations 586751 636025 599203 648805
Notes: The table presents results of the unemployment wage penalty regressions using different sam-
ples. All specifications include year, industry and county fixed effects. Specifications 1 and 3 control
for heterogeneous time trends. P-values in parentheses are computed using standard errors which
are clustered on the county level. “Past UE” is an dummy variable, indicating whether a worker
experienced an unemployment spell during the past five years.
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